Freud's psychoanalysis: A moral cure

That psychoanalytical treatment in its classical Freudian sense is primarily a moral or ethical cure is not a very controversial claim. However, it is far from obvious how we are to understand precisely the moral character of psychoanalysis. It has frequently been proposed that this designation is valid because psychoanalysis strives neither to cure psychological symptoms pharmaceutically, nor to superficially modify the behaviour of the analysand, but to lead the analysand through an interpretive process during which he gradually gains knowledge of the unconscious motives that determine his behaviour, a process that might ideally liberate him to obtain, in relation to his inner desires, the status of a moral agent. There resides something appealing in these claims. But it is the author's belief that there is an even deeper moral dimension applying to psychoanalytical theory and praxis. Freudian psychoanalysis is a moral cure due to its way of thematizing psychological suffering as moral suffering. And this means that the moral subject – the being that can experience moral suffering – is not primarily something that the psychoanalytical treatment strives to realize, but rather the presupposition for the way in which psychoanalysis theorizes psychological problems as such.     

Self-Reference,Reality Principles,Marxism, and Social Transformations in the Postmodern Era

Three distinct turning points (“bottleneck breakings”) in universal evolution are discussed at some length in terms of “self-reference” and (corresponding) “Reality Principles.” The first (origin and evolution of animate Nature) and second (human consciousness) are shown to necessarily precede a third one, that of Marxist philosophy. It is pointed out that while the previous two could occupy a natural (so in a sense neutral) place as parts of human science, the self-reference of Marxism, as a social human phenomenon, through its direct bearings on the practice of society, did have a stormy history. I conclude that the fall of Bolshevism was unavoidable, and still, we might uphold our hope for a truly free society of humankind, just on the very basis of what we have learned of the fate of Marxist philosophy as such, as a recursively evolving social practice: the freedom of humankind of its own ideological burdens (constraints).     

Fiat's cultural revolution: TQM as functional integration

The opening decade of this millennium witnessed genome scientists, policy makers, critical race theorists and world leaders standing together to pronounce the anti-racist democratic potential of human genomics. Understanding and assessing this rise of ‘anti-racist, democratic genomics’ requires distinguishing between two problems of power and science: the first characterized by what Michel Foucault labeled states of domination; the second by what he described as relations of power. When states of domination exist, as in the case of Nazi science, liberal efforts to extend new powers of participation and autonomy to research subjects may play important roles in redressing power imbalances between researchers and their subjects. However, when distinctions between scientist and research subject blur, as in the case of much human genomics, efforts to extend liberal rights to subjects of genomic studies—or genomic liberalism—may produce novel problems, including: (1) human genome scientists' loss of capacity to describe their objects of study; (2) disruption of research subjects' abilities to define themselves; and (3) lack of accountability for the unintended effects of efforts to democratize genomics. In these ways genomic liberalism may foster, at the same that it impedes, the co-constitution of knowledge and democratic subjects. It may create new forms of racism at the very moment that it explicitly seeks anti-racist ends. Addressing the problems created by this paradoxical position will require more sustained attention to and critique of the anti-racist and democratic imaginaries that increasingly animate technoscience.     

Unsinnig: A Reply to Hutto∗

Abstract

In the late 1930s Heidegger makes allusions to ‘the wild’ and ‘the mild’ in connection with a human liberation that he understands as a steadfast response to the claim that historical being (Seyn) makes upon us. The following paper elucidates these allusions in terms of the overturning of metaphysics that they entail.     

Freedom from and Freedom for: Luther's Concept of Freedom for the Twenty‐First Century

This article examines Martin Luther's two fundamental claims around Christian freedom. Drawing on Luther, I suggest three primary characteristics of Christian freedom that should be recovered and championed in our twenty‐first‐century context: it is relational, it is a gift; and it contains within it an ethical imperative for the sake of the neighbor. Together, these three characteristics point to the fact that in a Christian understanding, “freedom” is never considered by itself, but only in the larger context of “freedom from” and “freedom for.”     

The Pursuit of Happiness: The Virtue of Consumption and the Consumption of Virtue

Abstract : In a consumer culture we seek fulfillment and happiness through the act of consumption, often conflating purchasing power with freedom. The Christian tradition, however, teaches us that our telos is nothing less than friendship with God. It is through incorporation into a community of faith that we participate in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus and thereby receive a foretaste of true happiness.     

Openness,economic freedom and democracy moderate the relationship between national intelligence and GDP

Recent studies have shown a consistent relationship between per-capita GDP and the average intelligence of the population. In the present paper we show that intelligence is indeed a powerful predictor of GDP. However, other variables significantly moderate the relationship. The rise in GDP with rising intelligence proved more pronounced in countries exhibiting high levels of openness, Freedom/Democracy, and economic freedom. These conditions appear to enable a country to translate its cognitive capital into material wealth.     

Rethinking the Comparative Study of Religious Ethics

This essay describes the author's change of approach to the comparative study of religious ethics from the one contained in a book on the subject (with Sumner B. Twiss), published in 1978. The change resulted from interactions with Abdulaziz Sachedina, the noted scholar of Islam, demonstrating the importance of comparing different ethical systems in reference to global topics like human rights, particularly the right to freedom of conscience.