In conversation with J. Philippe Rushton

The interview covers Rushton’s background in England, South Africa, and Canada, his education at the University of London (B.Sc., 1970; Ph.D., 1973), and his early research (1970–1980) on the social learning of generosity in 7- to 11-year olds. In his first book, Altruism, socialization, and society (1980), Rushton solved two “anomalies” for his social learning perspective—altruism in animals and traits in people—causing a “paradigm shift” for him toward sociobiology. He spent January to June 1981 at the University of California, Berkeley, to study the longitudinal stability of personality traits like altruism. There, he was influenced by Jensen’s work on g and race differences in rate of maturation and two-egg twinning. Subsequently, Rushton found that across 60 variables, Europeans fall between East Asians and Africans, closer to East Asians. He extrapolated Wilson’s (fast–slow) r-K life history theory to explain the pattern. Also covered is Rushton’s research on the heritability of altruism, and Genetic Similarity Theory explaining assortative mating and ethnic nepotism. Spouses and best friends are as similar as half-siblings and people randomly chosen from the same ethnic group are as related as first cousins. Altruism follows lines of similarity to replicate genes effectively. Rushton’s research on creativity is described.     

Socio-economic health inequalities: Their origins and implications

Abstract

Evidence attests to substantial variations in health contingent on socioeconomic position. It is argued that these effects cannot be dismissed as artefact nor can they be explained, in the main, by either social selection or an unequal distribution of accepted behavioural risk factors among different social groups. The most likely explanation would seem to be social causation. However, it is continuing social and material inequality that appears most implicated; accounts which locate the effects in childhood social and material causes are far less compelling. The persistence of socioeconomic health differentials into the materially better-off social strata and the possible determining role of relative as well as absolute living standards suggest that psychological, in addition to material, variables are likely to be involved. Isolating the key psychological variables and identifying the nature of their influences will not be easy tasks, although social relations, psychological stress, uplifts, and control have emerged as possible candidates. However, psychological mediators of this sort most probably constitute surface rather than basic causes. Socio-economic inequality, it is contended, remains the basic cause, and, as such, the proper target for intervention. Psychological interventions are unlikely to yield much in the way of dividends in this context and indeed could inadvertently contribute to victim blaming.     

When does feature search fail to protect against attentional capture?

ABSTRACT

When participants search for a shape (e.g., a circle) among a set of homogenous shapes (e.g., triangles) they are subject to distraction by colour singletons that are more salient than the target. However, when participants search for a shape among heterogeneous shapes, the presence of a non-target colour singleton does not slow responses to the target. Attempts have been made to explain these results from both bottom-up and top-down perspectives. What both accounts have in common is that they do not predict the occurrence of attentional capture on typical feature search displays. Here, we present a case where manipulating selection history, rather than the displays themselves, leads to attentional capture on feature search trials. The ability to map specific colours to the target and distractor appears to be what enables resistance to capture during feature search.     

Two facets of cognitive control in analogical mapping: The role of semantic interference resolution andgoal-driven structure selection

The study used scene analogies to investigate two component processes of analogical thinking: resolution of semantic interference, which emerges when the proper mapping between analogically matching objects is incoherent with their categorical features (e.g., stereotypical functions), and goal-driven selection of the key relational structure, by directing attention to the most promising objects which constitute that structure among many other candidate objects. We manipulated interference by placing in corresponding scenes the objects from one category in different relational roles. Selection was loaded by including additional, relationally irrelevant objects in a scene. We also manipulated relational complexity and the presence of salient objects (people) in relations. Increased load on both interference resolution and selection decreased the accuracy of analogical mapping, but these factors did not interact. Moreover, the factors yielded opposite patterns of interaction with relational complexity. Finally, salience eased selection, but tended to negatively influence interference resolution. In summary, inference resolution and selection seem to constitute two relatively independent facets of cognitive control involved in analogical thinking. Selection may act before mapping occurs, while interference influences analogy making only if an interfering object takes part in mapping.     

Mediated conditioning versus retrospective revaluation in humans: The influence of physical and functional similarity of cues

Two experiments assessed whether similarity between the two elements of a compound would influence the degree of mediated extinction versus recovery from overshadowing in human causal judgements. In both Experiments 1 and 2, we assessed the influence of extinguishing one element of a two-element compound on judgements about the other element. In Experiment 1 we manipulated the physical similarity of the two elements of the compound; in Experiment 2, we used equivalence and distinctiveness pretraining in order to vary their functional similarity. We found that these procedures influenced mediated extinction and recovery from overshadowing as a function of both physical and acquired similarity and distinctiveness, respectively. The implications of these results for previously reported differences between humans and nonprimate animals are discussed.     

The word class effect in the picture–word interference paradigm

The word class effect in the picture–word interference paradigm is a highly influential finding that has provided some of the most compelling support for word class constraints on lexical selection. However, methodological concerns called for a replication of the most convincing of those effects. Experiment 1 was a direct replication of Pechmann and Zerbst (2002 Pechmann, T. and Zerbst, D. 2002. The activation of word class information during speech production. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 28: 233–243. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Experiment 4). Participants named pictures of objects in the context of noun and adverb distractors. Naming took place in bare noun and sentence frame contexts. A word class effect emerged in both bare noun and sentence frame naming conditions, suggesting a semantic origin of the effect. In Experiment 2, participants named objects in the context of noun and verb distractors whose word class relationship to the target and imageability were orthogonally manipulated. As before, naming took place in bare noun and sentence frame naming contexts. In both naming contexts, distractor imageability but not word class affected picture naming latencies. These findings confirm the sensitivity of the picture–word interference paradigm to distractor imageability and suggest the paradigm is not sensitive to distractor word class. The results undermine the use of the word class effect in the picture–word interference paradigm as supportive of word class constraints during lexical selection.     

Temporal distinctiveness and repetition benefits in task switching: Disentangling stimulus-related and response-related contributions

Despite the popularity of the Wason selection task in the psychology of reasoning, doubt remains as to whether card choices actually reflect a process of reasoning. One view is that while participants reason about the cards and their hidden sides—as indicated by protocol analysis—this reasoning merely confabulates explanations for cards that were preconsciously cued. This hypothesis has apparently been supported by studies that show that participants predominantly inspect cards which they end up selecting. In this paper, we reanalyse the data of one such study, which used eye-movement tracking to record card inspection times (Ball, Lucas, Miles, & Gale, 2003). We show that while cards favoured by matching bias are inspected for roughly equal lengths of times, their selection rates are strongly affected by their logical status. These findings strongly support a two-stage account in which attention is necessary but not sufficient for card selections. Hence, reasoning does indeed affect participants' choices on this task.