On a Neg‐Raising Fallacy in Determining Enthymematicity: If She Did not Believe or Want …

Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg‐raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not‐p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency to equivocate in arguments for the enthymematicity of arguments (e.g., Lewis Carroll's paradox, Hume's problem) as well as in arguments for the enthymematicity of action explanations (e.g., arguments for psychologism and for explanatory individualism). The article concludes with a warning, because the equivocation is often helpful in teaching and because neg‐raising verbs include philosophically vital verbs: desire, want, intend, think, suppose, imagine, expect, feel, seem, appear.     

The Epistemic Regress Problem,the Problem of the Criterion,and the Value of Reasons

There are important similarities between the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Each turns on plausible principles stating that epistemic reasons must be supported by epistemic reasons but that having reasons is impossible if that requires having endless regresses of reasons. These principles are incompatible with the possibility of reasons, so each problem is a paradox. Whether there can be an antiskeptical solution to these paradoxes depends upon the kinds of reasons that we need in order to attain our epistemic goals. This article explains the problems and considers the ways in which two different conceptions of human flourishing support the value of different kinds of reasons. One conception requires reasons that allow an easy solution to these paradoxes. The other—rational autonomy—requires reasons that depend upon endless regresses. So we cannot have the kinds of fully transparent reasons required for rational autonomy.     

素食的心理过程及影响因素

随着人们对健康、环境以及动物保护的关注, 素食主义日渐兴起。国内外对素食的心理学研究仍处于起步阶段。个体选择素食的心理过程涉及认知、情感、动机、认同感等方面, 素食行为受到个体差异、刻板印象、宏观因素的影响。未来研究有待深入探讨社会文化对素食行为的影响、中国文化情境下对素与素食的社会表征、素食的具身认知效应以及素食亚文化的动态形成过程, 以期引导对个体健康与环境有益的饮食模式。     

Denoting and Disquoting

Fregeans hold that predicates denote things, albeit things different in kind from what singular terms denote. This leads to a familiar problem: it seems impossible to say what any given predicate denotes. One strategy for avoiding this problem reduces the Fregean position to form of nominalism. I develop an alternative strategy that lets the Fregean hold on to the view that predicate denote things by reconceiving the nature of singular denotation and of Fregean objects.     

Choosing Between Lotteries: Remarkable Coordination Without Communication

The current research examines tacit coordination behavior in a lottery selection task. Two hundred participants in each of three experiments and 100 in a fourth choose to participate in one of two lotteries, where one lottery has a larger prize than the other. Independent of variations in the complexity of the mechanism of prize allocation, the prize amounts, and whether the lottery is the participant's first or second choice, we typically find that the percentage of participants who choose the high versus low‐prize lotteries does not significantly differ from the equilibrium predictions. This coordination is achieved without communication or experience. We additionally find that participants with an analytical thinking style and a risk‐averse tendency are more likely to choose the low‐prize lottery over the high‐prize lottery. This tendency seems to be stable across choices. The pattern of our results suggests that to achieve tacit coordination, having a subset of individuals who attend to the choices of others is sufficient. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lottery attractiveness and presentation mode of probability and value information

The attractiveness of lotteries that vary in p (probability) and o (outcome) depends on the presentation mode of p and o information. Extending previous findings on temporally experienced p, we manipulate the numerically stated versus spatially experienced format of both p (graphical presentation of a distribution of lottery tickets in an urn) and o (distribution of money notes). Lottery attractiveness ratings were sensitive to the expected value (EV), but p received more weight than o at constant EV levels (p‐dominance). Both EV sensitivity and p‐dominance were enhanced for experienced p and numerical o. This format particularly revealed the unattractiveness of low‐p lotteries. Experiencing p was functional in terms of accuracy and high‐risk avoidance, but only when the task environments rendered p diagnostic of EV. The presentation mode manipulations did not affect the initial perception stage but the relative weighting of p and o in the final judgment integration stage. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Obstacles facing the psychoanalyst when interpreting narcissistic pathologies: Characteristics of the authoritarian patient

This paper explores the unconscious agreements between patient and analyst that promote some aspects of conflict to be excluded from the content of the interpretations. This generates an experience of exerting omnipotent control over the analyst, which subsequently consolidates a narcissistic phantasy. A stagnation of the analytic process is established in the course of the analysis but this remains hidden by areas of partial progress in the patient. Clinical material is provided in order to show the vicissitudes of the interrelationship between patient and analyst. It also demonstrates the working through by the analyst of a situation of both transferential and countertransferential conflict. This leads to an inhibition on the part of the analyst in his interpreting function. The use of projective identifications, which are mutually contradictory and incompatible, is also under discussion. This, as a result of being expressed simultaneously, constitutes a paradox, which may lead the analyst to confusion and an experience of paralysis. The subsequent confusional anxieties are considered. Additionally, authoritarianism is discussed, including its attendant difficulties of establishing boundaries between the self and the object. Finally, under consideration is the risk one takes in formulating authoritarian interpretations, which, in certain cases, can impose criteria on the patient.     

Helmut Reich's Proposal

A form of logic called relational and contextual reasoning is put forward as an improvement over other, more familiar types of logic. Developmental ideas are used to show how maturity ordinarily leads people away from binary (true/false) logic to systems of reasoning that are more subtle and better suited to making decisions in the face of ambiguity.