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31.
A plausible and popular rule governing the scope of truth-functional logic is shown to be indequate. The argument appeals to the existence of truth-functional paraphrases which are logically independent of their natural language counterparts. A more adequate rule is proposed. 相似文献
32.
In Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski (Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 25, 1996, pp. 617–677), Greg Ray defends Tarski"s account of logical consequence against the criticisms of John Etchemendy. While Ray"s defense of Tarski is largely successful, his attempt to give a general proof that Tarskian consequence preserves truth fails. Analysis of this failure shows that de facto truth preservation is a very weak criterion of adequacy for a theory of logical consequence and should be replaced by a stronger absence-of-counterexamples criterion. It is argued that the latter criterion reflects the modal character of our intuitive concept of logical consequence, and it is shown that Tarskian consequence can be proved to satisfy this criterion for certain choices of logical constants. Finally, an apparent inconsistency in Ray"s interpretation of Tarski"s position on the modal status of the consequence relation is noted. 相似文献
33.
Roger Cotterrell 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2000,3(1):9-26
How are general relations of law and morality typically conceived in an environment of Anglo-saxon common law? This paper considers some classical common law methods and traditions as these have confronted and been overlaid with modern ideas of legal positivism. While classical common law treated a community and its morality as the cultural foundation of law, legal positivism's analytical separation of law and morals, allied with liberal approaches to legal regulation, have made the relationship of legal and moral principles more complex and contested. Using ideas from Durkheim's and Weber's sociology, I argue that the traditional common law emphasis on an inductive, empirical treatment of moral practices has continuing merit, but in contemporary conditions the vague idea of community embedded in classical common law thought must be replaced with a much more precise conceptualisation of coexisting communities, whose moral bonds are diverse and require a corresponding diversity of forms of legal recognition or protection. 相似文献
34.
35.
Gilbert Plumer 《Argumentation》2001,15(2):173-189
The nontechnical ability to identify or match argumentative structure seems to be an important reasoning skill. Instruments that have questions designed to measure this skill include major standardized tests for graduate school admission, for example, the United States-Canadian Law School Admission Test (LSAT), the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE), and the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT). Writers and reviewers of such tests need an appropriate foundation for developing such questions – they need a proper representation of phenomenological argumentative structure – for legitimacy, and because these tests affect people's lives. This paper attempts to construct an adequate and appropriate representation of such structure, that is, the logical structure that an argument is perceived to have by mature reasoners, albeit ones who are untrained in logic. 相似文献
36.
James B. Freeman 《Argumentation》2001,15(4):397-423
Many in the informal logic tradition distinguish convergent from linked argument structure. The pragma-dialectical tradition distinguishes multiple from co-ordinatively compound argumentation. Although these two distinctions may appear to coincide, constituting only a terminological difference, we argue that they are distinct, indeed expressing different disciplinary perspectives on argumentation. From a logical point of view, where the primary evaluative issue concerns sufficient strength of support, the unit of analysis is the individual argument, the particular premises put forward to support a given conclusion. Structure is internal to this unit. From a dialectical point of view, where the focus concerns how well a critical discussion comes to a reasoned conclusion of some disputed question, the argumentation need not constitute a single unit of argument. The unit of dialectical analysis will be the entire argumentation made up of these several arguments. The multiple/co-ordinatively compound distinction is dialectical, while the linked/convergent distinction is logical. Keeping these two pairs of distinctions separate allows us to see certain attempts to characterize convergent versus linked arguments as rather characterizing multiple versus co-ordinatively compound arguments, in particular attempts of Thomas, Nolt, and Yanal, and to resolve straightforwardly conflicts, tensions, or anomalies in their accounts. Walton's preferred Suspension/Insufficient Proof test to identify linked argument structure correctly identifies co-ordinatively compound structure. His objection to using the concept of relevance to explicate the distinction between linked and convergent structure within co-ordinatively compound argumentation can be met through explicating relevance in terms of inference licenses. His counterexample to the Suspension/No Support test for identifying linked structure which this approach supports can itself be straightforwardly dealt with when the test is explicated through inference licenses. 相似文献
37.
Dale Jacquette 《Argumentation》2007,21(4):335-347
This essay proposes and defends a general thesis concerning the nature of fallacies of reasoning. These in distinctive ways
are all said to be deductively invalid. More importantly, the most accurate, complete and charitable reconstructions of these
species and specimens of the informal fallacies are instructive with respect to the individual character of each distinct
informal fallacy. Reconstructions of the fallacies as deductive invalidities are possible in every case, if deductivism is
true, which means that in every case they should be formalizable in an expressively comprehensive formal symbolic deductive
logic. The general thesis is illustrated by a detailed examination of Walter Burleigh's paradox in his c. 1323 work, De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior (Longer Treatise on the Purity of Logic), as a challenge to the deductive validity of hypothetical syllogism. The paradox has the form, ‹If I call you a swine, then
I call you an animal; if I call you an animal, then I speak truly; therefore, if I call you a swine, then I speak truly'.
Several solutions to the problem are considered, and the inference is exposed as an instance of the common deductive fallacy
of equivocation. 相似文献
38.
Maurice A. Finocchiaro 《Argumentation》2007,21(3):253-268
Krabbe (2003, in F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 641–644) defined a metadialogue as a dialogue about one or more dialogues, and a ground-level dialogue
as a dialogue that is not a metadialogue. Similarly, I define a meta-argument as an argument about one or more arguments,
and a ground-level argument as one which is not a meta-argument. Krabbe (1995, in F.H van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 333–344) showed that formal-fallacy criticism (and more generally, fallacy criticism) consists of
metadialogues, and that such metadialogues can be profiled in ways that lead to their proper termination or resolution. I
reconstruct Krabbe’s metadialogical account into monolectical, meta-argumentative terminology by describing three-types of
meta-arguments corresponding to the three ways of proving formal invalidity he studied: the trivial logic-indifferent method;
the method of counterexample situation; and the method of formal paraphrase. A fourth type of meta-argument corresponds to
what Oliver (1967, Mind
76, 463–478), Govier (1985, Informal Logic
7, 27–33), and Copi (1986) call refutation by logical analogy. A fifth type of meta-argument represents my reconstruction of
arguments by parity of reasoning studied by Woods and Hudak (1989, Informal Logic
11, 125–139). Other particular meta-arguments deserving future study are Hume’s critique of the argument from design in the
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and Mill’s initial argument in The Subjection of Women about the importance of established custom and general feeling vis-à-vis argumentation. 相似文献
39.
Si Sun 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(1):115-130
“The Strong Programme” is put forward as a metaphysical theory of sociology by the Edinburgh School (SSK) to study the social causes of knowledge. Barry Barnes and David Bloor are the proponents of the School. They call their programme “the Relativist View of Knowledge” and argue against rationalism in the philosophy of science. Does their relativist account of knowledge present a serious challenge to rationalism, which has dominated 20th century philosophy of science? I attempt to answer this question by criticizing the main ideas of SSK and defending rationalism theories in modern philosophy of science. 相似文献
40.
以活动为认知对象的逻辑还没有系统地建立。本文我们采用半无穷方法、自代入方法、固定点方法和拟赋值方法全面建立这样的逻辑,从而研究知道一个活动的各种逻辑特性。根据这些方法,我们分别提出四类刻画知道一个活动的逻辑系统和相应的语义,然后证明这些系统相对各自的语义是可靠和完全的。 相似文献