Is our Universe Deterministic? Some Philosophical and Theological Reflections on an Elusive Topic

Abstract. The question of whether or not our universe is deterministic remains of interest to both scientists and theologians. In this essay I argue that this question can be solved only by metaphysical decision and that no scientific evidence for either determinism or indeterminism will ever be conclusive. No finite being, no matter how powerful its cognitive abilities, will ever be able to establish the deterministic nature of the universe. The only being that would be capable of doing so would be one that is at once transcendent and immanent. Such a being is compatible with the God of the Christian tradition, which yields that a deterministic worldview is compatible with (yet does not necessarily lead to) a deterministic worldview. A more important point is that because science is never able to establish the determinism of our universe, it can never definitely rule out divine action except on metaphysical grounds.     

Logical, Semantic and Cultural Paradoxes

The property common to three kinds of paradoxes (logical, semantic, and cultural) is the underlying presence of an exclusive disjunction: even when it is put to a check by the paradox, it is still invoked at the level of implicit discourse. Hence the argumentative strength of paradoxical propositions is derived. Logical paradoxes (insolubilia) always involve two contradictory, mutually exclusive, truths. One truth is always perceived to the detriment of the other, in accordance with a succession which is endlessly repetitive. A check is put on the principle of the excluded middle by the logical paradoxes, because self-reference leads to an endlessly repeating circle, out of which no resolution is conceivable. Logical paradoxes are to be compared with the `objective ambiguity' prevalent in oracles (Gallet, 1990). Semantic paradoxes are contextually-determined occurrences, whose resolution at the metalinguistic level is made possible by the discovery of a middle term. They express a wilful ambiguity, in which the interlocutor is invited to take an active part in the construction of sense, since what must be found is the unexpected sense thanks to which A and not-A can be asserted simultaneously. Cultural paradoxes play about doxa (`common sense') and openly challenge common opinion because of their character as inopinata (`unexpected'). My aim is to show that even cultural paradoxes hide sometimes a flaw of argumentation similar to logical or semantic paradox; they too imply an exclusive disjunction leading to the disappearance of the middle terms. Finally, basing myself on the theory of topoi (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1983), a tentative resolution of the cultural paradoxes will be suggested.     

Informative Aboutness

Pretheoretically, (B) ‘all believers are immortal’ is about all believers, but (1) B is not about any unbeliever. Similarly, (M) ‘all mortals are unbelievers’ is not about any immortal, but (2) M is about all mortals. But B and M are logically equivalent universal generalizations, so arguably they are about exactly the same objects; by (2), they are about those mortals who are unbelievers, contradicting (1). If one responds by giving up (1), is there still a sense in which B treats unbelievers differently from believers? I argue that there is. B is uninformative about unbelievers but informative about believers, in the following sense: for any object o, the information that B provides only about o—namely, ‘o is a believer only if o is immortal’—is entailed (and thus rendered redundant) by ‘o is an unbeliever’ but not by ‘o is a believer’.     

Dummett and Frege on sense and Selbständigkeit

As part of his attack on Frege’s ‘myth’ that senses reside in the third realm, Dummett alleges that Frege’s view that all objects are selbständig (‘self-subsistent’, ‘independent’) is an underlying mistake, since some objects depend upon others. Whatever the merits of Dummett’s other arguments against Frege’s conception of sense, this objection fails. First, Frege’s view that senses are third-realm entities is not traceable to his view that all objects are selbständig. Second, while Frege recognizes that there are objects that are dependent upon other objects, he does not take this to compromise the Selbständigkeit of any objects. Thus, Frege’s doctrine that objects are selbständig does not make the claim of absolute independence that Dummett appears to have taken it to make. Nevertheless, in order to make a good case against Frege based on the dependency of senses, Dummett need only establish his claim that senses depend upon expressions: appeal to an absolute conception of independence is unnecessary. However, Dummett’s arguments for the dependency of senses upon expressions are unsuccessful and they show that Dummett’s conception of what it is to be an expression also differs significantly from Frege’s.     

追求积极情绪可能导致消极后果及其机制探讨

近年来有关研究发现了追求积极情绪可能给个体带来消极后果, 即个体越追求积极情绪, 他们很可能越体验不到幸福, 并称之为“追求积极情绪的悖论”。当个体把追求积极情绪作为目标时, 可能会(1)为个人的快乐设定过高的标准; (2)通过不恰当的活动去获得快乐; (3)监控获得快乐的过程, 妨碍了沉浸体验。这三个心理过程导致了“追求积极情绪的悖论”。未来的研究应该进一步关注：(1)全面揭示追求积极情绪的后果; (2)揭示追求积极情绪导致消极后果的生理神经机制; (3)追求积极情绪的跨文化研究; (4)探索正确追求积极情绪的方式。     

Three Abductive Solutions to the Meno Paradox – with Instinct, Inference, and Distributed Cognition

This article analyzes three approaches to resolving the classical Meno paradox, or its variant, the learning paradox, emphasizing Charles S. Peirce’s notion of abduction. Abduction provides a way of dissecting those processes where something new, or conceptually more complex than before, is discovered or learned. In its basic form, abduction is a “weak” form of inference, i.e., it gives only tentative suggestions for further investigation. But it is not too weak if various sources of clues and restrictions on the abductive search are taken into account. We present three, complementary versions of abduction: (1) as a sort of guessing instinct or expert-like intuition, where unconscious clues are important; (2) as a form of inference, where a strategic point of view is essential; and (3) as a part of distributed cognition and mediated activity, where the interaction with the material, social, and cultural environment is emphasized. Our starting point is Peirce’s own notion of abduction, but we broaden the perspective, especially to the direction of distributed cognition.     

A Process Interpretation of Daoist Thought

Despite the fact that the Dao De Jing道德經 is one of the mos frequently translated texts in history,most of these translations share certain unexamined and problematic assumptions which often make it seem as though the text is irrational,incoherent,and full of non sequiturs.Frequently,these assumptions involve the imposition of historically anachronous,linguistically unsound,and philosophically problematic categories and attitudes onto the text.One of the main causes of the problem is the persistent tendency on the part of most translators to read the first line of the text as referring to or implying the existence of some kind of "eternal Dao." These are what I term "ontological "readings,as opposed to the "process" reading I will be articulating here.     

Sub-Optimal Choice by Pigeons: Failure to Support The Allais Paradox

Pigeons show a preference for an alternative that provides them with discriminative stimuli (sometimes a stimulus that predicts reinforcement and at other times a stimulus that predicts the absence of reinforcement) over an alternative that provides them with nondiscriminative stimuli, even if the nondiscriminative stimulus alternative is associated with 2.5 times as much reinforcement (Stagner & Zentall, 2010). In Experiment 1 we found that the delay to reinforcement associated with the nondiscriminative stimuli could be reduced by almost one half before the pigeons were indifferent between the two alternatives. In Experiment 2 we tested the hypothesis that the preference for the discriminative stimulus alternative resulted from the fact that, like humans, the pigeons were attracted by the stimulus that consistently predicted reinforcement (the Allais paradox). When the probability of reinforcement associated with the discriminative stimulus that predicted reinforcement was reduced from 100% to 80% the pigeons still showed a strong preference for the discriminative stimulus alternative. Thus, under these conditions, the Allais paradox cannot account for the sub-optimal choice behavior shown by pigeons. Instead we propose that sub-optimal choice results from positive contrast between the low expectation of reinforcement associated with the discriminative stimulus alternative and the much higher obtained reinforcement when the stimulus associated with reinforcement appears. We propose that similar processes can account for sub-optimal gambling behavior by humans.     

Vicissitudes in adult life resulting from traumatic experiences in adolescence1

The author deals with the diffi culties in combining the concepts of trauma and phantasy. He evaluates Freudian observations relating to chance and trauma. He considers traumatic effects of chance in relation to the rupture of a narcissistic phantasy of invulnerability. The narrating of traumatic events may awaken in the analyst tendencies to repeat the aggression of these traumatic events towards the subject. The accusatory interpretation can be one of the means by which this repetition is established. The author explores a type of trauma which is essentially related to the disturbance of the structure which contains the ideals of the subject. This disturbance is a consequence of disillusionment resulting from the loss of an object who was the depository of these ideals. Trauma generates a state of mourning for lost ideals. The author describes traumatic events which occurred in a patient's life at puberty; paradoxical behaviours in the patient's parents caused the patient to have new traumas. The reluctance to explore the derivatives of the unconscious, and to investigate possible meaning in symbols, was a central problem in this patient's analysis. The author discusses disturbances in symbolization, and he examines the subject of projective identifi cations that were received by patients from their primary objects.     

四卡问题解决中的匹配偏向再探

选取经典的四卡问题作为实验材料,深入探讨了“综合考虑证真证伪作用”的提示以及逻辑分析过程对被试解决四卡问题不能产生促进效应的原因。结果发现:(1)多数被试能对卡片P和-Q进行正确的逻辑推断,但是最后却仍然倾向于选择卡片Q而非-Q,这种错误并非是由于附加的认知任务使得被试的短时记忆容量超载所致。(2)元音偶数组与元音非偶数组的被试对四张卡片作出正确逻辑推断的人数百分比基本一致,但是后者选择P-Q的人数百分比却显著高于前者,这表明多数被试似乎并不依据逻辑分析的结果及其命题检验的规则来作出选择,而是采用匹配策略,错误地选择了Q卡片。