Keeping People In or Out?

Abstract : In this article I argue that the Lutheran doctrine of two kingdoms provides a good basis for the legitimate participation of all citizens in political discourse and decisions, no matter what faith they hold. The argument is backed by selected insights from philosopher Jürgen Habermas and sociologists Linda Woodhead and Paul Heelas. Against this backdrop, I suggest some challenges for a theology that addresses issues related to religion and society.     

Intentions to participate in counselling among front-line,at-risk Irish government employees: an application of the theory of planned behaviour

ABSTRACT

The study set out to examine intentions to engage in counselling among at-risk Irish government employees and the differential utility of two alternative theory of planned behaviour (TPB) models of behaviour to explain intentions to participate in counselling. Individuals (N=259) employed in a front-line, at-risk occupation for the Irish government completed a TPB-based questionnaire. Quantitative analyses revealed that participants held positive to neutral intentions to participate in counselling, irrespective of gender. The original TPB model explained 49.9% of variance in intentions whereas an alternative TPB model, splitting the perceived behavioural control (PBC) construct between its internal and external control components, explained a further 8.9% of variance. Furthermore, self-efficacy was found to be the strongest predictor of intentions. This study therefore supports the use of the TPB in understanding counselling-seeking behaviour.     

Perspective-taking and depth of theory-of-mind reasoning in sequential-move games

Theory-of-mind (ToM) involves modeling an individual's mental states to plan one's action and to anticipate others' actions through recursive reasoning that may be myopic (with limited recursion) or predictive (with full recursion). ToM recursion was examined using a series of two-player, sequential-move matrix games with a maximum of three steps. Participants were assigned the role of Player I, controlling the initial and the last step, or of Player II, controlling the second step. Appropriate for the assigned role, participants either anticipated or planned Player II's strategy at the second step, and then determined Player I's optimal strategy at the first step. Participants more readily used predictive reasoning as Player II (i.e., planning one's own move) than as Player I (i.e., anticipating an opponent's move), although they did not differ when translating reasoning outcome about the second step to optimal action in the first step. Perspective-taking influenced likelihood of predictive reasoning, but it did not affect the rate at which participants acquired it during the experimental block. We conclude that the depth of ToM recursion (related to perspective-taking mechanisms) and rational application of belief-desire to action (instrumental rationality) constitute separate cognitive processes in ToM reasoning.     

The development of automatic and controlled inhibitory retrieval processes in true and false recall

In three experiments, we investigated the role of automatic and controlled inhibitory retrieval processes in true and false memory development in children and adults. Experiment 1 incorporated a directed forgetting task to examine controlled retrieval inhibition. Experiments 2 and 3 used a part-set cue and retrieval practice task to examine automatic retrieval inhibition. In the first experiment, the forget cue had no effect on false recall for adults but reduced false recall for children. In Experiments 2 and 3, both tasks caused retrieval impairments for true and false recall, and this occurred for all age groups. Implicit inhibition, which occurs outside of our conscious control, appears early in childhood. However, because young children do not process false memories as automatically as adults, explicit inhibition can reduce false memory output.     

Art as Orientation

What is it that we lack in everyday life that causes us to value art so highly? This article argues that (almost) all values are to be understood in terms of a needs‐satisfaction system, and hence that the value of art can be understood only with reference to the state of the appreciator prior to engagement with the artwork. Aesthetic appreciation can be analysed as a process, which can be described in empirically based psychological terms, leading to a functional view of aesthetic experience as potentially enhancing the individual's orientation at sensory, cognitive, and interpersonal levels; our motivation is a special form of pleasure. Various objections are then considered, with particular attention to the role of pleasure in connection with tragedy; the relation of art to related cultural pursuits is also briefly indicated.     

The Owl and the Ostrich: Reply to Sami Pihlström on Ethical Unthinkabilities and Philosophical Seriousness

Sami Pihlström argues in his “Ethical Unthinkabilities and Philosophical Seriousness” that there are some philosophical views that are so dangerous that we should not discuss them. He advances this argument with special reference to my (anti‐natalist) view that being brought into existence is always a serious harm. In response I argue: (a) that there are major flaws in his argument for the conclusion that we should not think about (purportedly) unthinkable views; and (b) that my views about the harm of coming into existence are in any event neither unthinkable nor dangerous.     

The psychological neuroscience of depression: implications for understanding effects of deep brain stimulation

In this article it is suggested that current psychological theories of depression presuppose that this condition will develop as a result of a vicious circle involving negatively biased communication between systems of emotional stress-/alarm-signaling, executive functions and mood regulation. These systems may from a neuroanatomical point of view be located in the limbic system, the orbitofrontal and lateral prefrontal cortex and the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal (HPA-) axis respectively. The theoretical and practical implications of this model for the understanding of pharmacological treatments of depression are briefly discussed and this theory is related to the catecholamine hypothesis of depression. The model is furthermore discussed in relation to deep brain stimulation (DBS) of treatment resistant major depression. Similarities and differences between this perspective and the one advocated by the "homeostatic theory" of depression are discussed. It is concluded that a topographical psychological theory may offer a useful heuristic in thinking about depression and that it offers several testable predictions about treatments of the disorder.     

The evolution of decision-making under risk: Framing effects in monkey risk preferences

When making choices between risky options, human decision-makers exhibit a number of framing effects. One of the most prominent framing effects is the tendency for decision makers to evaluate gambles relative to a reference point, and to act risk-seeking when prospects are framed as losses but risk-averse when identical prospects are framed as gains. This tendency for risk-preferences to reverse between loss and gain frames has been termed the reflection effect, and is one of the primary predictions of Prospect Theory. Here, we explore whether non-human primates exhibit a similar reflection effect. Using a token-trading task, we show that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) exhibit an analogous reversal of risk preferences depending on whether outcomes are presented as gains or losses, suggesting that similar framing effects also influence choice in non-human primates. This finding suggests that the mechanisms that drive framing effects in humans may be evolutionarily ancient, extending broadly across the primate order.     

Some determinants of remote behavioral history effects in humans

Undergraduates were exposed to a series of reinforcement schedules: first, to a fixed-ratio (FR) schedule in the presence of one stimulus and to a differential-reinforcement-of-low-rate (DRL) schedule in the presence of another (multiple FR DRL training), then to a fixed-interval (FI) schedule in the presence of a third stimulus (FI baseline), next to the FI schedule under the stimuli previously correlated with the FR and DRL schedules (multiple FI FI testing), and, finally, to a single session of the multiple FR DRL schedule again (multiple FR DRL testing). Response rates during the multiple FI FI schedule were higher under the former FR stimulus than under the former DRL stimulus. This effect of remote histories was prolonged when either the number of FI-baseline sessions was small or zero, or the time interval between the multiple FR DRL training and the multiple FI FI testing was short. Response rates under these two stimuli converged with continued exposure to the multiple FI FI schedule in most cases, but quickly differentiated when the schedule returned to the multiple FR DRL.     

Modeling the effect of reward amount on probability discounting

The present study with college students examined the effect of amount on the discounting of probabilistic monetary rewards. A hyperboloid function accurately described the discounting of hypothetical rewards ranging in amount from $20 to $10,000,000. The degree of discounting increased continuously with amount of probabilistic reward. This effect of amount was not due to changes in the rate parameter of the discounting function, but rather was due to increases in the exponent. These results stand in contrast to those observed with the discounting of delayed monetary rewards, in which the degree of discounting decreases with reward amount due to amount-dependent decreases in the rate parameter. Taken together, this pattern of results suggests that delay and probability discounting reflect different underlying mechanisms. That is, the fact that the exponent in the delay discounting function is independent of amount is consistent with a psychophysical scaling interpretation, whereas the finding that the exponent of the probability-discounting function is amount-dependent is inconsistent with such an interpretation. Instead, the present results are consistent with the idea that the probability-discounting function is itself the product of a value function and a weighting function. This idea was first suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), although their prospect theory does not predict amount effects like those observed. The effect of amount on probability discounting was parsimoniously incorporated into our hyperboloid discounting function by assuming that the exponent was proportional to the amount raised to a power. The amount-dependent exponent of the probability-discounting function may be viewed as reflecting the effect of amount on the weighting of the probability with which the reward will be received.