The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in the Quality of Life/Environmental Interface

In this examination of the relationship between quality of life and the environment, it is argued that a broad framework within which the relationship can be established is required. The framework used is that of the dominant social paradigm (Pirages & Ehrlich, 1974) that contains political, economic, and technological institutions. It is these institutions that determine both the quality of life and environmental constructs within any society. The paper integrates these three areas in a single model that hypothesizes a particular relationship between the dominant social paradigm, the environment, and quality of life.     

Quality of Life in the European Union and the United States of America: Evidence from Comprehensive Indices

The main question of this article is about the quality of life in the European Union and the United States measured by different comprehensive indicators (HDI, WBI, WISP, OLS, PWI, ABS, HLE). On the world scale moderately different levels of quality of life characterize the European Area and the US. In objective terms, the US is more at the top level regarding economy and science, whereas Europe is more at the top level regarding social concerns in a broad sense. In subjective terms, which means to rely on the usual subjective measures, the average of US population seems to be slightly better off than the average of the EU population. That said, the differences inside the EU are often more significant than those between the EU and the US. Many EU countries in Northern and Western Europe show higher satisfaction levels than the US, and Eastern Europe is especially low in respect to the satisfaction of its population. It is rather obvious that the choice of criteria and values influences the results of the comparisons of nations and supranational unions to a considerable degree.     

Becoming a philosopher: What Heidegger learned from Dilthey, 1919–25

Wilhelm Dilthey is, famously, an epistemological pioneer for a second, ‘human’ kind of science that ‘understands’ life as we live it, instead of ‘explaining’ things as we observe them. Even today, he is usually cited for his role in the Erklären–Verstehen debate. My article, however, follows Heidegger's suggestion that we make the existence of the debate itself the problem. Whether there are different sorts of entity, different reasons for studying them and different means for doing so – such issues raise questions about science itself, not just about how to do it better. Moreover, what sort of philosopher is competent to address such questions? Heidegger argues that Dilthey's later writings intimate that it must be one who thinks from the ‘standpoint of (historical) life itself.’ This issue, says Heidegger, is ‘alive’ in Dilthey but is continually short-circuited by his very traditional plan for a ‘Critique of Historical Reason.’ Dilthey's unsuccessful struggles to produce this Critique are his gift to us, however. They encourage us to explicitly reconsider, as Heidegger does not only in Being and Time but throughout his life, what Dilthey cannot: If philosophy, like all human practices, is historical to the core, what is it to ‘be’ philosophical, about science or anything else?     

Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement

In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibility. This raises a puzzle about why Kant regarded it as synthetic, and what his explanatory claim means. I argue that the principle of complete determination does not follow from the principle of excluded middle because the externally negated or ‘negative’ judgement ‘Not (S is P)’ does not entail the internally negated or ‘infinite’ judgement ‘S is not-P.’ Kant's puzzling explanatory claim means that empirical objects are determined by the content of the totality of experience. This entails that empirical objects are completely determinate if and only if the totality of experience has a completely determinate content. I argue that it is not a priori whether experience has such a completely determinate content and thus not analytic that objects obey the principle of complete determination.     

Detrimental effect of cellular precipitation on the creep strength of Inconel740H

Cellular precipitation (also known as discontinuous precipitation) has been observed at the grain boundaries of a newly developed nickel-based Inconel740H alloy designed for use at 700?°C in advanced ultrasupercritical coal-fired power plants. By means of element mapping and selected area diffraction, the cellular precipitates were identified as Cr-rich M₂₃C₆ carbides. The onset of cellular precipitation was found to follow a pucker mechanism in Inconel740H. The cellular precipitates at the grain boundaries, even at low volume fractions, were severely detrimental to the creep strength at 750?°C. The creep rupture life of Inconel740H containing cellular precipitates at grain boundaries was only one-tenth of that for the alloy without cellular precipitates. The reason for the drastically decreased creep rupture life is attributed to the poor resistance of cellular precipitates to crack propagation during creep.     

Kierkegaard's Mirrors: Interest,Self, and Moral Vision

This paper advances the view that the history of philosophy is both a kind of history and a kind of philosophy. Through a discussion of some examples from epistemology, metaphysics, and the historiography of philosophy, it explores the benefit to philosophy of a deep and broad engagement with its history. It comes to the conclusion that doing history of philosophy is a way to think outside the box of the current philosophical orthodoxies. Somewhat paradoxically, far from imprisoning its students in outdated and crystallized views, the history of philosophy trains the mind to think differently and alternatively about the fundamental problems of philosophy. It keeps us alert to the fact that latest is not always best, and that a genuinely new perspective often means embracing and developing an old insight. The upshot is that the study of the history of philosophy has an innovative and subversive potential, and that philosophy has a great deal to gain from a long, broad, and deep conversation with its history.     

Analytic philosophy, 1925–69: emergence,management and nature

ABSTRACT

This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925–69. The pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers systematically promote a form of critical philosophy and marginalize rival approaches to philosophy. This pattern, it is argued, helps to explain the growing dominance of analytic philosophy during the twentieth century and allows characterizing this form of philosophy as, at least during 1925–69, a sectarian form of critical philosophy.     

Louis Couturat,modern logic,and the international auxiliary language

ABSTRACT

To some extent, the early twentieth century revival of universal languages was the work of logicians and mathematicians. Pioneers of modern logic such as Frege, Russell and Peano wanted to overcome the diversity and deficiencies of natural languages. Through the rigour of formal logic, they aimed at providing scientific thinking with a reliable medium free from the ambiguity and inconsistencies of ordinary language. This article shows some interconnections between modern logic and the search for a common tongue that would unite scientists and people of all nations. The French mathematician and philosopher Louis Couturat is a key figure in understanding the interplay between these two movements. Through his work in composing the Ido language as an alternative to Esperanto, Couturat gave a new life to the Leibnizian idea of a universal characteristics. In addition, his multifaceted work provides a valuable insight into some political implications of early analytic philosophy.     

Phenomenology of autobiographical memories: The Memory Experiences Questionnaire

The phenomenology of autobiographical memories varies on a number of dimensions: some memories are vivid and others dim; some are emotionally intense and others lack emotional content. The present research sought to develop a psychometrically-sound scale to assess the entire range of dimensions on which autobiographical memories differ. We reviewed the literature on memory experiences and identified 10 relevant dimensions: Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Time Perspective, Sensory Details, Visual Perspective, Emotional Intensity, Sharing, Distancing, and Valence. We constructed a comprehensive item pool to assess these dimensions and, using data from several large samples (Ns=941; 510; 212), we showed that: (a) all 10 scales had adequate reliability (median alpha=.87; range=.72 to .97), (b) the 10-factor structure provided a good fit to the data, and (c) gender, personality, and memory recency had theoretically meaningful relations with the 10 scales. For example, gender and ethnicity differences in phenomenology were mediated by memory content, and early and recent memories had distinct phenomenologies. The discussion focuses on the theoretical and practical utility of the 10 scales.