范畴三段论推理中信念偏差效应的实验研究

本研究利用三段论评价任务,分析了已有信念与三段论逻辑状态间的交互影响,探讨了三段论推理判断中信念偏差的存在与作用机制,同时从信念偏差角度对心理模型理论进行了初步验证。结果发现：1．范畴三段论推理的逻辑判断过程中存在信念偏差效应;2．信念偏差效应以逻辑状态与结论可信性交互作用的方式存在;3当逻辑结果与信念相一致时,信念会促进逻辑反应,反之则妨碍逻辑反应;4．信念偏差效应对逻辑有效、结论不可信的单模型三段论问题影响最大,而对逻辑有效、结论不可信的多模型三段论问题相对影响最小。     

“亚当·斯密问题”的逻辑张力

“亚当·斯密问题”是指斯密的《国富论》与《道德情操论》之间存在着对立或不一致的问题,最初由十九世纪中叶的德国历史学派所提出。此后,随着现实与理论的发展,出现了不同的看法。学者们普遍认为,斯密的两大著作之间、经济学与伦理学之间存在着对立或者不存在对立,而是相互一致的。这些看法都具有各自的积极合理的内容,但缺乏辩证的观点,而没有看到“斯密问题”自身的逻辑张力,也就是说,“斯密问题”所指涉的是现实的经济与伦理之间及作为其理论表现的经济学与伦理学之间的关系。“斯密问题”所含的这些关系呈现出了一个动态的、由肯定到否定再到否定之否定的辩证过程。     

Probabilities,causation, and logic programming in conditional reasoning: reply to Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2016)

Oaksford and Chater (2014 Oaksford, M., &; Chater, N. (2014). Probabilistic single function dual process theory and logic programming as approaches to non-monotonicity in human vs. artificial reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning, 20, 269–295. doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.877401[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], Thinking and Reasoning, 20, 269–295) critiqued the logic programming (LP) approach to nonmonotonicity and proposed that a Bayesian probabilistic approach to conditional reasoning provided a more empirically adequate theory. The current paper is a reply to Stenning and van Lambalgen's rejoinder to this earlier paper entitled ‘Logic programming, probability, and two-system accounts of reasoning: a rejoinder to Oaksford and Chater’ (2016) in Thinking and Reasoning. It is argued that causation is basic in human cognition and that explaining how abnormality lists are created in LP requires causal models. Each specific rejoinder to the original critique is then addressed. While many areas of agreement are identified, with respect to the key differences, it is concluded the current evidence favours the Bayesian approach, at least for the moment.     

四卡问题解决中的内容与逻辑分析效应

选取条件概率(P(Q|P))由低到高的四个命题作为四卡问题中的检验规则,探讨了大学生被试对四张卡片的逻辑证明作用的推断能力及其对解决四卡问题的影响。结果发现:(1)不同条件概率的命题之间正确选择P-Q的人数百分比不存在显著差异,命题的条件概率因素对四卡问题的正确解决没有影响。(2)逻辑分析过程对四卡问题的正确解决产生了一定的抑制作用,这可能是因为被试不能从整体上思考四张卡片在命题检验中的逻辑作用的缘故。(3)一些被试即使在逻辑分析过程中表现出知道-Q卡片的证伪作用,仍然倾向于选择卡片Q而非-Q,这一现象再次证实了人类思维的非形式逻辑的一面。     

QUESTIONING SCIENTIFIC FAITH IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The late nineteenth century was not only a time in which religious faith was questioned in light of increasing claims of natural science. It is more accurate to see the familiar Victorian crisis of faith as but one aspect of a larger historical phenomenon, one in which the methods of both religion and science came under scrutiny. Among several examinations of the status of scientific knowledge in the waning decades of the century, the treatment of the subject by the German theologian Wilhelm Herrmann and philosopher Hans Vaihinger rejected its objective nature and denied that either scientists or theologians had access to the truth of nature. Although this stance regarding the nature of science, religion, and their relationship was limited to intellectuals in German society at the time, it foreshadowed developments in our own day in which the traditional search for truth has been problematized.     

Subjective Situations and Logical Omniscience

The beliefs of the agents in a multi-agent system have been formally modelled in the last decades using doxastic logics. The possible worlds model and its associated Kripke semantics provide an intuitive semantics for these logics, but they commit us to model agents that are logically omniscient. We propose a way of avoiding this problem, using a new kind of entities called subjective situations. We define a new doxastic logic based on these entities and we show how the belief operators have some desirable properties, while avoiding logical omniscience. A comparison with two well-known proposals (Levesque's logic of explicit and implicit beliefs and Thijsse's hybrid sieve systems) is also provided.     

Empirical Propositions and the Change of Language-Games

People unavoidably provide reasons for their words and deeds when reasoning in a language-game.Wittgenstein thinks that when people in different language-games argue with one other,they insist on adopting a doubtful attitude toward the reasons provided by the other side.His use of the term "language-game" here is a metaphor,and implies that people in different cultures can scarcely reason with one another.Indeed,according to Wittgenstein's consideration of concepts of logic in On Certainty,language-games are incompatible with one another because their internal logic and reasons are different from each other.However,in his discussion of empirical propositions Wittgenstein has also shown us the possibility that the intemal reasons of one language-game can transmit beyond its own borders and be valid in another language-game.     

INTERPRETING PUTNAM'S DIALECTICAL METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY

Abstract: Hilary Putnam's philosophical views have undergone extensive interpretation over many years. One such interpretive work is George Myerson's book Rhetoric, Reason and Society. Myerson's interest in dialogic rationalism leads him to examine the views of many theorists of rationality, philosophers and nonphilosophers alike. As a prominent philosopher of rationality, Putnam is at the very center of this examination. Notwithstanding this fact, I contend that Myerson misinterprets the dialectical character of Putnam's philosophy in general and of Putnam's views on rationality in particular. This misinterpretation, I argue, is revealing of an illusion of thought to which Myerson is subject, an illusion that makes it seem that it is possible to theorize intelligibly about rationality from a metaphysical standpoint. This same illusion, I claim, also makes it seem that Myerson's positive views on rationality are intelligible. Employing a close textual analysis of Myerson's book, I argue that neither scenario is the case.     

A philosophical reflection on the epistemology and methodology of indigenous psychologies

In order to answer the three crucial questions (why, what and how) about the development of indigenous psychology, three levels of breakthrough need to be made, namely, philosophical reflection, theoretical construction and empirical research. The controversial issues that have occurred in the earlier development of indigenous psychology are analyzed in terms of the switch in Western philosophy of science from positivism to post-positivism. Based on this analysis, it is argued that indigenous psychologists should construct formal theories illustrating the functioning of the human mind that may be applicable to various cultures, and then use these theories to study the particular mentalities of people in a given culture with the scientific methods of empirical research.     

Characterizing Simpler Recognizable Sets of Integers

For a given numeration system U, a set X of integers is said to be U-star-free if the language of the normalized U-representations of the elements in X is star-free. Adapting a result of McNaughton and Papert, we give a first-order logical characterization of these sets for various numeration systems including integer base systems and the Fibonacci system. For k-ary systems, the problem of the base dependence of this property is also studied. Finally, the case of k-adic systems is developed.