Heterogeneous heterogeneity by default: Testing categorical moderators in mixed-effects meta-analysis

Categorical moderators are often included in mixed-effects meta-analysis to explain heterogeneity in effect sizes. An assumption in tests of categorical moderator effects is that of a constant between-study variance across all levels of the moderator. Although it rarely receives serious thought, there can be statistical ramifications to upholding this assumption. We propose that researchers should instead default to assuming unequal between-study variances when analysing categorical moderators. To achieve this, we suggest using a mixed-effects location-scale model (MELSM) to allow group-specific estimates for the between-study variance. In two extensive simulation studies, we show that in terms of Type I error and statistical power, little is lost by using the MELSM for moderator tests, but there can be serious costs when an equal variance mixed-effects model (MEM) is used. Most notably, in scenarios with balanced sample sizes or equal between-study variance, the Type I error and power rates are nearly identical between the MEM and the MELSM. On the other hand, with imbalanced sample sizes and unequal variances, the Type I error rate under the MEM can be grossly inflated or overly conservative, whereas the MELSM does comparatively well in controlling the Type I error across the majority of cases. A notable exception where the MELSM did not clearly outperform the MEM was in the case of few studies (e.g., 5). With respect to power, the MELSM had similar or higher power than the MEM in conditions where the latter produced non-inflated Type 1 error rates. Together, our results support the idea that assuming unequal between-study variances is preferred as a default strategy when testing categorical moderators.     

Order effects in belief updating with consistent and inconsistent evidence

The current study tests for the presence of differential order effects in evaluation tasks with consistent and inconsistent evidence as predicted by the Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) belief-adjustment model. The results, based on both between-subjects and within-subjects experiments, demonstrate that there were significant recency effects with inconsistent evidence as predicted, larger recency effects when the inconsistent evidence was farther apart in subjective value as predicted, and significant recency effects even when subjects were given training designed to both help them understand the task as completely as possible and to be better able to assess the pieces of evidence. By including a within-subjects design, we were able to demonstrate that the difference in subjective value between two pieces of evidence is the primary factor influencing the magnitude of the recency effect, regardless of whether the evidence is consistent or inconsistent. This latter finding is unique and contrary to previous research and theory.     

STIMULUS (INSTRUCTIONAL) FADING DURING EXTINCTION OF SELF-INJURIOUS ESCAPE BEHAVIOR

Three individuals with developmental disabilities were exposed to a series of assessment conditions to identify the source of reinforcement for their self-injurious behavior. In each case, self-injury occurred most often in instructional (demand) situations containing a brief time-out from the task contingent on self-injury, indicating that the behavior was an escape response (i.e., maintained by negative reinforcement). Treatment was implemented in a multiple baseline across subjects design and consisted of extinction (prevention of escape) plus instructional fading (initial elimination of instructions followed by their gradual reintroduction). Results showed that the combined treatment produced immediate and large reductions in self-injury that were maintained as the frequency of instructions was increased across sessions to match the original baseline rate of presentation. Results of a component analysis conducted with 1 subject suggested that stimulus fading accelerated the behavior-reducing effects of extinction.     

Effects of differences between stimuli, responses, and reinforcer rates on conditional discrimination performance

In a discrete-trial conditional discrimination procedure, 4 pigeons obtained food reinforcers by pecking a key with a short latency on trials signaled by one stimulus and by pecking the same key with a long latency on trials signaled by a second stimulus. The physical difference between the two stimuli and the temporal separation between the latency values required for reinforcement were varied factorially over four sets of conditions, and the ratio of reinforcer rates for short and long latencies was varied within each set of conditions. Stimulus discrimination varied directly with both stimulus and response differences and was unaffected by the reinforcer ratio. Sensitivity to reinforcement, estimated by generalized-matching-law fits to the data within each set of conditions, varied directly with the response difference but inversely with the stimulus difference arranged between sets of conditions. Because variations in stimulus differences, response differences, and reinforcer differences did not have equivalent effects, these findings question the functional equivalence of the three terms of the discriminated operant: antecedent stimuli, behavior, and consequences.     

Delay reduction: current status.

Delay-reduction theory states that the effectiveness of a stimulus as a conditioned reinforcer may be predicted most accurately by the reduction in time to primary reinforcement correlated with its onset. We review support for the theory and then discuss two new types of experiments that assess it. One compares models of choice in situations wherein the less preferred outcome is made more accessible; the other investigates whether frequency of conditioned reinforcement affects choice beyond the effect exerted by frequency of primary reinforcement.     

Violations of transitivity: Implications for a theory of contextual choice

Violations of strong stochastic transitivity in concurrent-chains choice were first reported by Navarick and Fantino. In a series of articles, Navarick and Fantino concluded that neither a unidimensional model capable of predicting exact choice probabilities nor a fixed-variable equivalence rule was possible for the concurrent-chains procedure. I show that when choice is modeled contextually (i.e., when preference for a schedule is affected by factors other than the schedule itself, e.g., aspects of the alternative schedule), a unidimensional, exact-choice probability model is possible that both predicts the intransitivities reported by Navarick and Fantino and provides a fixed-variable equivalence rule for the concurrent-chains procedure. The contextual model is an extension of the generalized matching law and violates a key assumption underlying traditional choice models—simple scalability—because of (a) schedule interdependence and (b) bias from procedural contingencies. Therefore, strong stochastic transitivity cannot be expected to hold. Contextual scalability is analyzed to reveal a hierarchy of context effects in choice. Navarick and Fantino's intransitivities can be satisfactorily explained by bias. If attribute sensitivity is context dependent, however, and if there are similarity structures among choice alternatives, the contextual model is shown to be able to predict violations of ordinal preference. Therefore, it may be possible to formulate a deterministic, general psychophysical model of choice as a behavioral alternative to probabilistic, multidimensional choice theories.     

Adaptation, teleology, and selection by consequences

This paper presents and defends the view that reinforcement and natural selection are selection processes, that selection processes are neither mechanistic nor teleological, and that mentalistic and vitalistic processes are teleological but not mechanistic. The differences between these types of processes are described and used in discussing the conceptual and methodological significance of “selection type theories” and B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorist view that “operant behavior is the field of intention, purpose, and expectation. It deals with that field precisely as the theory of evolution has dealt with another kind of purpose” (1986, p. 716). The antimentalism of radical behaviorism emerges as a post-Darwinian extension of Francis Bacon's (and Galileo's) influential view that “[the introduction of final causes] rather corrupts than advances the sciences” (Bacon, 1905, p. 302).     

Unit price as a useful metric in analyzing effects of reinforcer magnitude.

In this paper, we applied the behavioral-economic concept of unit price to the study of reinforcer magnitude in an attempt to provide a consistent account of the effects of reinforcer magnitude on behavior. Recent research in the experimental analysis of behavior and in behavioral pharmacology suggests that reinforcer magnitude interacts with the schedule of reinforcement to determine response rate and total consumption. The utility of the unit-price concept thus stems from its ability to quantify this interaction as a cost-benefit ratio (i.e., unit price = characteristics of the schedule of reinforcement divided by magnitude of reinforcement). Research employing the unit-price concept has shown that as unit price increases, a positively decelerating function exists for consumption (i.e., a function with an increasingly negative slope, when plotted on log coordinates) and a bitonic function exists for response rate. Based on these findings, the present analysis applied the unit-price concept to those studies of reinforcer magnitude and drug self-administration that examined the effects of reinforcer magnitude on response rate using simple schedules of reinforcement (e.g., fixed-ratio schedule). This resulted in three findings: (a) Reinforcer-magnitude manipulations and schedule manipulations interact in a manner that can be quantified in terms of unit price as benefit and cost factors, respectively; (b) different reinforcer-magnitude manipulations are functionally interchangeable as benefit factors in the unit-price ratio; and (c) these conclusions appear warranted despite the differences in reinforcers (food or drug), species (dogs, monkeys, or rats), and schedules (interval or ratio), and despite the fact that these studies were not designed for a unit-price analysis. In methodological terms, these results provide further evidence that employing the unit-price concept is a parsimonious method for examining the effects of reinforcer magnitude. In theoretical terms, these results suggest that a single process may underlie the effect of combined reinforcer-magnitude and schedule manipulations.     

Schedule-induced defecation by rats during ratio and interval schedules of food reinforcement.

Lever pressing in rats was maintained by continuous and intermittent schedules of food while defecation was monitored. In Experiment 1, reinforcement densities were matched across variable-ratio and variable-interval schedules for three pairs of rats. Defecation occurred in all 3 rats on the variable-ratio schedule and in all 3 rats on the yoked variable-interval schedule. In Experiment 2, fixed-ratio and fixed-interval schedules with similar reinforcement densities maintained lever pressing. Defecation occurred in 3 of 4 rats on the fixed-ratio schedule and in 4 of 4 rats on the fixed-interval schedule. Almost no defecation occurred during continuous reinforcement in either experiment. These results demonstrate that defecation may occur during both ratio and interval schedules and that the inter-reinforcement interval is more important than the behavioral requirements of the schedule in generating schedule-induced defecation.