Is Political Conservatism Adaptive? Reinterpreting Right‐Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as Evolved,Sociofunctional Strategies

The Dual Process Model (DPM) explains prejudice and political conservatism as functions of Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and a Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Duckitt, 2001). From an evolutionary perspective, such orientations may represent specific adaptations to coalitional competition in the ancestral environment (Sinn & Hayes, 2016). Supporting this view, recent research suggests the two orientations represent divergent strategies, with RWA pursuing an honest‐cooperator strategy and SDO a deceptive, cooperation‐mimicking strategy (Heylen & Pauwels, 2015). In two studies, we examine additional evidence for an adaptationist interpretation of DPM. Utilizing life history theory, Study 1 finds that RWA reflects the predicted “slow” strategy by endorsing planning and control, investment in family relationships, altruism, and religiosity. In contrast, SDO reflects a “fast” strategy by devaluing planning and control, secure relationships, and altruism. Utilizing rank management theory, Study 2 finds that RWA reflects a prosocial orientation, endorsing coalition building and social networking while rejecting deception and manipulation. In contrast, SDO reflects an exploitive orientation, rejecting coalition building and networking but endorsing ruthless self‐advancement and deceptive tactics. These findings support an adaptationist revision of RWA to recognize its prosocial, honest‐cooperator dimension and of SDO to recognize proself, “dark” tactics seeking power within groups.     

International students’ attachment and psychological well-being: the mediation role of mental toughness

This study examined the relationships of adult attachment, mental toughness (MT), and psychological well-being of international students. We hypothesized that attachment anxiety and avoidance would predict psychological well-being outcome variables and that MT would mediate the attachment-wellbeing links. The participants were 217 international students from a large public college in the United States. Structure Equation Modeling analyses were used to examine the proposed mediation effects. Result showed that MT functioned as a mediator for the paths between attachment anxiety and the two well-being latent variables of psychological distress and life satisfaction. On the other hand, attachment avoidance was found to have a more direct effect on adjustment difficulties without going through MT. Limitation and counseling implications are discussed.     

The effect of perceived control on self-reported cardiovascular disease incidence across adulthood and old age

Objective: To examine whether rates of change in perceived control are predictive of cardiovascular disease (CVD) incidence across adulthood and old age.

Design: We used the PATH Through Life Project (n = 7103, M = 40, SD = 16; 52% women), a longitudinal panel survey that encompasses three cohorts at Time 1, ages 20–24, 40–44 and 60–64, who have been assessed three times at four-year intervals.

Method: We examined whether rates of change in perceived control were associated with CVD incidence over 8 years of time, over and above that of baseline levels of perceived control and known risk factors for CVD.

Main Outcome Measures: Self-reported CVD incidence.

Results: Increases in perceived control over time were associated with decreased likelihood of 8-year incidence of CVD and these effects were independent of socio-demographics, covariates and baseline levels of perceived control. The effects were consistent across young adulthood, midlife and old age and for men and women.

Conclusions: Findings demonstrate the importance of changes in perceived control as a predictor of CVD incidence across adulthood and old age. We suggest future research using mediation analysis to test reverse causality and mechanisms underlying the effects of perceived control on CVD incidence.     

Marr,Mayr, and MR: What functionalism should now be about

In this review essay on The Multiple Realization Book by Polger and Shapiro, I consider the prospects for a biologically grounded notion of multiple realization (MR) which has been given too little consideration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Thinking about MR in the context of biological notions of function and robustness leads to a rethink of what would count as a viable functionalist theory of mind. I also discuss points of tension between Polger and Shapiro’s definition of MR and current explanatory practice in neuroscience.     

The experimental critique and philosophical practice

Some experimental philosophers have criticized the standard intuition-based methodology in philosophy. One worry about this criticism is that it is just another version of the general skepticism toward the evidential efficacy of intuition, and is thereby subject to the same difficulties. In response, Weinberg provides a more nuanced version of the criticism by targeting merely the philosophical use of intuition. I contend that, though Weinberg’s approach differs from general skepticism about intuition, its focus on philosophical practices gives rise to a new difficulty. Most extant experimental surveys investigate intuitions about particular cases through vignettes giving little contextual information. However, philosophical practices crucially depend on intuitions about general claims and typically provide more contextual background. I argue that, due to these two differences between surveys’ and philosophers’ appeals to intuition, Weinberg’s critique lacks enough support from current experimental data. I conclude that experimental philosophers who engage in the negative program should pay more attention on testing philosophers’ use of general intuitions and context-rich intuitions.     

Dispositional optimism and luck attributions: Implications for philosophical theories of luck

We conducted two studies to determine whether there is a relationship between dispositional optimism and the attribution of good or bad luck to ambiguous luck scenarios. Study 1 presented five scenarios that contained both a lucky and an unlucky component, thereby making them ambiguous in regard to being an overall case of good or bad luck. Participants rated each scenario in toto on a four-point Likert scale and then completed an optimism questionnaire. The results showed a significant correlation between optimism and assignments of luck: more optimistic people rated the characters in the ambiguous scenarios as more lucky while more pessimistic people rated the same characters in the same scenarios as more unlucky. Study 2 separated the good and bad luck components of the study 1 scenarios and presented the components individually to a new group of participants. Participants rated the luckiness of each component on the same four-point scale and then completed the optimism questionnaire. We found that the luckiness of the bad luck component could be significantly predicted by their level of optimism. We discuss how these findings pose problems for philosophical accounts that treat luck as an objective property.     

From Kant to Sade: a fragment of the history of philosophy in the Dialectic of Enlightenment

In this paper, I set out (1) to consider the extent to which Horkheimer and Adorno's account of the transition from Kant's philosophy to key features of the novels of the Marquis de Sade in the Second Excursus of their Dialectic of Enlightenment can be viewed as a fragment of the ‘history of philosophy’ and (2) to explain this account in a way that allows us to ask whether it succeeds in establishing a necessary connection between Kant's philosophy and Sade's novels. In connection with (2), a particular problem emerges. This problem concerns the role played by a non-instrumental form of reason in Horkheimer and Adorno's attempt to establish an essential connection between Kant's theoretical philosophy and Sade's novels, in which the practical implications of the theoretical employment of reason allegedly become explicit. It will be shown that, despite appearances to the contrary, an employment of reason of the relevant type is not identified by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason.     

Robustness of Decision‐Making Competence: Evidence from Two Measures and an 11‐Year Longitudinal Study

Decision‐making competence (DMC) is the ability to follow normative principles when making decisions. In a longitudinal analysis, we examine the robustness of DMC over time, as measured by two batteries of paper‐and‐pencil tasks. Participants completed the youth version (Y‐DMC) at age 19 and/or the adult version (A‐DMC) 11 years later at age 30, as part of a larger longitudinal study. Both measures are composed of tasks adapted from ones used in experimental studies of decision‐making skills. Results supported the robustness of these measures and the usefulness of the construct. Response patterns for Y‐DMC were similar to those observed with a smaller initial sample drawn from the same population. Response patterns for A‐DMC were similar to those observed with an earlier community sample. Y‐DMC and A‐DMC were significantly correlated, for participants who completed both measures, 11 years apart, even after controlling for measures of cognitive ability. Nomological validity was observed in correlations of scores on both tests with measures of cognitive ability, cognitive style, and environmental factors with predicted relationships to DMC, including household socioeconomic status, neighborhood disadvantage, and paternal substance abuse. Higher Y‐DMC and A‐DMC scores were also associated with lower rates of potentially risky and antisocial behaviors, including adolescent delinquency, cannabis use, and early sexual behavior. Thus, the Y‐DMC and A‐DMC measures appear to capture a relatively stable, measurable construct that increases with supportive environmental factors and is associated with constructive behaviors. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.