Young children's use of statistical sampling evidence to infer the subjectivity of preferences

A crucial task in social interaction involves understanding subjective mental states. Here we report two experiments with toddlers exploring whether they can use statistical evidence to infer the subjective nature of preferences. We found that 2-year-olds were likely to interpret another person’s nonrandom sampling behavior as a cue for a preference different from their own. When there was no alternative in the population or if the sampling was random, 2-year-olds did not ascribe a preference and persisted in their initial beliefs that the person would share their own preference. We found similar but weaker patterns of responses in 16-month-olds. These results suggest that the ability to infer the subjectivity of preferences based on sampling information begins to emerge between 16 months and 2 years. Our findings provide some of the first evidence that from early in development, young children can use statistical evidence to make rational inferences about the social world.     

Connecting instances to promote children's relational reasoning

The practice of learning from multiple instances seems to allow children to learn about relational structure. The experiments reported here focused on two issues regarding relational learning from multiple instances: (a) what kind of perceptual situations foster such learning and (b) how particular object properties, such as complexity and similarity, interact with relational learning. Two kinds of perceptual situations were of interest here: simultaneous view, where instances are viewed at once, and sequential view, where instances are viewed one at a time (one right after the other). We examined the influence of particular perceptual situations and object properties using two tests of relational reasoning: a common match-to-sample task, where new instances are compared with a common sample, and a variable match-to-sample task, where new instances are compared with a sample that varies on each trial. Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that simultaneous presentation of even highly dissimilar instances, one simple and one complex, effectively connects them together and improves relational generalization in both match-to-sample tasks. Experiment 3 shows that simple samples are more effective than complex ones in the common match-to-sample task. However, when one instance is not used a common sample and various pairs of instances are simply compared, as in Experiment 4, simple and rich instances are equally effective at promoting relational learning. These results bear on our understanding of how children connect instances and how those initial connections affect learning and generalization.     

大学生工作记忆容量对图形推理影响的眼动研究

采用眼动技术,选取瑞文图形推理测验作为实验材料,探讨工作记忆对于图形推理过程的影响。实验为2(工作记忆容量:高、低)×2(性别:男、女)×3(题目难度:高、中、低)的混合实验设计。以扫视时间、眼跳幅度、注视次数、扫视次数、瞳孔直径为因变量指标。实验结果表明:第一,不同性别大学生进行图形推理过程的眼动模式有一定差异,但这种差异并非由工作记忆差异所导致,而是图形推理策略不同所引起;第二,工作记忆容量高低影响图形推理过程,由于工作记忆影响注意资源分配,从而工作记忆容量高低不同会导致采用不同的策略进行图形推理,不仅影响工作记忆推理过程,也导致推理成绩的差异。这些结果能为学生选择适合自己的学习策略、因材施教以及考试测评提供依据。     

Are Causal Structure and Intervention Judgments Inextricably Linked? A Developmental Study

The application of the formal framework of causal Bayesian Networks to children’s causal learning provides the motivation to examine the link between judgments about the causal structure of a system, and the ability to make inferences about interventions on components of the system. Three experiments examined whether children are able to make correct inferences about interventions on different causal structures. The first two experiments examined whether children’s causal structure and intervention judgments were consistent with one another. In Experiment 1, children aged between 4 and 8 years made causal structure judgments on a three‐component causal system followed by counterfactual intervention judgments. In Experiment 2, children’s causal structure judgments were followed by intervention judgments phrased as future hypotheticals. In Experiment 3, we explicitly told children what the correct causal structure was and asked them to make intervention judgments. The results of the three experiments suggest that the representations that support causal structure judgments do not easily support simple judgments about interventions in children. We discuss our findings in light of strong interventionist claims that the two types of judgments should be closely linked.     

PATERNITY BETWEEN LAW AND BIOLOGY: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PATERNITY IN THE WAKE OF DNA TESTING

Abstract: The discovery of DNA paternity tests has stirred a debate concerning the definition of paternity and whether the grounds for such a definition are legal or biological. According to the classical rules of Islamic law, paternity is established and negated on the basis of a valid marriage. Modern biomedical technology raises the question of whether paternity tests can be the sole basis for paternity, even independently of marriage. Although on the surface this technology seems to challenge the authority of Islamic law in this area, the paper argues that classical Islamic rulings pertaining to paternity issues continue to hold higher authority even in cases of conflict with modern technology‐based alternatives. Through closer analysis, the paper traces the emergence of a differentiation in the function of DNA tests between identity and paternity verification. While the former is accepted without reservation, the latter is approved only when it does not violate the rulings of Islamic law.     

Young children discriminate improbable from impossible events in fiction

Can young children discriminate impossible events, which cannot happen in reality, from improbable events, which are unfamiliar but could possibly happen in reality? When asked explicitly to categorize these types of events, 4-year-olds (N = 54) tended to report that improbable events were impossible, consistent with prior results (Shtulman & Carey, 2007). But when presented with stories made up of improbable events, children preferred to continue these stories with additional improbable events rather than with impossible events, demonstrating their sensitivity to the difference between the two types of events. Children were indifferent between continuing these stories with additional improbable events or with ordinary, possible events. Children's differential performance on the story and categorization tasks suggests that they possess some knowledge of the distinction between improbable and impossible but find it difficult to express this knowledge without a supportive context.     

ADHD and Judgments of Impulsivity in Rule Violations

Abstract

Participants with ADHD (n?=?45) and participants without ADHD (n?=?130, total n?=?175) judged hypothetical moral and conventional rule violations that varied the impulsivity of the act, the ADHD diagnosis, and the gender of the actor in order to examine (1) social reasoning about impulsiveness and (2) whether participants infer impulsiveness from the characteristics of the actor, including gender and ADHD-status. Moral violations were judged more negatively than conventional violations, even when they were impulsive. The characteristics of the actor influenced judgments in that participants judged boys’ behavior as more acceptable, as having less control, and as deserving of less punishment compared to girls. In addition, actors who were described as having ADHD were judged overall more positively. Participants with ADHD judged that all actors should receive similar punishment, regardless of the actor’s ADHD diagnosis, while participants without ADHD judged actors with ADHD should receive less punishment than those without.