Inequalities in Health and Intergenerational Equity

In the popular folklore three-score-years-and-ten is treated as a fair innings for people, and thereby serves as an informal reference point for judgements about distributive justice within a community. But length of life alone is an insufficient basis for such judgements - a person's health-related quality-of-life also needs to be taken into account. If one of the objectives of public policy is to reduce inequalities in lifetime health, it will be demonstrated that this is very likely to require systematic discrimination against the older members of a community. The notion of community solidatity will also be tested, because a decision will need to be made as to whether the same fair innings applies to all members of the community, or whether some are entitled to more than others. The strength of the fair innings principle is that it brings these issues to the fore in a systematic way which should ais their resolition in a practical context.     

Pragmatism, Science, And Society: A Review Of Richard Rorty's Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1

Richard Rorty's Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 is a collection of papers that explores the implications of philosophical pragmatism in several areas, including natural science, mind—body issues in philosophy, and perspectives on liberal democracy and social change. Similarities between Rorty's pragmatism and Skinner's radical behaviorism are explored in each of these three areas. Although some important and interesting differences are found regarding the role of science in social change, most areas show remarkable similarities between the two systematic perspectives.     

The import of infancy for individual, family, and societal development: commentary on the special section: does infancy matter?

Across their life spans humans actualize a rich potential for cognitive and behavioral plasticity, a set of developmental changes that require regulation of organism-context relations on the part of both the individual and society. An individual’s action on the context must be started in infancy and maintained in subsequent periods of life for adaptive functioning to occur across ontogeny. The process of the individual acting as an agent of his or her own development is continuous, although the particular ways in which such control is manifested will change in developmentally appropriate ways. As demonstrated by the papers in this special issue, the significance of infancy for the rest of the life-span rests on an integration of this continuity and discontinuity within the person-context developmental system.     

Logic and Philosophy of Logic in Wittgenstein

This essay discusses Wittgenstein's conception of logic, early and late, and some of the types of logical system that he constructed. The essay shows that the common view according to which Wittgenstein had stopped engaging in logic as a philosophical discipline by the time of writing Philosophical Investigations is mistaken. It is argued that, on the contrary, logic continued to figure at the very heart of later Wittgenstein's philosophy; and that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of logic contains many interesting thoughts that have gone widely unnoticed.     

Virtue and the Good Life in the Early Confucian Tradition

This essay examines the role of virtue and the status of non‐moral goods in conceptions of the good human life through an exploration of the thought of Confucius and Mencius. Both Confucius and Mencius lived in quite similar worlds, but their conceptualizations of the world differed from each another. This difference led them to hold different views on the role of virtue and the status of non‐moral goods. On the one hand, Confucius highlighted the self‐sufficiency of virtue, but he acknowledged and appreciated the intrinsic and instrumental value of non‐moral goods. On the other hand, while Mencius underscored the role of virtue as the best means to the best ends, he tried to depreciate the value of non‐moral goods. As a consequence, even though their conceptions of the good life were essentially predicated on virtue, they parted company concerning the status of non‐moral goods in human life.     

Perceived Discrimination and Health-Related Quality of Life: Testing the Reserve Capacity Model in Hispanic Americans

ABSTRACT

This study tested aspects of the Reserve Capacity Model (Gallo & Matthews, 2003 Gallo, L. C. and Matthews, K. A. 2003. Understanding the association between socioeconomic status and physical health: Do negative emotions play a role?. Psychological Bulletin, 129: 10–51. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Gallo, Penedo Espinosa de los Monteros, & Arguelles, 2009 Gallo, L. C., Penedo, F. J., Espinosa de los Monteros, K. and Arguelles, W. 2009. Resiliency in the face of disadvantage: Do Hispanic cultural characteristics protect health outcomes?. Journal of Personality, 77: 1707–1746. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) as a means of understanding disparities in health-related quality of life appraisals among Hispanic Americans. Questionnaire data were collected from 236 Hispanic participants, including measures of perceived discrimination, optimism, social support, symptoms of trait anxiety, and physical and mental health-related quality of life. Path analysis indicated direct, negative associations between perceived discrimination and both forms of health-related quality of life. Results also showed that these relationships were partially mediated by the reserve capacity variable of optimism and by symptoms of anxiety, though evidence for mediation by anxiety was stronger than for optimism. Findings suggest that perceived discrimination depletes intrapersonal reserves in Hispanic Americans, which, in turn, induces negative emotions. Implications for community-level interventions are discussed.     

Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”     

What Is Legal Philosophy?

This article delineates some of the main issues that are debated by philosophers of law. It explores the connections between legal philosophy and other areas of philosophy, while also seeking to specify the distinctiveness of many of the concerns that have preoccupied philosophers of law. It illustrates its abstract points with examples focused on the separability of law and morality, the nature of the rule of law, the nature of rights, justifications for the imposition of punishment, and the identification of basic legal entitlements.     

Modeling,Truth, and Philosophy

Knowledge requires truth, and truth, we suppose, involves unflawed representation. Science does not provide knowledge in this sense but rather provides models, representations that are limited in their accuracy, precision, or, most often, both. Truth as we usually think of it is an idealization, one that serves wonderfully in most ordinary applications, but one that can terribly mislead for certain issues in philosophy. This article sketches how this happens for five important issues, thereby showing how philosophical method must take into account the idealized nature of our familiar conception of truth.     

Hume and the nominalist tradition

Many of the central theses of Hume's philosophy – his rejection of real relations, universals, abstract objects and necessary causal relations – had precedents in the later medieval nominalist tradition. Hume and his medieval predecessors developed complex semantic theories to show both how ontologies are apt to become inflated and how, if we understand carefully the processes by which meaning is generated, we can achieve greater ontological parsimony. Tracing a trajectory from those medieval traditions to Hume reveals Hume to be more radical, particularly in his rejection of abstraction and abstract ideas. Hume's denial of general, abstract ideas is consistent with his philosophical principles but fails to appreciate the more sophisticated nominalist approaches to abstraction, the result of which is a theoretically impoverished account of our capacity for generalization.