Lax monitoring versus logical intuition: The determinants of confidence in conjunction fallacy

The general assumption that people fail to notice discrepancy between their answer and the normative answer in the conjunction fallacy task has been challenged by the theory of Logical Intuition. This theory suggests that people can detect the conflict between the heuristic and normative answers even if they do not always manage to inhibit their intuitive choice. This theory gained support from the finding that people report lower levels of confidence in their choice after they commit the conjunction fallacy compared to when their answer is not in conflict with logic. In four experiments we asked the participants to give probability estimations to the options of the conflict and no-conflict versions of the tasks in the original set-up of the experiment or in a three-option design. We found that participants perceive probabilities for the options of the conflict version less similar than for the no-conflict version. As people are less confident when choosing between more similar options, this similarity difference is proposed to serve as a mediator in the task in a way that the conflict and no-conflict conditions have their effects on confidence ratings through manipulating the similarity of the answer options.     

后经验主义时代的理论心理学

随着经验实证主义的衰落,心理学迎来了后经验主义时代。在后经验主义时代,人们对理论和经验观察的关系有了新的理解。理论不再是经验观察的附属物,相反,经验事实是被理论决定的。理论不是经验事实的概括和归纳,而是一种文化历史的建构。后经验主义时代的理论心理学以库恩的范式论、现象学、释义学和社会建构论作为自己的哲学基础。理论的评价标准不再是与经验事实的一致性。因为经验事实由于受到理论的污染,不再是一种客观的标准。在后经验主义条件下,理论的评价标准可建立在概念和逻辑、价值观和意识形态、修辞与叙事以及实践和应用的水平上     

THE CONSEQUENCES OF METAPHYSICS: OR,CAN CHARLES PEIRCE'S CONTINUITY THEORY MODEL STUART KAUFFMAN'S BIOLOGY?

At the heart of the most radical proposals in Stuart Kauffman's Investigations is his attempt to show that we find in evolutionary biology some configuration spaces—the sets of possible developments for any given system—that (unlike those in traditional physics of Newtonian, relativistic, and quantum stripes) cannot be completely described in advance. We bring Charles Peirce's work on the philosophy of continuity to bear on the problem and discover, first, that Kauffman's arguments do not succeed; second, that Peirce's metaphysics provide new and sounder arguments for the same propositions; third, that Peirce's rigorous but nonstandard treatment of mathematical continuity shows great promise for modeling the unpredictability and growth we find in evolutionary biology; fourth, that it also strengthens a development only hinted at by biologists thus far—the inevitable involvement of the observer's mind in constituting the objects of science. We close with a logical argument for the surprising relevance of metaphysical hypotheses in the natural sciences and with suggestions for future work that will connect these questions to what Kauffman terms the “narrative stance” in biology.     

The Tense Logic for Master Argument in Prior’s Reconstruction

In this paper we examine Prior’s reconstruction of Master Argument [4] in some modal-tense logic. This logic consists of a purely tense part and Diodorean definitions of modal alethic operators. Next we study this tense logic in the pure tense language. It is the logic K _t 4 plus a new axiom (P): ‘p Λ G p ⊃ P G p’. This formula was used by Prior in his original analysis of Master Argument. (P) is usually added as an extra axiom to an axiomatization of the logic of linear time. In that case the set of moments is a total order and must be left-discrete without the least moment. However, the logic of Master Argument does not require linear time. We show what properties of the set of moments are exactly forced by (P) in the reconstruction of Prior. We make also some philosophical remarks on the analyzed reconstruction. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Logical information and epistemic space

Gaining information can be modelled as a narrowing of epistemic space. Intuitively, becoming informed that such-and-such is the case rules out certain scenarios or would-be possibilities. Chalmers’s account of epistemic space treats it as a space of a priori possibility and so has trouble in dealing with the information which we intuitively feel can be gained from logical inference. I propose a more inclusive notion of epistemic space, based on Priest’s notion of open worlds yet which contains only those epistemic scenarios which are not obviously impossible. Whether something is obvious is not always a determinate matter and so the resulting picture is of an epistemic space with fuzzy boundaries.     

Introduction: Special Issue on Spirituality and Adult Development, Part I

This article describes the purpose of the 3-part Special Issue on Spirituality and Adult Development, and the contents of Part I. Developing individuals express their belief that spirituality plays a key role in their development, yet developmental psychologists have given comparatively little attention to this factor. The concept of spirituality is seldom considered separately from that of religion. The purpose of this Special Issue is to begin to remedy this neglect. This introduction is a summary of the 6 empirical and theoretical articles that form Part I.     

用“逻辑陷阱”实现测谎功能的方法和数学证明

在心理测验过程中,有些受试者往往会说谎,作假答案,导致测验结果失真。本文使用逻辑推理的理论,探讨了在测验量表中设置“逻辑陷阱”来捕捉说谎者的方法。详细论述“逻辑陷阱”的测谎原理、设计方法。并给出具体推理过程的数学描述和证明。     

CONCEIVABILITY AND MODAL KNOWLEDGE

Abstract: This article is a discussion of Hume's maxim Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. First I explain this maxim and distinguish it from the principle Whatever cannot be imagined (conceived), is impossible. Next I argue that Thomas Reid's criticism of the maxim fails and that the arguments by Tamar Szábo Gendler and John Hawthorne for the claim that “it is uncontroversial that there are cases where we are misled” by the maxim are unconvincing. Finally I state the limited but real value of the maxim: it does help us, in certain cases, reliably to make up our minds. Along the way I show that Reid, his criticism of the maxim notwithstanding, actually employs it, and I furthermore argue that the principle What is inconceivable, is impossible is spurious.     

Public, Social, and Individual Perspectives on Religious Education. Voices from the Past and the Present

Inspired by Charles Taylor’s recent quest for the meaning of religion today, this article concentrates on the question of the meaning of religious education (RE) today. The focus is not so much on the ‘what’ but instead more on the ‘where’ (the locus) and the ‘how’ (the function) of RE. The view on what is held to be a pedagogically tenable position regarding RE is build up by methodologically using a differentiated practical–theological three-course model that distinguishes between the public, the social and the private domain. Developments and tendencies within the three domains are shown in respect with religion as such and RE in particular. It is made clear what this may mean for religious educators and philosophers of religious education today, who conceptualize religious education as an impossible possibility. Miedema is full professor of Educational Foundations, Endowed professor of Christian Education in and Dean of the Faculty of Psychology and Education, and full professor of Religious Education in the Faculty of Theology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands. His research is focusing now on pragmatism, history of education, the philosophy of religious education, and early childhood education.     

儒家伦理讨论中的六大概念问题

关于儒家伦理问题的讨论一直是中国哲学史界与伦理学界的一个热门话题,许多学者都抱着真挚的热情与善良的意愿努力开掘儒家传统伦理思想中的精微意蕴,并力图为现实生活与社会提供某种可资借鉴的范本。应当说其中的不少工作都有着深刻的理论价值和一定的现实意义,但也不能不看到,在讨论中有不少关涉核心问题的概念显得比较模糊甚或混乱,主要有伦理与德性、实践与思想、当然与可能、大众与精英、他律与自律、早期(先秦)儒家与后期(宋明)儒家等。对这些不同的概念做一辨析和梳理,将有利于关于儒家伦理问题的讨论在更深入和更精确的层面上进行。