Replies to Deng,Lee, and Skow

This paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on Chapters 2 and 6. In Chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In Chapter 6 I offer one part of an explanation of why we are disposed to think that time passes, relating to the supposedly ‘dynamic’ quality of experienced change. Deng, Lee, and Skow’s comments help me to clarify several issues, add some new thoughts, and make a new distinction that was needed, and I acknowledge, as I did in the book, that certain arguments in Chapter 6 are not conclusive; but I otherwise concede very little regarding the main claims and arguments defended in the book.     

Explaining away temporal flow – thoughts on Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’

I offer some responses to Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’, one of whose goals is to debunk a view of temporal experience somewhat prevalent in the metaphysics literature, which I call ‘Perceptualism’. According to Perceptualism: (1) it is part of the content of perceptual experience that time passes in a metaphysically strong sense: the present has a metaphysically privileged status, and time passes in virtue of changes in which events this ‘objective present’ highlights, and moreover (2) this gives us evidence in favor of strong passage. Prosser argues that perception cannot be sensitive to whether the strong passage obtains, and therefore cannot represent strong passage in a way that gives us evidence of its truth. Although I accept this conclusion, I argue that Prosser’s argument for it is problematic. It threatens to over-generalize to rule out uncontroversial cases of perceptual knowledge, such as our knowledge that we live in a spatial world. Furthermore, a successful argument ruling out perceptual evidence for strong passage would have to give constraints on the theory/observation distinction of a kind not provided by Prosser’s discussion. I also comment on several other parts of the book.     

Temporal Discounting Mechanisms of Future‐oriented Coping: Evidence from Delay Discounting and Task Prioritization Paradigms

Four studies were conducted to examine the relationship between future‐oriented coping and temporal discounting under different situational conditions. In Study 1, 138 participants were primed with either stressful or neutral stimuli, followed by a delay‐discounting task. In Study 2, 118 participants were primed with either stressful or neutral stimuli, followed by a task‐prioritization activity. The results of both studies indicated that future‐oriented coping had a significant negative association with temporal discounting or the number of rational choices in the neutral‐priming condition, but the relationship was not significant in the stress‐priming condition. In Study 3, qualitative data revealed that the major reason for shifting choices from larger but later payoffs to smaller but sooner rewards in a stressful condition was to reduce the stressful mood, create a positive mood, and promote a sense of accomplishment. This explanation was corroborated by Study 4, in which one group was allowed to choose an immediate payoff and the other group was blocked from choosing that immediate payoff. We confirmed that post‐test anxiety was significantly lower in the immediate payoff group compared with the delayed‐payoff group in proactive and preventive coping, using pre‐test anxiety as a covariate. Preventive coping helped to reduce anxiety levels in a stressful condition only when there was a choice to obtain an immediate payoff. These findings underscore the relationship between future‐oriented coping and temporal discounting, as well as the flexibility of discounting in the face of stress. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Naturalizing logic: Errors of reasoning vindicated: Logic reapproaches cognitive science

A complete revision of mainstream logic is an urgent task to be achieved. This revision will be able to bring logic into a creative rapprochement with cognitive science. This can be achieved by trying to do for logic what over forty years ago Quine and others attempted for epistemology. It is necessary to propose a “naturalization” of the logic of human inference. This paper deals with an examination of how the naturalization process might go, together with some indication of what might be achieved by it. To assist the reader in understanding the naturalization of logic I will take advantage of my own research on the concept of abduction, which vindicates the positive cognitive value of the fallacy of the affirming the consequent thanks to the so-called EC-model (Eco-Cognitive model), and of the recent book Errors of Reasoning: Naturalizing the Logic of Inference (2013) [86], by John Woods. While this paper certainly aims at promoting the research program on the naturalization of logic, it also further advocates the placement of abduction in the research programmes of logic, and stresses to what extent our contemporary philosophical and logical tradition is indebted towards Charles Sanders Peirce, a thinker often praised for his productivity but whose quality and importance are too often overlooked.     

Relativized common knowledge for dynamic epistemic logic

Relativized common knowledge is a generalization of common knowledge proposed for public announcement logic by treating knowledge update as relativization. Among other things relativized common knowledge, unlike standard common knowledge, allows reduction axioms for the public announcement operators. Public announcement logic can be seen as one of the simplest special cases of action model logic (AML). However, so far no notion of relativized common knowledge has been proposed for AML in general. That is what we do in this paper. We propose a notion of action model relativized common knowledge for action model logic, and study expressive power and complete axiomatizations of resulting logics. Along the way we fill some gaps in existing expressivity results for standard relativized common knowledge.     

基于多元回归的调节效应分析

在心理学和其他社科研究领域,大量实证研究建立调节模型,以分析自变量对因变量关系的影响机制,但在基于多元回归的调节效应分析实践中仍存在不足。我们回顾了均值中心化在基于多元回归的调节效应分析中的作用,均值中心化不影响乘积项(即调节效应)的检验,仅对一阶项(即主效应)的检验有影响。讨论了简单斜率的检验方法,建议在调节变量为连续变量时,使用Johnson-Neyman法进行简单斜率检验;在调节变量为类别变量或研究者对某个调节变量值感兴趣时,使用选点法。并用一个实际例子演示如何进行调节效应分析。随后展望了调节效应检验的拓展方向。     

Effects of geometric distortions,Gaussian blur,and contrast negation on recognition of familiar faces

It is assumed that “configural processing” is important for recognizing people whom we know. Studies have shown better discrimination of relational changes between facial features when faces are presented upright than upside down and when presented as photographic negatives. However, studies have also demonstrated tolerance for complex changes to facial configuration of familiar faces when images are geometrically distorted. In two experiments, we explored effects of linear stretching, Gaussian blur, and contrast negation on recognition of familiar or unfamiliar faces (Experiment 1) and familiar or unfamiliar company brand logos (Experiment 2). Only contrast negation severely impaired recognition of familiar faces but not unfamiliar faces or company brand logos. Effects of contrast negation were additional to linear stretching, whereas linear stretching independently had no impact on recognition. These findings highlight an important deficit in the recognition of familiar faces caused by contrast negation.     

How we have fallen: implicit trajectories in collective temporal thought

ABSTRACT

Memory may play a critical role in the ability to imagine events in the future. While most work on this relation has concerned episodic memory and simulated episodic events in the future, the current study examines how collective memories relate to imagination for the collective future. Two thousand American participants provided events for (1) America’s origins, (2) normative events that all Americans should remember, and (3) events in America’s future. Each event was rated for emotional valence. Whereas collective memories – particularly origin events – showed pronounced positivity biases, there was a negativity bias in collective future thought, indicating an implicit trajectory of decline in Americans’ representations of their nation across time. Imagination for the social future may not be simulated based on the template of collective memories, but may rather relate to the past in a way that is mediated by cultural narrative schemata.