Including Manual Signing as Nontargeted Information When Using a Constant Time Delay Procedure to Teach Receptive Identification of Packaged Food Items

This investigation extends the constant time delay research base by embedding nontargeted information in the task direction when teaching communication skills. Specifically, instructors taught receptive identification of packaged food items to 4 secondary students with moderate to severe disabilities and evaluated generalization to the community. In addition, instructors included the manual sign for each food item. The instructional strategy was a constant time delay procedure using a 5-s delay interval. The intervention, conducted within a multiple probe design across behaviors replicated across students, resulted in the acquisition and generalization of receptive identification of packaged food items by 3 out of 4 of the students. In addition, the students acquired the nontargeted manual signs with an average of 60% percent in the final probe session.     

ONE TRUE LOGIC?

This is a paper about the constituents of arguments. It argues that several different kinds of truth-bearer may be taken to compose arguments, but that none of the obvious candidates—sentences, propositions, sentence/truth-value pairs etc.—make sense of logic as it is actually practiced. The paper goes on to argue that by answering the question in different ways, we can generate different logics, thus ensuring a kind of logical pluralism that is different from that of J. C. Beall and Greg Restall.     

TAKING SCIENCE SERIOUSLY WITHOUT SCIENTISM: A RESPONSE TO TAEDE SMEDES

In responding to Taede Smedes, I first examine his thesis that the recent dialogue between science and religion has been dominated by scientism and does not take theology seriously. I then consider his views on divine action, free will and determinism, and process philosophy. Finally I use the fourfold typology of Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and Integration to discuss his proposal for the future of science and religion.     

Ramsey, ‘Universals’ and atomic propositions

In ‘Universals’ (1925), Ramsey declares that we do not, and cannot, know the forms of atomic propositions. A year later, in a symposium with Braithwaite and Joseph, he announces a change of mind: atomic propositions may, after all, be discoverable by analysis. It is clear from the 1926 paper that Ramsey intends this to be a revision of the 1925 claim. Puzzlingly, however, Ramsey does not mention analysis in 1925. My task in this article is to provide a justification for that change of mind. My argument consists of two parts. I first show what relation holds between the negative 1925 assertion and the more positive 1926 assertion which allows us to read the latter claim as a retraction of the former, as Ramsey appears to have intended it. Then I shall argue that the retraction of the 1925 claim is forced upon Ramsey by reflection on the fact that three theses, all of which he held in or around the relevant period, are, rather surprisingly, revealed to be inconsistent.     

Logical Operations and Invariance

I present a notion of invariance under arbitrary surjective mappings for operators on a relational finite type hierarchy generalizing the so-called Tarski–Sher criterion for logicality and I characterize the invariant operators as definable in a fragment of the first-order language. These results are compared with those obtained by Feferman and it is argued that further clarification of the notion of invariance is needed if one wants to use it to characterize logicality.     

Using a modified constant prompt-delay procedure to teach spelling to students with physical disabilities

Current research suggests that constant delay is an effective means of teaching students through near-errorless learning. The current study examined how procedures used in previous research may be modified so that constant delay can be implemented with students who have physical disabilities that prevent them from engaging in fluent academic responding. A multiple baseline design with probes was used to assess the effectiveness of a modified constant-delay procedure in teaching spelling to students with physical disabilities. This procedure was found to be effective for all 3 students.     

Realism,Positivism and Reference

Summary  Depending on the realist or instrumentalist twist that is given to positivism, interesting arguments can be made for both causal and classical theories of reference with regard to the use of scientific terms in the language of theory. But my claim is that the rigid foundationalism that supports the theoretical terms via the correspondence rules of the Received View undercuts the notion that it is possible to argue coherently for a causal theory of reference as allied to a positivistic view.     

Some Useful 16-Valued Logics: How a Computer Network Should Think

In Belnaps useful 4-valued logic, the set 2={T,F} of classical truth values is generalized to the set 4=(2)={,{T},{F},{T,F}}. In the present paper, we argue in favor of extending this process to the set 16=(4) (and beyond). It turns out that this generalization is well-motivated and leads from the bilattice FOUR₂ with an information and a truth-and-falsity ordering to another algebraic structure, namely the trilattice SIXTEEN₃ with an information ordering together with a truth ordering and a (distinct) falsity ordering. Interestingly, the logics generated separately by the algebraic operations under the truth order and under the falsity order in SIXTEEN₃ coincide with the logic of FOUR₂, namely first degree entailment. This observation may be taken as a further indication of the significance of first degree entailment. In the present setting, however, it becomes rather natural to consider also logical systems in the language obtained by combining the vocabulary of the logic of the truth order and the falsity order. We semantically define the logics of the two orderings in the extended language and in both cases axiomatize a certain fragment comprising three unary operations: a negation, an involution, and their combination. We also suggest two other definitions of logics in the full language, including a bi-consequence system. In other words, in addition to presenting first degree entailment as a useful 16-valued logic, we define further useful 16-valued logics for reasoning about truth and (non-)falsity. We expect these logics to be an interesting and useful instrument in information processing, especially when we deal with a net of hierarchically interconnected computers. We also briefly discuss Arielis and Avrons notion of a logical bilattice and state a number of open problems for future research.Dedicated to Nuel D. Belnap on the occasion of his 75th Birthday