What is <Emphasis Type="Italic">the</Emphasis> Logic of Inference?

The topic of this paper is the question whether there is a logic which could be justly called the logic of inference. It may seem that at least since Prawitz, Dummett and others demonstrated the proof-theoretical prominency of intuitionistic logic, the forthcoming answer is that it is this logic that is the obvious choice for the accolade. Though there is little doubt that this choice is correct (provided that inference is construed as inherently single-conclusion and complying with the Gentzenian structural rules), I do not think that the usual justification of it is satisfactory. Therefore, I will first try to clarify what exactly is meant by the question, and then sketch a conceptual framework in which it can be reasonably handled. I will introduce the concept of ‘inferentially native’ logical operators (those which explicate inferential properties) and I will show that the axiomatization of these operators leads to the axiomatic system of intuitionistic logic. Finally, I will discuss what modifications of this answer enter the picture when more general notions of inference are considered. Presented by Hannes Leitgeb     

Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision.

In the companion paper (Towards a “sophisticated” model of belief dynamics. Part I), a general framework for realistic modelling of instantaneous states of belief and of the operations involving them was presented and motivated. In this paper, the framework is applied to the case of belief revision. A model of belief revision shall be obtained which, firstly, recovers the Gärdenfors postulates in a well-specified, natural yet simple class of particular circumstances; secondly, can accommodate iterated revisions, recovering several proposed revision operators for iterated revision as special cases; and finally, offers an analysis of Rott’s recent counterexample to several Gärdenfors postulates [32], elucidating in what sense it fails to be one of the special cases to which these postulates apply.     

关于医学哲学逻辑起点的思考——兼与刘虹教授商榷

人的生命存在在医学哲学理论体系中具有最抽象、最简单、最根本的规定性。医学哲学的其它概念都是人的生命存在的逻辑展开和转化。同时,人的生命存在是人的健康的先决条件,而健康只是人的生命存在的一种样态。因之,医学哲学应以人的生命存在作为其逻辑起点。     

An application of bi‐logical theory to the study of psychic change and mourning4

The authors propose that the process of psychic change involves the ‘working through’ of mourning for the loss of ‘theories of life’ that are based on narcissistic omnipotent beliefs. These theories need to be changed by other more realistic ones regarding how to resolve the inherent and natural problems of existence. Questioning the ‘truth’ of these theories of life, as well as the acquisition of the perception of the existence of time, makes up part of the process referred to, and this applies to the analyst in a certain way as much as to the patient. Such problems are lived, re‐edited and revised in the transference/countertransference relationship. The authors present a clinical illustration. They explore the concepts of symmetry, asymmetry, homogenization and differentiation in MatteBlanco's bi‐logical theory and propose that these are important to the comprehension of the dynamic of the psychic changes which occur in a non‐static analytic process.     

道教哲学的思想主题与逻辑建构

本文力求在吸收已有道教研究成果的基础上,尝试以现代哲学观念,对道教的价值关怀予以分析说明以建立符合现代学科要求的道教哲学形态。由于目前的工作仅是初步提出自己对道教哲学的一种理解,希望能够对此正处于建设中的学科的进展有所推动。     

SOME THOUGHTS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ETHICS

The author attempts to establish a framework for understanding the contribution of psychoanalysis to ethics through examining the work of certain philosophers, especially Kant. After reviewing the development of Freudian thought and going beyond the ‘psychoanalysis and/or psychiatry?’ question, he asserts that the space of the psychoanalytical cure revolves around an ethical problem. Thus, the limits of analysis should be determined by the subject's capacity for developing a structure of belief in the unconscious, with the concomitant capacity to go beyond equivocation in respect of an ethical conflict that underlies all cases where psychical suffering is manifested. Indeed, only human beings are called upon to deal with an ethical paradox “equally a logical one”which could be stated thus: there is Good in Evil and Evil in Good. This ethical paradox is the consequence of human subjection to the constituent laws of the Oedipus complex, which distances the human being, in his/her dealings with Evil and with Good, from any naturalist stance. In respect of the cure, then, we must take into account that Evil does not proceed from any particular drive‐based characteristic, but is rather the expression of specific subjection to an unconscious Other, towards which it directs its affects. Finally, the author proposes a principle that emerges from the preceding discussion: let us not impute to or place in the Other our own subjective splitting or pain at existing.     

Choice preferences without inferences: subconscious priming of risk attitudes

We present a procedure for subconscious priming of risk attitudes. In Experiment 1, we were reliably able to induce risk‐seeking or risk‐averse preferences across a range of decision scenarios using this priming procedure. In Experiment 2, we showed that these priming effects can be reversed by drawing participants' attention to the priming event. Our results support claims that the formation of risk preferences can be based on preconscious processing, as for example postulated by the affective primacy hypothesis, rather than rely on deliberative mental operations, as posited by several current models of judgment and decision making. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

AN EVALUATION OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN QUALITY OF ATTENTION AND NEGATIVE REINFORCEMENT WITH CHILDREN WHO DISPLAY ESCAPE‐MAINTAINED PROBLEM BEHAVIOR

The choice‐making behavior of 2 typically developing children who engaged in problem behavior maintained by negative reinforcement was evaluated within a concurrent‐operants assessment that varied the quality of attention across free‐play and demand conditions. The results demonstrated that it was possible to bias responding towards academic demands for both participants by providing high‐quality attention, despite the continuous availability of negative reinforcement. The current study extended brief clinical methods with typically developing children and demonstrated how different qualities of attention provided across concurrent schedules could bias responding.     

Children’s multiplicative transformations of discrete and continuous quantities

Recent studies have documented an evolutionarily primitive, early emerging cognitive system for the mental representation of numerical quantity (the analog magnitude system). Studies with nonhuman primates, human infants, and preschoolers have shown this system to support computations of numerical ordering, addition, and subtraction involving whole number concepts prior to arithmetic training. Here we report evidence that this system supports children’s predictions about the outcomes of halving and perhaps also doubling transformations. A total of 138 kindergartners and first graders were asked to reason about the quantity resulting from the doubling or halving of an initial numerosity (of a set of dots) or an initial length (of a bar). Controls for dot size, total dot area, and dot density ensured that children were responding to the number of dots in the arrays. Prior to formal instruction in symbolic multiplication, division, or rational number, halving (and perhaps doubling) computations appear to be deployed over discrete and possibly continuous quantities. The ability to apply simple multiplicative transformations to analog magnitude representations of quantity may form a part of the toolkit that children use to construct later concepts of rational number.     

Taking Degrees of Truth Seriously

This is a contribution to the discussion on the role of truth degrees in manyvalued logics from the perspective of abstract algebraic logic. It starts with some thoughts on the so-called Suszko’s Thesis (that every logic is two-valued) and on the conception of semantics that underlies it, which includes the truth-preserving notion of consequence. The alternative usage of truth values in order to define logics that preserve degrees of truth is presented and discussed. Some recent works studying these in the particular cases of Łukasiewicz’s many-valued logics and of logics associated with varieties of residuated lattices are also presented. Finally the extension of this paradigm to other, more general situations is discussed, highlighting the need for philosophical or applied motivations in the selection of the truth degrees, due both to the interpretation of the idea of truth degree and to some mathematical difficulties.