Religion and Religions in Prisons: Observations from the United States and Europe

Despite manifest differences and internal variety, this article attempts to integrate the histories and present landscapes of religious practice in prison in the United States and in Western Europe. We identify, among incarcerated people in the United States, Italy, and Germany, discernible drifts toward religious pluralization, privatization, and individualization. Over the past half‐century, the administration of religion in prison has been loosened to allow for a wider variety of religious beliefs and practices. Meanwhile, as subsidized by outside volunteers, religion, especially of a socially “useful,” capitalism‐friendly sort, remains a cost‐effective means for prison administrators to efficiently subcontract their mandate to rehabilitate. Due to the decentralization and diversification of religion in contemporary prisons on both sides of the northern Atlantic, this article concludes by encouraging would‐be ethnographers of the prison interested in religion to venture beyond the expressly delineated religious space and into what we call “religious gray zones.”     

Our inalienable ability to sin: Peter Olivi’s rejection of asymmetrical freedom

From the time of Augustine to the late thirteenth century, leading Christian thinkers agreed that freedom requires the ability to make good choices, but not the ability to make bad ones. If freedom required the ability to sin, they reasoned, neither God nor the angels nor the blessed in heaven could be free. This essay examines the work of Peter Olivi, the first medieval philosopher known to reject the asymmetrical conception of freedom. Olivi argues that the ability to sin is essential to creaturely freedom and remains even in heaven. While Anselm is the nominal target of Olivi’s arguments on this topic, they form part of a wider critique directed even more at Aquinas and his followers. Olivi faults them for misunderstanding the nature of the created will and for failing to provide a foundation for a particular kind of moral responsibility: personal merit.     

In the grip of the python: Conflicts at the university-industry interface

When the University of Toronto withdrew a contract it held with me in December 2000, it initiated a sequence of events that led to a public letter to the University from senior figures in the world psychopharmacology community protesting against the infringement of academic freedom involved and a first ever legal action, undertaked by this author, seeking redress for a violation of academic freedom. The issues of academic freedom surrounding this case have been intertwined with a debate about the possibility that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) group of antidepressants have the potential to trigger suicidality in a subgroup of patients. Whether the SSRIs do trigger suicidality or not, exploration of this issue has given rise to a number of worrying sets of observations. First, in my view, there is evidence that pharmaceutical companies have miscoded raw data on suicidal acts and suicidal ideation. Second, this author also maintains that there is a growing body of examples of ghostwriting of articles in the therapeutics domain. Many of the tensions evident in this case, therefore, can be linked to company abilities to keep clinical trial data out of the public domain — this is the point at which the pharmaceutical python gets a grip on academia.     

Patients’ health or company profits? The commercialisation of academic research

This paper is a personal account of the events associated with the author's work at the University of Toronto's Hospital for Sick Children on a drug, deferiprone, for the treatment of thalassaemia. Trials of the drug were sponsored by the Canadian Medical Research Council and a drug company which would have been able, had the trials been successful, to seek regulatory approval to market the drug. When evidence emerged that deferiprone might be inadequately effective in a substantial proportion of patients, the drug company issued legal threats when the author proposed informing her patients and the scientific community. Until protests were made by international authorities in her field of research, the hospital and university did not adequately support the author's academic freedom and responsibilities as a medical practitioner. It is argued that underlying cause of this, and of other similar cases, is the political philosophy which is driving the commercialisation of universities and bringing about the deregulation of drug approval procedures. Together these changes constitute a serious threat to the public good.     

Why patients should give thanks for their disease: traditional Christianity on the joy of suffering.

Patristic teaching about sin and disease allows supplementing well-acknowledged conditions for a Christian medicine with further personal challenges, widely disregarded in Western Christianities. A proper appreciation of man's vocation toward (not just achieving forgiveness but) deification reveals the need to cooperate with the Holy Spirit's offer of grace toward restoring man's pre-fallen nature. Ascetical exercises designed at re-establishing the spirit's mastery over the soul distance persons from (even supposedly harmless) passion. They thus inspire the struggle towards emulating Christ's (self-crucifying) kenotic love, and to accept even secularly "undeserved" suffering as spiritually deserved in view of his (forever) lacking fervor in that struggle. Only in the spirit of that love can the evil Adam's sin brought into this world work its therapeutic impact, the eschatological purpose of which explains God's lovingly permitting that evil. This therapeutic impact is physically manifested already in this life through the transforming energies granted the saints of the church.     

Freedom in responsibility: a response.

This paper is a critical response to Elisabeth Gr?b-Schmidt's article "Freedom in responsibility: On the relevance of 'sin' as hermeneutic guiding principle in bioethical decision making." Gr?b-Schmidt's chief contention is that ethics begins with anthropology, and that moral responsibility is thereby grounded within a set of given limits. Freedom is distorted into sin when these limits are transgressed. My principal complaint is that her account of the relationship between freedom and sin is grounded in a tragic ontology. Alternatively, I contend that anthropology is grounded in Christology in which freedom is a gift of the Spirit. Consequently, sin is not so much tragic as it marks a refusal of humans to accept their divine election. The issues of human cloning and embryonic stem-cell research are used to exemplify what difference these respective differences might make in a process of moral deliberation.     

Motor maps and synergies

Consider the process of raising and lowering the arm in the sagittal plane. Different parts of different muscles operate over different sectors of the angular range. How and why does the nervous system implement this differential muscle activation according to joint angle? We contend that such control depends on the adaptive formation of motor maps. These solve the problem of redundancy in the musculoskeletal system by connecting a relatively small number of cortical columns in the motor cortex to a large number of alpha motor neuron pools. We argue that motor maps are formed such that each functional muscle is activated in proportion to its moment arm about the movement. Because of this the required agonist and antagonist turning forces are generated with a minimum demand for metabolic energy. We know from biomechanical principles that, at any given posture, those muscle fibres that change length most in response to a small joint-angle change are those with the greatest moment arm. Likewise those that change least have the smallest. By establishing a model of the polynomial relationships between the lengths of functional muscles l and the corresponding changes in joint angles theta, the nervous system can generate signals partial differentiallj/ partial differentialthetai (where lj is the length of the jth functional muscle and thetai is the magnitude of the ith elemental movement). These signals create motor maps by modulating the gains of descending motor pathways. As a result, functional muscles are activated in proportion to their moment arms. This reduces the demand for metabolic energy to a minimum. Since moment arms change with joint angle, it also accounts for the experimental observations above. Such motor mapping effectively provides a minimum energy "wired-in" synergy. Established in utero, motor maps are the first stage of synergy formation and provide the basis for the development of subsequent task-dependent synergies.     

Grace and Imagination: From Fear to Freedom

Creative use of our imagination is essential if we are to live a vibrant life. Although our use of imagination is often blocked by various fears, D. W. Winnicott's insights into play, aggression, and the use of transitional objects open up paths towards greater freedom. The sacred texts, symbols, and liturgies of our religious traditions can then become the toys which engage us in profound and re-creating soul play. Through grace and the evocative examples of our teachers, we can find ways to use our imagination more freely to deepen our spiritual life and psychological wholeness.     

The psychologist who is not a psychologist: a deconstructive reading of Wolfgang Giegerich's idea of psychology proper

This paper represents an archetypal and deconstructive reading of the work of Wolfgang Giegerich. In an attempt to extend and philosophically develop Jung's late‐life view of the objective psyche, Giegerich, via Hegel, defines psychology proper as fundamentally separate from the everyday person and the ‘human, all‐too‐human’ aspects of the soul. It is argued that, in so doing, Giegerich removes the human person from being the primary focus of his psychology and creates instead a hierarchy of ideas and values privileging syntax over semantics, the logical over the empirical, and thinking over imagination. This bypasses the emotionality of the everyday person/patient and also renders psychology proper unable to address the day‐to‐day practice of the analyst. Giegerich attempts to rectify this problem by re‐incorporating what he had previously rejected, making his theory more complex than is apparent in his binary oppositions. In the end, however, it remains a question to what extent Giegerich is successful in avoiding a binary scission (Saban 2015) or a tendency to regularly de‐emphasize the human aspect of the soul (Hoedl 2015) in his need to continue to heroically push off from the ego seeking total freedom from neurosis and from our humanity.