Is our Universe Deterministic? Some Philosophical and Theological Reflections on an Elusive Topic

Abstract. The question of whether or not our universe is deterministic remains of interest to both scientists and theologians. In this essay I argue that this question can be solved only by metaphysical decision and that no scientific evidence for either determinism or indeterminism will ever be conclusive. No finite being, no matter how powerful its cognitive abilities, will ever be able to establish the deterministic nature of the universe. The only being that would be capable of doing so would be one that is at once transcendent and immanent. Such a being is compatible with the God of the Christian tradition, which yields that a deterministic worldview is compatible with (yet does not necessarily lead to) a deterministic worldview. A more important point is that because science is never able to establish the determinism of our universe, it can never definitely rule out divine action except on metaphysical grounds.     

Logical, Semantic and Cultural Paradoxes

The property common to three kinds of paradoxes (logical, semantic, and cultural) is the underlying presence of an exclusive disjunction: even when it is put to a check by the paradox, it is still invoked at the level of implicit discourse. Hence the argumentative strength of paradoxical propositions is derived. Logical paradoxes (insolubilia) always involve two contradictory, mutually exclusive, truths. One truth is always perceived to the detriment of the other, in accordance with a succession which is endlessly repetitive. A check is put on the principle of the excluded middle by the logical paradoxes, because self-reference leads to an endlessly repeating circle, out of which no resolution is conceivable. Logical paradoxes are to be compared with the `objective ambiguity' prevalent in oracles (Gallet, 1990). Semantic paradoxes are contextually-determined occurrences, whose resolution at the metalinguistic level is made possible by the discovery of a middle term. They express a wilful ambiguity, in which the interlocutor is invited to take an active part in the construction of sense, since what must be found is the unexpected sense thanks to which A and not-A can be asserted simultaneously. Cultural paradoxes play about doxa (`common sense') and openly challenge common opinion because of their character as inopinata (`unexpected'). My aim is to show that even cultural paradoxes hide sometimes a flaw of argumentation similar to logical or semantic paradox; they too imply an exclusive disjunction leading to the disappearance of the middle terms. Finally, basing myself on the theory of topoi (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1983), a tentative resolution of the cultural paradoxes will be suggested.     

Informative Aboutness

Pretheoretically, (B) ‘all believers are immortal’ is about all believers, but (1) B is not about any unbeliever. Similarly, (M) ‘all mortals are unbelievers’ is not about any immortal, but (2) M is about all mortals. But B and M are logically equivalent universal generalizations, so arguably they are about exactly the same objects; by (2), they are about those mortals who are unbelievers, contradicting (1). If one responds by giving up (1), is there still a sense in which B treats unbelievers differently from believers? I argue that there is. B is uninformative about unbelievers but informative about believers, in the following sense: for any object o, the information that B provides only about o—namely, ‘o is a believer only if o is immortal’—is entailed (and thus rendered redundant) by ‘o is an unbeliever’ but not by ‘o is a believer’.     

Dummett and Frege on sense and Selbständigkeit

As part of his attack on Frege’s ‘myth’ that senses reside in the third realm, Dummett alleges that Frege’s view that all objects are selbständig (‘self-subsistent’, ‘independent’) is an underlying mistake, since some objects depend upon others. Whatever the merits of Dummett’s other arguments against Frege’s conception of sense, this objection fails. First, Frege’s view that senses are third-realm entities is not traceable to his view that all objects are selbständig. Second, while Frege recognizes that there are objects that are dependent upon other objects, he does not take this to compromise the Selbständigkeit of any objects. Thus, Frege’s doctrine that objects are selbständig does not make the claim of absolute independence that Dummett appears to have taken it to make. Nevertheless, in order to make a good case against Frege based on the dependency of senses, Dummett need only establish his claim that senses depend upon expressions: appeal to an absolute conception of independence is unnecessary. However, Dummett’s arguments for the dependency of senses upon expressions are unsuccessful and they show that Dummett’s conception of what it is to be an expression also differs significantly from Frege’s.     

Thomas Aquinas on hylomorphism and the in-act principle

In Summa Theologiae I.76.1 Aquinas presents an argument for the hylomorphic union of body and soul that he attributes to Aristotle. Aquinas builds on Aristotle’s original argument, however, offering his own short but powerful line of reasoning in support of one of the main premises. This additional argument involves an appeal to the principle that nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. This principle has roots in the thought of Aristotle, but is not explicitly used by him. It is, however, fundamental for Aquinas and pervasive throughout his work. In this paper I examine the principle and its implications for Aquinas’ version of the argument. Furthermore, I argue that the principle is foundational to Aquinas’ criticisms of Averroes’ account of the intellective soul and that its inclusion renders Aquinas’ version of the argument incompatible with Averroes’ view.     

Why study A Level Religious Studies? Qualitative perspectives from two English Midlands sixth forms

Religious Studies (RS) is expected to impact students’ personal development as well as enabling acquisition of knowledge and understanding of religious and philosophical traditions. But to what extent does this actually occur? As part of a larger quantitative investigation of the effects of A Level RS in students’ beliefs, values and worldviews through a large-scale questionnaire survey of AS students, a small-scale, in-depth piece of qualitative research was undertaken with A Level RS students in two Midlands sixth forms. Through semi-structured interviews and classroom observation, it explores students’ motivations for studying A Level RS, the value they see in the subject and how far they perceived themselves changed as a result. Students appreciated the scope to discuss and debate, and the potential wider applicability of the subject. All students felt they had their own stance both challenged and confirmed, although there also appeared to be limiting factors as to how far understanding of, and empathy for, the beliefs, values and worldviews of others was possible.     

Metamorphoses of the Ideal

For Evald Il’enkov, philosophy is a science of the ideal. Il’enkov spent his entire life researching the logical and historical metamorphoses of the ideal. In general, he considered the ideal as a relation between at least two different things, one of which adequately represents the essence of another. At various times Il’enkov explored quite a few ideal phenomena: forms of value and forms of property, personality and talent, language, music and fine arts, not to mention numerous categories of dialectics, ethics, and aesthetics. The article also addresses the problem: which of these phenomena is the most typical and adequate form of being of the ideal?.     

四卡问题解决中的匹配偏向再探

选取经典的四卡问题作为实验材料,深入探讨了“综合考虑证真证伪作用”的提示以及逻辑分析过程对被试解决四卡问题不能产生促进效应的原因。结果发现:(1)多数被试能对卡片P和-Q进行正确的逻辑推断,但是最后却仍然倾向于选择卡片Q而非-Q,这种错误并非是由于附加的认知任务使得被试的短时记忆容量超载所致。(2)元音偶数组与元音非偶数组的被试对四张卡片作出正确逻辑推断的人数百分比基本一致,但是后者选择P-Q的人数百分比却显著高于前者,这表明多数被试似乎并不依据逻辑分析的结果及其命题检验的规则来作出选择,而是采用匹配策略,错误地选择了Q卡片。     

《易》象与《诗》象:论《周易》的类艺术表现方式

文章从符号学角度,通过《诗》《易》比较,论述了《周易》的类艺术特征。在构成符号的综合性上,在篇章的结构、句式词语的使用上,在物象选择与深层意蕴上,《易》和《诗》具有异质同构的关系。后世艺术作品中出现的同类意象,其原型可溯到《诗》,更可求诸《易》。     

A reconstruction of contemporary Confucianism as a form of knowledge

Traditional Confucianism might be likened to a great tree, with various branches and trends of thought emerging from common roots. Continuing with this metaphor, Confucianism as a form of knowledge might be regarded as a main branch, and the resulting form of Confucianism constitutes the main body of Chinese learning. Due to modern society’s transformation, Confucianism as a form of knowledge has begun to disappear and the form of Confucianism which has its own discourse system and problem consciousness has become a disconnected tradition and an object of study of all the branches of learning in modern times. It is important for the present-day development of Confucianism that we break the rigescent modern academic system, propagate Confucianism as a form of knowledge, and rebuild the Confucian form of knowledge. __________ Translated from Hebei Xuekan 河北学刊 (Hebei Academic Journal), 2005(4) by Yan Xin