From Logos to Pathos in Social Psychology and Academic Argumentation: Reconciling Postmodernism and Positivism in a Sociology of Persuasion

This paper argues that one can empirically test, via positivist methods, the post-modern attack on positivist epistemologies: Postmodern perspectives hold Knowledge and Truth to be intersubjective, consensus-driven social constructions. But traditional scientific approaches to knowledge, exemplified here by the cognitive social psychology of persuasion, seem oblivious to this and continue to detach the study of attitudes, beliefs, and emotions from that of knowledge, facts, and reason. Abandoning these artificial distinctions in both epistemology and method would enable this social psychology, reconstituted as a Sociology of Persuasion, to contribute greatly to illuminating the processes of Truth and Knowledge construction in social interaction. Moreover, this would facilitate academic engagement in civic discourse.     

Change mechanisms in cognitive therapy of a simple phobia: Logical analysis and empirical hypothesis testing

The effectiveness of two hypothesized change mechanisms in cognitive therapy was investigated: logical analysis and empirical hypothesis testing. Thirty-eight spider phobics, as determined by performance on a behavioral avoidance test, were randomly assigned to either one of these two conditions or to a no-treatment control condition. Subjects participated in three group sessions. Outcome phobia questionnaire data suggested that both mechanisms produced desirable changes in a short period of time, with stronger evidence that logical analysis was superior to the control. Outcome from the behavior avoidance test and self-efficacy ratings failed to reach statistical significance but the trends were in the direction of positive change. Results are discussed in terms of the tripartite response dessynchrony hypothesis. Suggestions for future process research in cognitive therapy are provided.William O'Donohue, Ph.D., is an assistant professor of psychology at Northern Illinois University.Jeff Szymanski is a graduate student in clinical psychology at Northern Illinois University.The authors would like to thank Christine Casselles, Melissa McKelvie, Thomas M. Brown, Jill C. Rudman, Bonnie Schrieber, Amy Ray, Anne Valle, Lisa Herold, Jacqueline Ryan, Heather Barta, and Angela Leek for their assistance in this project. Moreover, the authors are grateful to Sol Feldman and Jane Fisher for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Ernest Becker and the Psychology of Worldviews

Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski offer experimental confirmation for Ernest Becker's claim that the fear of death is a powerful unconscious motive producing polarized worldviews and scapegoating. Their suggestion that their findings also prove Sigmund Freud's theory of repression, with worldviews as its irrational products, is questionable, although Becker's own statements about worldviews as "illusions" seem to invite such interpretation. Their basic theory does not depend on this, however, and abandoning it would enable them to take better advantage of their finding that worldviews incorporating the values of rationality and tolerance tend to counteract polarization effects.     

Does the Traditional Treatment of Enthymemes Rest on a Mistake?

In many actual arguments, the conclusion seems intuitively to follow from the premisses, even though we cannot show that it follows logically. The traditional approach to evaluating such arguments is to suppose that they have an unstated premiss whose explicit addition will produce an argument where the conclusion does follow logically. But there are good reasons for doubting that people so frequently leave the premisses of their arguments unstated. The inclination to suppose that they do stems from the belief that the only way in which an argument's conclusion can follow definitely from its premisses is to follow logically. I argue that this belief is mistaken. I propose a revision of the current generic conception of logical consequence, and its variant specifications, to avoid the paradoxes of strict implication. The revised conception can then be naturally extended to include also what we might call 'enthymematic consequence'. This concept is a kind of consequence, whose properties merit investigation.     

V.A. Smirnov’s Results in the Field of Modern Formal Logic

This paper is a survey of V.A. Smirnovs main results in modern logic.     

Construction of the World: Ontology in the Tractatus

Why does Wittgenstein say in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that the world has as its members only facts, not things? Focusing on this question, I start with the problem, in its general form, “How is it possible to determine something as X?” and establish the excluding-allowing model for determination. From this model, I derive an argument for Wittgenstein’s aforementioned statement. The argument shows that a whole cannot be determined as consisting of components that are determined separately in a strong sense, whereas in a weak sense it can be. This thus demonstrates why the context principle holds. The recommended interpretation places suitable weight on the Tractarian notion of possibility. It provides new insights into Wittgenstein’s conception of logic, and his atomism about facts and states of affairs.     

FINDING THE SOMETHING IN NOTHING

Formless Infinity: Clinical Explorations of Matte Blanco and Bion. By Riccardo Lombardi. Translated by Karen Christenfeld, Gina Atkinson, Andrea Sabbadini, and Philip Slotkin. London/New York: Routledge, 2016. 282 pp.     

Cartographic systems and non-linguistic inference

It is often assumed that the capability to make inferences requires language. Against this assumption, I claim that inferential abilities do not necessarily require a language. On the contrary, certain cartographic systems could be used to explain some forms of inferences, and they are capable of warranting rational relations between contents they represent. By arguing that certain maps, as well as sentences, are adequate for inferential processes, I do not mean to neglect that there are important differences between maps and sentences. Instead, the purpose of this paper is to highlight interesting distinctions that might affect the way that cartographic thinking works.     

Grounding Rights in Social Practices: A Defence

This paper defends a social practiceconception of moral rights possession againstwhat many of its critics take to be a decisiveobjection, namely that such a conceptionprevents us from using moral rights forcritical purposes.