BION'S “EVIDENCE” AND HIS THEORETICAL STYLE

The author discusses “Evidence” (1976), a brief but very intense and fascinating paper in which Bion provides a unique opportunity to see him at work in his clinical practice. In the story of a patient, Bion reconstructs two sessions that are all the more true for being imaginary—i.e., narrated (“dreamed”). The matter of language and style in psychoanalysis is of the utmost importance, according to Bion—one could say, literally, a matter of life or death. In Bion's discourse, writing, reading, and analysis converge in the same place, the author notes; all are significant if they involve an experience of truth and the ability to learn from experience.     

The Need for Absolute Truth and Self-Rumination as Basic Suppressors in the Relationship Between Private Self-Consciousness and Mental Health

Self-reflection has not so far been shown to have any specific benefits for mental health except for self-knowledge. Recent research showed that the controversy concerning the relationship between self-reflection and mental health could completely be eliminated if self-rumination and the need for absolute truth, especially the need for absolute truth, were considered as suppressor variables. This research replicated these findings in a different sample and expanded these findings by showing that the same is true for private self-consciousness. The need for absolute truth as a new variable was shown to be highly important in understanding the effects of self-consciousness on mental health.     

Self‐absorption paradox is not a paradox: Illuminating the dark side of self‐reflection

Although considered an important component of a healthy personality, self‐reflection has not so far been shown to have any specific benefits for mental health. This research addresses this issue by taking into consideration two important suppressor variables, self‐rumination and the need for absolute truth. The latter is an innovative variable, defined and presented in this research. The first two studies aimed to validate a new measure that acts as an operational definition of the need for absolute truth. The first study was conducted with two group of participants; the first group consisted of 129 females and 67 males, mean age = 20 years, and the second 182 females and 104 males, mean age = 27. In the second study, participants were 22 females and 18 males, mean age = 20.5. In the final study, conducted with 296 female, 163 male participants (mean age = 37), suppressor effects were tested using structural equation modeling. The results showed that by taking account of these two suppressor variables, particularly the need for absolute truth, the expected relationship between self‐reflection and mental health was revealed. The need for absolute truth was shown to be crucial for understanding the effects of self‐reflection on mental health, therefore it should be considered in all processes of psychotherapy.     

Dispositions and the Argument from Science

Central to the debate between Humean and anti-Humean metaphysics is the question of whether dispositions can exist in the absence of categorical properties that ground them (that is, where the causal burden is shifted on to categorical properties on which the dispositions would therefore supervene). Dispositional essentialists claim that they can; categoricalists reject the possibility of such ‘baseless’ dispositions, requiring that all dispositions must ultimately have categorical bases. One popular argument, recently dubbed the ‘Argument from Science’, has appeared in one or another form over much of the last century and purports to win the day for the dispositional essentialist. Taking its cue from physical theory, the Argument from Science treats the exclusively dispositional characterizations of the fundamental particles one finds in physical theory as providing a key premise in what has been called a ‘decisive’ argument for baseless dispositions. Despite sharing the intuition that dispositions can be baseless, I argue that the force and significance of the Argument from Science have been greatly overestimated: no version of the argument is close to decisive, and only one version succeeds in scoring points against the categoricalist. Not only is physical theory more ontologically innocent than defenders of baseless dispositions seem to appreciate, most versions of the Argument from Science neglect important ways that dispositions could be grounded by categorical properties.     

Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes

One of the many ways that ‘deflationary’ and ‘inflationary’ theories of truth are said to differ is in their attitude towards truth qua property. This difference used to be very easy to delineate, with deflationists denying, and inflationists asserting, that truth is a property, but more recently the debate has become a lot more complicated, owing primarily to the fact that many contemporary deflationists often do allow for truth to be considered a property. Anxious to avoid inflation, however, these deflationists are at pains to point out that the truth property, on their view, is not a property of any significant interest. Correspondingly, inflationists have seen this as an opportunity to refine what kind of property they think truth is, which—according to them—moves their views beyond deflationism. The upshot of this is that there are number of different accounts in the literature of what distinguishes an inflationary truth property from a deflationary one, or—as it is sometimes put—what distinguishes a ‘substantive’ property from an ‘insubstantive’ one. This has made it hard to pin down exactly what is at issue at the metaphysical level between deflationists and inflationists, which makes it increasingly hard to see how debates between them are properly phrased. Given that these positions represent the two central attitudes towards truth in contemporary debates, this makes for a serious obstacle for the project of discerning the correct theory of truth. The aim of this paper is to discern the best way to distinguish between substantive and insubstantive properties, and thus to restore some focus to these debates. I argue that the three central distinctions in the literature fail, and offer what I take to be a more promising distinction in terms of a graded distinction between abundant and sparse properties.     

The use of child drawings to explore the dual↔group analytic field in child analysis

Awareness that the child is part of a complex relational system has ensured that all child analysts agree on the necessity of establishing a therapeutic alliance with the parents. Unconscious conflictual dynamics involve the child analyst and include him, from the time of the initial consultation, in an analytic field that is closer to that of a group than to the bi‐personal set‐up of therapy with adults. Through a clinical example, the author hypothesizes that the child’s drawings and play can be viewed as tools capable of mapping the unconscious emotions present in an analytic field that extends beyond the analyst–child couple. Play and drawings can be used in the relationship with the parents not in an explanatory sense, but as a probe with which to explore the universe of unconscious emotions present in the group field. The images or the story of the play used with this particular modality prove to be an attractive pathway that is effective in facilitating the alpha function of each of the members of the group. Furthermore, in this sense, they create the conditions for an occasion through which the parents can become more aware of their own unconscious emotions that have been entrusted to the child and expressed through his symptomatology. The possibility for the little group of subjects involved in a child analysis for oscillation in a dual–group field permits not only a shared experience of knowledge, but also a shared creativity aimed at knowledge of emotional truth (O).     

Scientific Realism and the Meanings of Theoretical Terms

In contemporary philosophy of science, there are many interesting arguments for and against scientific realism with regard to the meaningfulness and truthfulness of theoretical statements. Some anti-realists hold that since many important concepts in scientific theories have no specific referents, the relevant theoretical statements are therefore either false or meaningless. In this essay, I join the debates concerning the plausibility of scientific realism by focusing on two intertwined issues： first, that of how we can we explicate the meaningfulness of theoretical statements, especially statements pertaining to unobservable objects, and second, that of the meaningfulness of theoretical statements for our acceptance of scientific realism.     

The Embrace of Radical Philosophical Emptiness as a Liberating Conceptualization of Thought in Roland Barthes and Jean Baudrillard

Among the challenges of poststructuralist thought has been the demand that we acknowledge a kind of philosophical emptiness which many feel accompanies the perceived decline in foundationalist thought. By looking more closely at Barthes and Baudrillard＇s writing on meaning, writing, language, truth, and the real, we can come to a better understanding of the emergence and implications of the poststructural challenge. The paper argues that Barthes＇ and Baudrillard＇s writing on these five key concepts can lead us to a more liberating conception of thought and contribute to our individual effort to become more challenging thinkers. This paper also （unavoidably） points to several points of convergence and divergence between Barthes and Baudrillard.     

The distinctive “should” of assertability

Recent work has assumed that the normativity associated with assertion differs from the normativity of morality, practical rationality, etiquette, and legality. That is, whether an assertion “should” be made is not merely a function of these other familiar sorts of normativity and is especially connected to truth. Some researchers have challenged this assumption of distinctive normativity. In this paper I report two experiments that test the assumption. Participants read a brief story, judged whether an assertion should be made, and rated several other qualities of the assertion, including its truth value, morality, rationality, etiquette, legality, and folly. Of these qualities, truth value most strongly predicted assertability. The findings support the assumption of distinctive normativity and provide further evidence that the norm of our social practice of assertion is factive (i.e., it makes truth essential to assertability).     

AN ARCHIMEDEAN POINT FOR PHILOSOPHY

Abstract: According to an orthodox account of meaning and translation, meaning is a property of expressions of a language, and translation is a matching of synonymous expressions across languages. This linguistic account of translation gives rise to well‐known skeptical conclusions about translation, objectivity, meaning, and truth, but it does not conform to our best translational practices. In contrast, I argue for a textual account of meaning based on the concept of a text‐type that does conform to our best translational practices. With their semantic function in view, text‐types are Archimedean points for their respective disciplines. The text‐type of philosophy is no exception. Culture‐transcendent conceptual analysis can proceed on firm footing without having to deny the reality of radical cultural and linguistic difference by treating components of text‐types as the concepts to be analyzed. Analyses of central philosophical concepts are provided as a means of adjudicating philosophical controversy.