马克思的自由观及其当代意义

马克思的哲学中,艺术活动始终是人类自由生存的典范状态。在其早期思想中,由于视生产劳动本质上是一种类似于艺术的活动,马克思认为消除了异化的生产实践便是人的自由的实现?而在其晚年思想中,由于认识到物质生产领域始终是一个必然性王国,自由王国便被置于这一必然王国的彼岸,自由的实现也便只能存在于艺术活动之中,但这一自由王国的繁荣又依赖于必然王国借助生产率的提高所提供的自由时间的增长。马克思的这一自由观对于当代人类的自我理解仍有重要的意义。     

THE CREATED CO-CREATOR: WHAT IT IS AND IS NOT

Abstract In this article I briefly assesses Philip Hefner's concept of the created co‐creator by considering both what it does and does not claim. Looking at issues of reductionism, biological selfishness, biology and freedom, and environmental ethics, I point out strengths and weaknesses in Hefner's conception of the created co‐creator.     

FREEDOM AND NEUROBIOLOGY: A SCOTISTIC ACCOUNT

Abstract With the aid of some Scotistic conceptual distinctions, I develop a way of meeting the apparent deterministic sway of neurobiology. I make a careful distinction between formal and material freedom. Formal freedom, the ability to will or not to will a certain state of affairs regardless of whether it can be effectuated, remains, even if our material freedom to effectuate it is hampered by neurobiological mechanisms. These conceptual findings are linked with contemporary empirical research on obsessive‐compulsive disorder and the possibility of volitional modulation of cerebral function.     

Reductionism's Demise: Cold Comfort

Abstract. Nonreductive physicalism, as opposed to reductionism, enjoys wide popularity by virtue of being regarded as comporting with the traditional image of human beings as free and ontologically unique without the difficulties of mind‐body dualism. A consideration of reasons, both good and bad, for which reductionism is rejected suggests instead that the move to nonreductive physicalism does nothing to mitigate the implications of a physicalist account of human nature.     

Do Split Brains Listen to Prozac?

Abstract. Cognitive science challenges our understandings of self and freedom. In this article, adapted from a chapter in Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences (Peterson 2003), I review some of the scientific literature with regard to issues of self and freedom. I argue that our sense of self is a construct and heavily dependent on the kind of brain that we have. Furthermore, understanding the issue of freedom requires an understanding of the findings of cognitive science. Human beings are constrained to be free; our biology in no small way determines the kinds of freedom that we are able to have.     

庄子与史铁生的自由精神之比较

“乘物以游心”的庄子在乱世以自由逍遥的精神追求探究人生意义,执着的行魂史铁生处盛世思接远古,以个体的自由精神彰显生命本色。前者的自由精神是在时代之匣里对必然人生命运的结果性追求,后者的自由精神是于个体的偶然命运之殇里传递过程的美好。二者穿越时空对自由精神的多向度诉求使得人类的普世价值历久弥新。     

On Taboos: The Danish Cartoon Crisis 2005–20081

Abstract : The international crisis following the publication of 12 Muhammad cartoons in the Danish newspaper Jyllands‐Posten (September 30, 2005) raises the general question of how to exercise the freedom of expression in relation to religious taboos. After briefly reviewing the Cartoon Crisis from September 2005 to the bombings on the Danish Ambassay in Pakistan in June 2008, the article addresses Lutheran resources for coping with secularisation and desecularisation, in particular as regards the taboos that persist as a part of religious and humanistic values. The thesis is that the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms has given rise to two models of interpretation that have both been historically active. The doctrine of the two regiments has been interpreted both as a ‘liberalist’ argument for a principled separation of religion and politics, and as a ‘social‐conservative’ (later Social Democratic) argument for the view that the state should take care of its citizens' welfare through education, the legal system and social services. In today's global and multi‐religious world, this leads us to ask the question to what extent a welfare society, for the sake of peace and social order, should, or should not, protect religious sensitivities. Should religious communities always be kept out of public life, or can they be recognised as non‐governmental organizations in civil society, hence as potential partners for the state?     

Marcel's Testimony in Existential Psychotherapy with Couples and Families

In recent years a number of family therapists and teachers of family therapy have questioned the direction of the family therapy movement into relationship-distant and procedurally based treatment orientations. The purpose of this article is to outline Gabriel Marcel's concept of testimony and to show how this concept can be utilized to facilitate an increased emphasis upon the treatment relationship during marital and family psychotherapy.     

Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism

In this paper I discuss two kinds of attempts to qualify incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of freedom to avoid what have been thought to be incredible commitments of these rival accounts. One attempt -- which I call soft libertarianism -- is represented by Robert Kane's work. It hopes to defend an incompatibilist conception of freedom without the apparently difficult metaphysical costs traditionally incurred by these views. On the other hand, in response to what I call the robot objection (that if compatibilism is true, human beings could be the products of design), some compatibilists are tempted to soften their position by placing restrictions on the origins of agency. I argue that both of these attempts are misguided. Hard libertarianism and hard compatibilism are the only theoretical options.     

Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom

Some defenders of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) have responded to the challenge of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP by arguing that there remains a flicker of freedom -- that is, an alternative possibility for action -- left to the agent in FSCs. I argue that the flicker of freedom strategy is unsuccessful. The strategy requires the supposition that doing an act-on-one's-own is itself an action of sorts. I argue that either this supposition is confused and leads to counter-intuitive results; or, if the supposition is acceptable, then it is possible to use it to construct a FSC in which there is no flicker of freedom at all. Either way, the flicker of freedom strategy is ineffective against FSCs. Since the flicker of freedom strategy is arguably the best defense of PAP, I conclude that FSCs are successful in showing that PAP is false. An agent can act with moral responsibility without having alternative possibilities available to her.