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121.
Mavis Biss 《Metaphilosophy》2016,47(4-5):558-570
To a greater extent than other theorists, Claudia Card in her analysis of moral luck considers the impact of attempts to transform moral meanings on the development of the agent's character and her responsibilities, over time and in relation to other agents. This essay argues that this wider frame of reference captures more of what is at stake in the efforts of those who resist oppression by attempting to implement radically revised meanings. 相似文献
122.
Fernando Broncano‐Berrocal 《Metaphilosophy》2015,46(1):1-25
This essay explains the notion of luck in terms of risk. It starts by distinguishing two senses of risk, the risk that an event has of occurring and the risk at which an agent is with respect to an event. It cashes out the former in modal terms (rather than probabilistic) and the latter in terms of lack of control. It then argues that the presence or absence of event‐relative risk marks a distinction between two types of luck or fortune commonly overlooked in ordinary usage of the terms “luck” and “fortune.” After offering a detailed account of the notion of control, the essay advances a new version of the so‐called lack of control account of luck: lucky events are events with respect to which one is at risk and hence events over which one lacks control in the specified way. Finally, it argues that its account steers clear of counterexamples to the lack of control account of luck. 相似文献
123.
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2015,45(2):220-241
Pluralist egalitarians think that luck and relational egalitarianism each articulates a component in a pluralist account of egalitarian justice. However, this ecumenical view appears problematic in the light of Elizabeth Anderson's claim that the divide arises because two incompatible views of justification are in play, which in turn generates derivative disagreements – e.g. about the proper currency of egalitarian justice. In support of pluralist egalitarianism I argue that two of Anderson's derivative disagreements are not rooted in the disagreement over justification she identifies, and that the disagreement over justification cuts across standard disagreements between luck and relational egalitarian justice. 相似文献
124.
Joe Milburn 《Metaphilosophy》2014,45(4-5):578-593
In recent years, philosophers have tended to think of luck as being a relation between an event (taken in the broadest sense of the term) and a subject; to give an account of luck is to fill in the right‐hand side of the following biconditional: an event e is lucky for a subject S if and only if ____. We can call such accounts of luck subject‐relative accounts of luck, since they attempt to spell out what it is for an event to be lucky relative to a subject. This essay argues that we should understand subject‐relative luck as a secondary phenomenon. What is of philosophical interest is giving an account of subject‐involving luck, i.e., filling in the right‐hand side of this biconditional: it is a matter of luck that S ?s iff ____. The essay argues that one of the upshots of focusing on subject‐involving luck is that lack of control accounts of luck (LCALs) become more attractive. In particular, a range of counterexamples to LCALs of subject‐relative luck do not apply to LCALs of subject‐involving luck. 相似文献
125.
Daniel M. Rempala Ryan T. Tolman Bradley M. Okdie Dohyun Ahn 《Asian Journal of Social Psychology》2014,17(4):325-330
We examined whether gender‐role egalitarianism predicted participants' rank‐order preferences for traits in potential marriage partners of the opposite sex, and whether gender‐role egalitarianism mediated cultural differences between participants from North America, Polynesia and East Asia. Participants completed the Sex‐Role Egalitarianism Scale and ranked the following traits in terms of their importance in choosing a potential marriage partner: kindness, physical attractiveness, social level, athleticism, creativity and liveliness. Parallel analyses for male and female participants reveal that traditional males value physical attractiveness more than egalitarian males, and that traditional females value social level more and kindness less than egalitarian females. Gender‐role egalitarianism fully mediated the effect of culture on kindness rankings, but no others. These results expand upon previous findings by accounting for individual differences regarding beliefs about traditional gender roles. 相似文献
126.
新兴生物增强技术通过低投入、高效益的方式显著提升个体能力,但其依赖支付能力的获取机制可能加剧社会不平等。学界提出的三种治理方案：“全有或全无的平等”存在价值失衡与可行性缺陷;“增强补贴”难以有效缩小群体差异;“补贴叠加禁止”补贴弱势与限制优势并举,但其依赖的运气平等主义隐含“向下拉平”的伦理风险。以关系平等主义为核心框架的治理思路,反对压迫性社会关系,聚焦能力差异是否引发政治支配与社会排斥。其治理路径要求国家应通过普惠性补贴等方式促进技术普及,同时监管通用能力差异的临界范围,避免其导致压迫性社会关系。
相似文献127.
Heather C. Lench Darren Domsky Rachel Smallman Kathleen E. Darbor 《British journal of psychology (London, England : 1953)》2015,106(2):272-287
Belief in moral luck is represented in judgements that offenders should be held accountable for intent to cause harm as well as whether or not harm occurred. Scores on a measure of moral luck beliefs predicted judgements of offenders who varied in intent and the outcomes of their actions, although judgements overall were not consistent with abstract beliefs in moral luck. Prompting participants to consider alternative outcomes, particularly worse outcomes, reduced moral luck beliefs. Findings suggest that some people believe that offenders should be punished based on the outcome of their actions. Furthermore, prompting counterfactuals decreased judgements consistent with moral luck beliefs. The results have implications for theories of moral judgement as well as legal decision making. 相似文献
128.
E. J. Coffman 《Metaphilosophy》2014,45(4-5):477-508
This essay aims to reorient current theorizing about luck as an aid to our discerning this concept's true philosophical significance. After introducing the literature's leading theories of luck, it presents and defends counterexamples to each of them. It then argues that recent luck theorists’ main target of analysis—the concept of an event's being lucky for a subject—is parasitic on the more fundamental notion of an event's being a stroke of luck for a subject, which thesis serves as at least a partial diagnosis of the leading theories’ failure. Next, it develops an analysis of strokes of luck that utilizes insights from the recent luck literature. Finally, having set out a comprehensive new analysis of luck—the Enriched Strokes Account of lucky events—the essay revisits the initial counterexamples to the literature's leading theories and argues that the Enriched Strokes Account properly handles all of them. 相似文献
129.
Alfred R. Mele 《Metaphilosophy》2014,45(4-5):543-557
This essay sketches a problem about luck for typical incompatibilist views of free will posed in Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck (2006), and examines recent reactions to that problem. Reactions featuring appeals to agent causation receive special attention. Because the problem is focused on decision making, the control that agents have over what they decide is a central topic. Other topics discussed include the nature of lucky action and differences between directly and indirectly free actions. 相似文献
130.
Lee John Whittington 《Metaphilosophy》2014,45(4-5):654-667
Moral luck, until recently, has been understood either explicitly or implicitly through using a lack of control account of luck. For example, a case of resultant moral luck is a case where an agent is morally blameworthy or more morally blameworthy or praiseworthy for an outcome despite that outcome being significantly beyond that agent's control (Nagel 1993). Due to a shift in understanding the concept of luck itself in terms of modal robustness, however, other accounts of moral luck have surfaced. Both Duncan Pritchard (2006) and Julia Driver (2013) have offered an alternative way of understanding moral luck by employing versions of a modal account of luck. This essay considers some problems with these accounts and attempts to resolve them. 相似文献