Clinical cut‐off point for the Distrust dimension of the Dimensional Clinical Personality Inventory 2 (IDCP‐2)

The Clinical Dimensional Personality Inventory 2 (IDCP ‐2) is a 206‐item self‐report tool developed for the assessment of 12 dimensions (divided into 47 factors) of personality pathology. One of the scales comprising the instrument, the Distrust scale, is intended to provide psychometric information on traits closely related to the Paranoid Personality Disorder (PPD ). In the present research, we used the Item Response Theory and the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve analysis to establish a clinical meaningful cutoff for the Distrust scale. Participants were 1,679 adults, among outpatients diagnosed with PPD , outpatients diagnosed with other PD s, and adults from the community. The Wright map revealed that outpatients were located at the very high levels on the latent continuum of the Distrust scale, with a very large effect size for the mean difference between patients and non‐patients. The ROC curve supported a cutoff at −1.00 score in theta standardization which yielded 0.87 of sensitivity and 0.54 of specificity. Findings from the present investigation suggest the IDCP ‐2 Distrust scale is useful as a screening tool of the core features of the PPD . We address potential clinical applications for the instrument and discuss limitations from the present study.     

NON‐RELATIVE REASONS AND HUMEAN THOUGHT: IF WHAT IS A REASON FOR YOU IS A REASON FOR ME,WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THE HUMEAN?

Abstract: A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non‐relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason‐giving consideration and show that the non‐relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason‐giving considerations are generalizable. I then consider the relationship between the generalizability thesis and the Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. I argue that, contrary to a common assumption, there is a subtle and clearly motivated version of the Humean thesis that does not deny, and so is not threatened by, the generalizability thesis.     

Make‐or‐Break: Chasing Risky Goals or Settling for Safe Rewards?

Humans regularly pursue activities characterized by dramatic success or failure outcomes where, critically, the chances of success depend on the time invested working toward it. How should people allocate time between such make‐or‐break challenges and safe alternatives, where rewards are more predictable (e.g., linear) functions of performance? We present a formal framework for studying time allocation between these two types of activities, and we explore optimal behavior in both one‐shot and dynamic versions of the problem. In the one‐shot version, we illustrate striking discontinuities in the optimal time allocation policy as we gradually change the parameters of the decision‐making problem. In the dynamic version, we formulate the optimal strategy—defined by a giving‐up threshold—which adaptively dictates when people should stop pursuing the make‐or‐break goal. We then show that this strategy is computationally inaccessible for humans, and we explore boundedly rational alternatives. We compare the performance of the optimal model against (a) a myopic giving‐up threshold that is easier to compute, and even simpler heuristic strategies that either (b) only decide whether or not to start pursuing the goal and never give up or (c) consider giving up at a fixed number of control points. Comparing strategies across environments, we investigate the cost and behavioral implications of sidestepping the computational burden of full rationality.     

Risky behavior in young adult pedestrians: Personality determinants,correlates with risk perception,and gender differences

Based on the risk homeostasis theory, the aim of this study was to assess acceptable risk, measured by personality factors, and risk perception, measured by physiological arousal, as predictors of risky behavior in young adult pedestrians, as well as to assess for gender differences. Eighty-two young adults, aged 18–30, completed self-report measures about risky pedestrian behaviors and these personality traits: impulsiveness, conscientiousness and openness to experience. Sixty-four of these participants then took part in an experimental task designed to assess their perception of the level of risk in situations involving different interactions between cars and pedestrians. Risk perception was assessed by these physiological responses: heart rate, skin conductance level, and skin conductance response. Results showed that risky behavior had significant correlations with impulsiveness, conscientiousness, and skin conductance level. Gender differences also emerged in risky behavior, impulsiveness, conscientiousness, and skin conductance level. Finally, a structural equation model showed that impulsiveness, conscientiousness and the difference in skin conductance level between risky and neutral situations predicted risky pedestrian behaviors, and explained 23.6% of the its variance, after controlling the effect of gender. Implications for evaluation, prevention, and intervention for risky pedestrian behaviors are discussed.     

Degree of Language Experience Modulates Visual Attention to Visible Speech and Iconic Gestures During Clear and Degraded Speech Comprehension

Visual information conveyed by iconic hand gestures and visible speech can enhance speech comprehension under adverse listening conditions for both native and non‐native listeners. However, how a listener allocates visual attention to these articulators during speech comprehension is unknown. We used eye‐tracking to investigate whether and how native and highly proficient non‐native listeners of Dutch allocated overt eye gaze to visible speech and gestures during clear and degraded speech comprehension. Participants watched video clips of an actress uttering a clear or degraded (6‐band noise‐vocoded) action verb while performing a gesture or not, and were asked to indicate the word they heard in a cued‐recall task. Gestural enhancement was the largest (i.e., a relative reduction in reaction time cost) when speech was degraded for all listeners, but it was stronger for native listeners. Both native and non‐native listeners mostly gazed at the face during comprehension, but non‐native listeners gazed more often at gestures than native listeners. However, only native but not non‐native listeners' gaze allocation to gestures predicted gestural benefit during degraded speech comprehension. We conclude that non‐native listeners might gaze at gesture more as it might be more challenging for non‐native listeners to resolve the degraded auditory cues and couple those cues to phonological information that is conveyed by visible speech. This diminished phonological knowledge might hinder the use of semantic information that is conveyed by gestures for non‐native compared to native listeners. Our results demonstrate that the degree of language experience impacts overt visual attention to visual articulators, resulting in different visual benefits for native versus non‐native listeners.     

On Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science

In his enormously influential The Modularity of Mind, Jerry Fodor (1983) proposed that the mind was divided into input modules and central processes. Much subsequent research focused on the modules and whether processes like speech perception or spatial vision are truly modular. Much less attention has been given to Fodor's writing on the central processes, what would today be called higher‐level cognition. In “Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science,” he argued that central processes are “bad candidates for scientific study” and would resist attempts at empirical analysis. This essay evaluates his argument for this remarkable claim, concluding that although central processes may well be “messier” than input modules, this does not mean that they cannot be studied and understood. The article briefly reviews the scientific progress made in understanding central processes in the 35 years since the book was published, showing that Fodor's prediction is clearly falsified by massive advances in topics like decision making and analogy. The essay concludes that Fodor's Law was not based on a clear argument for why the complexities of central systems could not be studied but was likely based on intuitions and preferences that were common in psychology at the time.     

A Review and Meta‐Analysis Examining Conceptual and Operational Definitions of Problematic Internet Use

This study examined different conceptual and operational definitions of problematic Internet use (PIU). 3 perspectives of PIU are described along with a meta‐analytic review (K = 112) conducted to explore the implications stemming from how PIU is measured. The results offer evidence to support the construct validity of measures developed from the impulse control disorder and relationship resource deficits traditions but raise questions about substance dependence measures of PIU. Additionally, there were small but noteworthy differences in the associations between PIU and key antecedents and outcomes that could be attributed to PIU measurement tradition. Suggestions for developing a more robust body of scholarship on PIU are offered.     

How Ethical is Islamic Banking in the Light of the Objectives of Islamic Law?

Islamic banking is based on moral foundations that make it distinct from conventional banking. Some argue that because of its foundation in Islam, Islamic banking may represent a more morally appealing alternative. Yet, evidence shows that this is not the case. Indeed, the current practice of Islamic banking has not been able to achieve its goals which are based on Islam's moral values: to enhance justice, equitability, and social well‐being. This essay examines the extent to which Islamic banking is ethical and concludes that the practice of the industry does not seem to be de facto ethical from the Islamic perspective of ethical values. It only consists in trading the same instruments of conventional banks without genuinely enforcing Islam's ethical vision. The practice of Islamic banking misrepresents Islam and does not contribute to solving social problems. The interaction between maqasid al‐shari?a (objectives of Islamic law) and qiyās (deductive analogy) provides a supplementary tool for interpreting the failure of the prior in terms of the practical misuse of the latter by Islamic banks. This essay provides an interpretive approach to the current debate about why Islamic banking has failed and suggests ways to move cautiously in the future.