Why don't you believe me? Detecting deception in messages written by nonnative and native speakers

Detecting lies is crucial in numerous contexts, including situations in which individuals do not interact in their native language. Previous research suggests that individuals are perceived as less credible when they communicate in a nonnative compared with native language. The current study was the first to test this effect in truthful and fabricated messages written by native and nonnative English speakers. One hundred native English speakers judged the veracity of these messages, and overall, they proved less likely to believe and to correctly classify nonnative speakers' messages; differences in verbal cues between native and nonnative speakers' messages partly explained the differences in the judgments. Given the increased use of nonnative languages in a globalized world, the discrimination against nonnative speakers in veracity judgments is problematic. Further research should more thoroughly investigate the role of verbal cues in written and spoken nonnative language to enable the development of effective interventions.     

Lying about flying: The efficacy of the information protocol and model statement for detecting deceit

Due to time constraints, interviews aimed to detect deception in airport settings should be brief and veracity assessments should be made in real time. In two experiments carried out in the departure hall of an international airport, truth tellers were asked to report truthfully their forthcoming trip, whereas liars were asked to lie about the purpose of their trip. In Experiment 1, we examined five verbal cues that we thought had potential to discriminate truth tellers from liars in short airport interviews: elaboration in disclosing information, checkable details, how many people are aware of the trip, complications, and plausibility. In Experiment 2, we attempted to improve the interview protocol by adding a second interview phase in which we introduced an information protocol and model statement. All five cues differentiated truth tellers from liars in both experiments, but the information protocol and model statement did not enhance these differences.     

The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?

People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are; this is called the truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the heuristic‐analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in truth responding was not the result of speakers appearing more deceptive, but was instead attributable to the rater's processing style. Yet contrary to HAMs, across three experiments we found the decline in bias was not related to the amount of processing time available (Experiments 1–3) or the communication channel (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 we found support for a new account: that the bias reflects whether raters perceive the statement to be internally consistent.     

Perceived warmth and competence of others shape voluntary deceptive behaviour in a morally relevant setting

The temptation to deceive others compares to a moral dilemma: it involves a conflict between the temptation to obtain some benefit and the desire to conform to personal and social moral norms or avoid aversive social consequences. Thus, people might feel different levels of emotional and moral conflict depending on the target of the deception. Here we explored, in a morally relevant setting, how social judgements based on two fundamental dimensions of human social cognition – ‘warmth’ and ‘competence’ – impact on the decision to deceive others. Results revealed independent effects for warmth and competence. Specifically, while people are less inclined to deceive for self-gain those individuals they perceive as warm, they also tend to lie more to highly competent others. Furthermore, the perceived warmth and competence modulated the general tendency to reduce deceptive behaviour when there was a risk of disclosure compared to when the lying was anonymous, highlighting the importance of these judgements in social evaluation processes. Together, our results demonstrate that the emotional costs and personal moral standards that inhibit engagement in deceptive behaviour are not stable but rather malleable according to the target and the consequences of the deception.     

The relationship between the adult attachment and the tendency to judge others as liars

The relationship between 2 dimensions (anxiety and avoidance) of adult attachment and tendency to judge others as liars was examined in this study. We measured 308 participants' adult attachment and tendency to judge others as liars in self‐, other‐, or relationship‐oriented situations. Results supported our hypotheses by showing that (a) anxiety positively predicted the tendency to judge others as liars in self‐oriented situations and (b) avoidance moderated the relationship between anxiety and the tendency to judge others as liars in other‐ and relationship‐oriented situations. Attachment anxiety could positively predict the tendency to judge others as liars only when participants' avoidance was high. Theoretical implications and suggestions for future studies were discussed.     

GKT范式在确定犯罪嫌疑人中的应用：一项ERP测谎研究

刑事犯罪已成为当今各国面临的普遍性社会问题,因此急需可靠有效的测谎技术以适应当前打击犯罪的严峻形势。本研究采用犯罪知识测试范式（Guilty knowledge test, GKT）,以犯罪嫌疑人为对象,以真实犯罪现场为素材,探究真实环境下与测谎探测相关的脑电指标（P300、CNV）的有效性和可靠性。行为数据显示,目标刺激的反应正确率显著小于探测和无关刺激,探测刺激的反应时显著小于目标刺激和无关刺激。脑电数据显示,相较于目标刺激和无关刺激,探测刺激诱发的P300波幅最大且P300的检出率为92.5%,而在CNV指标上目标刺激诱发的波幅最大, 无关刺激次之,探测刺激最小。结果表明,与CNV相比,P300能够有效检测被试所隐藏的犯罪细节信息,且检出率较高,稳定性较好,是一种较为可靠的测谎指标。     

Using an Example Statement Increases Information but Does Not Increase Accuracy of CBCA,RM, and SCAN

Verbal credibility assessment methods are frequently used in the criminal justice system to investigate the truthfulness of statements. Three of these methods are Criteria Based Content Analysis (CBCA), Reality Monitoring (RM), and Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN). The aim of this study is twofold. First, we investigated the diagnostic accuracy of CBCA, RM, and especially SCAN. Second, we tested whether giving the interviewee an example of a detailed statement can enhance the diagnostic accuracy of these verbal credibility methods. To test the latter, two groups of participants were requested to write down one true and one fabricated statement about a negative event. Prior to this request, one group received a detailed example statement, whereas the other group received no additional information. Results showed that CBCA and RM scores differed between true and fabricated statements, whereas SCAN scores did not. Giving a detailed example statement did not lead to better discrimination between truth tellers and liars for any of the methods but did lead to the participants producing significantly longer statements. The implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When proportion consensus scoring works

Most objectively scored tests use items with easily identifiable correct answers. When such veridical scoring keys cannot be constructed, researchers sometimes use proportion consensus scoring (PCS) to identify the best answers. To determine if PCS identifies the best answers, we scored a test using both PCS and veridical scoring. Among 353 undergraduates, regular PCS, two-stage PCS, and expert PCS all had high correlations for easy items, but no PCS methods had high correlations for difficult items. Thus, PCS cannot reliability identify the best answers to individual items. However, PCS worked well for total scores. For easy items, total scores had correlations above .99 for all PCS methods. For difficult items, expert and two-stage PCS had correlations of .92 and .82 for the 60-item test. Thus, expert and two-stage PCS can be justified (even for difficult items) if the scoring key is based upon people who truly possess some degree of expertise and if scores are summed over many items.     

The computerized scoring algorithm for the autobiographical memory test: updates and extensions for analyzing memories of English-speaking adults

ABSTRACT

The Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) has been central in psychopathological studies of memory dysfunctions, as reduced memory specificity or overgeneralised autobiographical memory has been recognised as a hallmark vulnerability for depression. In the AMT, participants are asked to generate specific memories in response to emotional cue words, and their responses are scored by human experts. Because the manual coding takes some time, particularly when analysing a large dataset, recent studies have proposed computerised scoring algorithms. These algorithms have been shown to reliably discriminate between specific and non-specific memories of English-speaking children and Dutch- and Japanese-speaking adults. The key limitation is that the algorithm is not developed for English-speaking adult memories, which may cover a wider range of vocabulary that the existing algorithm for English-speaking child memories cannot process correctly. In the present study, we trained a new support vector machine to score memories of English-speaking adults. In a performance test (predicting memory specificity against human expert coding), the adult-memory algorithm outperformed the child-memory variant. In another independent performance test, the adult-memory algorithm showed robust performances to score memories that were generated in response to a different set of cues. These results suggest that the adult-memory algorithm reliably scores memory specificity.     

A P.S. on B.S.: Some Remarks on Humbug and Bullshit

While lies have attracted philosophical attention since antiquity, phenomena in the near area have generated considerably less interest. Lately, however, Max Black and Harry Frankfurt have visited a close relative: humbug or bullshit, as it's either more politely or more rudely called. In this article their views on humbug and bullshit are exposed, explained, critiqued, and, ultimately, rejected. An alternative view is then proposed and defended.