Viewing death on television increases the appeal of advertised products

References to death abound in many television programs accessible to most people. Terror Management Theory postulates that existential anxiety, which death reminders activate, may reinforce materialistic tendencies. The current article explores the effect of a death reminder in television shows on the desirability of advertised products. Consistent with Terror Management Theory's predictions, in two studies participants show greater desire for products, which were advertised immediately following clips from programs that featured a death scene, compared with programs that did not. Cognitive accessibility of death predicted the appeal difference while changes in affect or interest in the show did not. The findings are discussed in light on affective and existential theories which make opposite predictions. Implications and future directions are considered.     

Oculomotion mediates attentional guidance toward temporarily close objects

Previous research has identified multiple features of individual objects that are capable of guiding visual attention. However, in dynamic multi-element displays not only individual object features but also changing spatial relations between two or more objects might signal relevance. Here we report a series of experiments that investigated the hypothesis that reduced inter-object spacing guides visual attention toward the corresponding objects. Our participants discriminated between different probes that appeared on moving objects while we manipulated spatial proximity between the objects at the moment of probe onset. Indeed, our results confirm that there is a bias toward temporarily close objects, which persists even when such a bias is harmful for the actual task (Experiments 1a and 1b). Remarkably, this bias is mediated by oculomotor processes. Controlling for eye-movements reverses the pattern of results (Experiment 2a), whereas the location of the gaze tends toward the temporarily close objects under free viewing conditions (Experiment 2b). Taken together, our results provide insights into the interplay of attentional and oculomotor processes during dynamic scene processing. Thereby, they also add to the growing body of evidence showing that within dynamic perception, attentional and oculomotor processes act conjointly and are hardly separable.     

Becoming Eastern Orthodox in diaspora: materializing Orthodox Russia and Holy Rus’

In this article, I draw on interviews and participant observation data from a two-year-long ethnographic study in a Russian Orthodox parish in the United States. I argue that both the Russian Orthodox immigrants and the Protestant converts to Orthodoxy attending this parish may be usefully thought of as diasporic groups. Seeking to construct their particular Orthodox identity, both groups deal with their own physical and symbolic displacements, and attempt to find their place of belonging. I demonstrate how in the process, through reliance on religious narratives, prayer, and Russian Orthodox icons, parishioners construct two overlapping, yet distinctive places of their origin: Holy Rus’ and Orthodox Russia. Finally, attending to how some Orthodox Christians were able to position themselves in two groups simultaneously, I suggest that we think of religious practitioners as able to inhabit two diasporas at once.     

Linking Disjoint Supermatrices and Criteria Clusters

An axiom of the Analytic Network Process (ANP) requires the elements being considered to be strongly connected in order to obtain a meaningful priority vector. A simple example demonstrates the issues that can arise when a decision contains disjoint clusters within the Supermatrix. From the example it can be observed that the necessary information to complete additional linking pin comparisons would have already been collected; and by performing linking pin comparisons a decision maker can convert a disjoint Supermatrix into a strongly connected Supermatrix. The linking process is summarized in five steps and provided in the general form. This linking comparison methodology exploits the fundamental advantages of pairwise comparisons and can also be used to weight the criteria clusters within a decision network. Linking pin comparisons performed at the level of a criterion of a single alternative with respect to another criterion of that same alternative can be used to obtain the criteria cluster weights. Linking pin comparisons at this level can reduce the decision maker's cognitive burden in comparison to totality comparisons. The ability to strongly connect an otherwise disjoint Supermatrix and reduce the decision maker's cognitive burden demonstrates the usefulness of linking pin comparisons in ANP decision models. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ATTACKS ON LINKING OR A DRIVE TO COMMUNICATE? TOLERATING THE PARADOX

The notion of attacks on linking, as described by Bion, may depict a patient's drive to communicate the internalization of a destructive relationship between a primary object and an infant. This may be enacted between patient and analyst in the here and now of the analysis, whereby fragmentation and numbing of thinking may point to a primitive catastrophe relived in the psychoanalytic setting. The patient's material may seem incoherent, but incoherence might be the communication the patient is unconsciously trying to convey. Thus, the notion of attacks on linking depicts a paradoxical, caesural experience in which the attack on linking is itself a link.     

Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Question

The special composition question is the question, ‘When do some things compose something?’ The answers to this question in the literature have largely been at odds with common sense, either by allowing that any two things (no matter how apparently unrelated) compose something, or by denying the existence of most ordinary composite objects. I propose a new ‘series-style’ answer to the special composition question that accords much more closely with common sense, and I defend this answer from van Inwagen's objections. Specifically, I will argue (among other things) that the proposed answer entails the transitivity of parthood, that it is non-circular, and that it casts some light on the ancient puzzle about the Ship of Theseus.     

Retrieval of names in face and object naming in an interference study

Two experiments using the interference paradigm are reported. In the first experiment, the participants spoke aloud the names of celebrities and the names of objects when presented with pictures while hearing distractors. In the case of proper names, we replicated the data obtained by Izaute and Bonin (2001) using the interference paradigm with a proper name written naming task. In the case of common names, the results replicated those obtained by Shriefers, Meyer, and Levelt (1990). In the second experiment, the participants produced the names of celebrities when presented with their faces while hearing distractors that were either proper names associated with the celebrities (associate condition), that belonged to a different professional category (different condition), or that corresponded to the proper names of the celebrities (identical condition). For negative SOAs, “associate” distractors were found to increase latencies compared to the “different category” condition. The implications of the findings for proper name retrieval are briefly discussed.     

There are Intentionalia of Which it is True that Such Objects Do Not Exist

Abstract

According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a kind such that its members figure (for independent reasons) in such an inventory. Negatively put, if there are no things of a certain metaphysical kind, thoughts about things of that kind are not really committed to such things. Pace Crane, however, this does not mean that the intentionalia that are really there are only those that exist. For existence, qua first-order property, is no metaphysical kind. Thus, there may really be intentionalia that do not exist, provided that they belong to good metaphysical kinds.     

Intentional Objects,Pretence, and the Quasi-Relational Nature of Mental Phenomena: A New Look at Brentano on Intentionality

Abstract

Brentano famously changed his mind about intentionality between the 1874 and 1911 editions of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (PES). The 1911 edition repudiates the 1874 view that to think about something is to stand in a relation to something that is within in the mind, and holds instead that intentionality is only like a relation (it is ‘quasi-relational’). Despite this, Brentano still insists that mental activity involves ‘the reference to something as an object’, much as he did in the 1874 edition of PES. The question is what Brentano might have meant by this, given that he rejects a relational account of intentionality. The present paper suggests an answer. It draws on recent work on pretence theory to provide a model of Brentano’s notion of the quasi-relational nature of mental phenomena, as well as of the notion of mental reference to an object, and argues that the model helps to explain why Brentano might have been able discern a clear continuity between the views of the 1874 and 1911 editions of PES, despite the differences.