Quantized Linear Logic,Involutive Quantales and Strong Negation

A new logic, quantized intuitionistic linear logic (QILL), is introduced, and is closely related to the logic which corresponds to Mulvey and Pelletier's (commutative) involutive quantales. Some cut-free sequent calculi with a new property quantization principle and some complete semantics such as an involutive quantale model and a quantale model are obtained for QILL. The relationship between QILL and Wansing's extended intuitionistic linear logic with strong negation is also observed using such syntactical and semantical frameworks.     

《周易》的“生态学”解读——从“还原”的角度

对于《周易》的研究,当代学者已从人文、象数、哲学乃至科学等角度进行解读,并取得了丰硕的成果。事实上,作为"天人之学"的《周易》蕴含了丰富的生态思想,其对生命的重视,对人与自然关系的认定乃至"与天与一"的宇宙观皆凸显了深层的生态关怀。无疑,在环境日益恶化的当下,回归经典寻求智慧不失为一种有益的探索。     

Global Distributive Justice

The paper discusses the problem of global distributive justice. It proposes to distinguish between principles for the domestic and for the global or intersocietal distribution of wealth. It is argued that there may be a plurality of partly diverging domestic conceptions of distributive justice, not all of which need to be liberal egalitarian conceptions. It is maintained, however, that principles regulating the intersocietal distribution of wealth have to be egalitarian principles. This claim is defended against Rawls's argument in The Law of Peoples that egalitarian principles of distributive justice should not be applied globally. Moreover, it is explained in detail, why Rawls's "duty of assistance to burdened societies" cannot be an appropriate substitute for a global principle of distributive justice.     

The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation

The rejection of rhetoric has been a constant theme in Western thought since Plato. The presupposition of such a debasement lies at the foundation of a certain view of Reason that I have called propositionalism, and which is analyzed in this article. The basic tenets of propositionalism are that truth is exclusive, i.e. it does not allow for any alternative, and that there is always only one proposition which must be true, the opposite one being false. Necessity and uniqueness are the ideals of propositionalism. But the question of the necessity of such a necessity is bound to arise. Foundationalism and propositionalism are intrinsically related. Since necessity excludes alternatives, rhetoric, which is based on the possibility of opposite standpoints, is unavoidably devalued as the crippled child of Reason, identical to sophistry or eristic. But propositionalism cannot justify itself and provide a justification for its own foundation without circle or contraditction. Since it responds to the problem of eradicating problems and alternatives through propositional entities, propositionalism is ultimately based on questioning to which it replies in the mode of denial. The unavowed foundation of Reason is therefore the question of questioning, even though this very question is suppressed as propositionalism. The trace of such a question is not only historical, but can also be seen, for instance, in the role played by the principle of contradiction in the constitution of propositional Reason (Artitotle): opposite propositions are not the expression of a problematic situation, they are either possible or successively unique propositions.We want to replace propositionalism by problematology which allows for the conceptualization of alternatives, thereby rendering a true rhetoric possible. Argumentation cannot then be equated with eristic any more, as propositionalism maintained.Rationality must be seen as having questioning as its true starting-point. Reason must be rhetorical if it is to survive the death of propositionalism which took place after the radical criticisms of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Even if it is still hard ffor philosophers and rhetoricians to think within another framework and even though they prefer endlessly to deconstauct the old one instead of changing it, problematology is bound to impose itself as the new voice for rationality, because Reason has always endeavored to solve problems. Propositionalism has been only one way of conceiving problems, based on the view that solutions could be but the suppression of questioning.     

东西方医学伦理思维之共通性

从中国古代医者的行医事迹、著作来探寻中国的医者是否在行医过程当中勤守医者的本份,也即类似原则思维的表现。虽然中国古代并没有"医学伦理"这个名词,但从历代具有代表性之医者身上发现,其实在中国古代医者的行医事迹当中,就表现出类似的医学伦理情操。因之,医学伦理原则是俱普世价值的,也即世界上有所谓的共同道德存在。     

伦理与道德之间－以“道理”说文为视角

“道”、“理”二字使道理、道德和伦理三个不同的基本范畴的关系变得耐人寻味,“道”与“理”合一相成即“道理”,道理和道德以“道”为“同源”,道理和伦理以“理”为“同源”,道德和伦理分有“道理”的“养分”,二者“同源共生异长”,长成各自独特的内涵,成为伦理学中两个最基本、最重要的范畴。     

Priming productive study strategies with preparatory quizzes in an engineering course

One approach to encourage productive study strategies is to incorporate preparatory quizzes (or pre‐quizzes) in which students are required to submit answers to questions before the underlying material is covered in class. In the present study, students took an introductory mechanical engineering class that either included pre‐quizzes (treatment group) or did not (control group). Students in the treatment group visited the online textbook more often and earlier in advance of deadlines, indicating better management of their study time—behaviors that have been shown to be productive study strategies. They also performed better in the course, indicating that techniques intended to prime productive study strategies can pay off. Finally, measures of productive learning strategies correlated with measures of course performance for both groups. These findings support the pretesting principle, which holds that students study more effectively and learn better when they take practice tests before a lesson.     

归纳推理心理效应的研究

归纳推理心理效应指的是归纳论断中各种因素对个体做出归纳结论时把握性（力度）大小的影响,根据影响因素的不同,主要可分为类别效应、属性效应和交互效应三种。文章认为,个体通常会采用分割－综合方式判断归纳力度大小,并且在归纳判断中形成的推理序列及由此造成的顺畅感直接影响着归纳力度的估计,作者还提出了对此模型的一种证明     

The relevance of Rawls' principle of justice for research on cognitively impaired patients

An ethical conflict arises when we must performresearch in the interest of future patients,but that this may occasionally injure theinterests of today's patients.In the case of cognitively impaired persons, thequestion arises whether it is compatible withhumane healthcare not only to treat, but alsoto use these patients for research purposes.Some bioethicists and theologians haveformulated a general duty of solidarity, alsopertaining to cognitively impaired persons, as ajustification for research on these persons. Ifone examines this thesis from the theory ofjustice according to John Rawls, it is revealedthat such a duty of solidarity cannotnecessarily be extrapolated from Rawls'conception of justice. This is at least true ofRawls' difference principle, because accordingto the difference principle only those measuresare justifiable which serve the interest of therespective least well off. Those measures whichwould engender additional injury for the leastwell off could not be balanced by any utilityaccording to Rawls.However, John Rawls' difference principleis subordinate to the first principle,which is that each person has an equalright to the most extensive basic libertycompatible with the same liberty for others.These primary goods are determined by thefreedom and integrity of the person.This integrity of decisionally impaired personswould be in danger if one would abstain fromresearch and thus forego the increase inknowledge related to their disease. Thus onecould conclude, at least from Rawls' firstprinciple, that society must take on a duty toguarantee the degrees of freedom forcognitively impaired persons and thus alsosupport the efforts for their healing.     

“Hands up Who Wants to Die?”: Primoratz on Responsibility and Civilian Immunity in Wartime

The question of the morality of war is something of an embarrassment to liberal political thinkers. A philosophical tradition which aspires to found its preferred institutions in respect for individual autonomy, contract, and voluntary association, is naturally confronted by a phenomenon that is almost exclusively explained and justified in the language of States, force and territory. But the apparent difficulties involved in providing a convincing account of nature and ethics of war in terms of relations between individuals has not prevented liberal theorists from attempting this task. This paper examines a recent attempt by Igor Primoratz to sketch out the implications of a consistent liberalism for just war doctrine and, in particular, as regards the question of who may be a legitimate target of attack in wartime. Primoratz’s paper itself is a critique of Michael Waltzer’s authoritative exposition of just war theory for failing to be sufficiently and consistently liberal. The debate between these two authors is a productive site for investigating the potential and limitations of liberal theories of just war.