The variable influence of confession inconsistencies: How factual errors (but not contradictions) reduce belief in suspect guilt

Wrongful conviction statistics suggest that jurors pay little heed to the quality of confession evidence when making verdict decisions. However, recent research indicates that confession inconsistencies may sometimes reduce perception of suspect guilt. Drawing on theoretical frameworks of attribution theory, correspondence bias, and the story model of juror decision‐making, we investigated how judgments about likely guilt are affected by different types of inconsistencies: self‐contradictions (Experiment 1) and factual errors (Experiment 2). Crucially, judgments of likely guilt of the suspect were reduced by factual errors in confession evidence, but not by contradictions. Mediation analyses suggest that this effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt is underpinned by the extent to which mock‐jurors generated a plausible, alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. These results indicate that not all confession inconsistencies are treated equally; factual errors might cause suspicion about the veracity of the confession, but contradictions do not.     

Termination of information evaluation in auditing

A screening decision is about whether a candidate fails to meet a decision maker's criteria and must be rejected, or whether it meets the criteria and can be accepted. Image theory contends that screening decisions are based on a simple, noncompensatory process that focuses solely upon the candidate's negative attributes. This contention has received empirical support in a job screening context in which students role-played a hypothetical person seeking a job. But how robust is image theory's prediction? The present work was done in the context of professional auditors screening prospective clients. The client screening context is a particularly interesting setting to test the implications of image theory. If auditors reject clients with negative attributes, as predicted by image theory, this will indicate that some clients are being denied access to a socially useful service. Further, auditors can accept prospective clients with negative attributes and simply adjust the audit plan and fees to compensate for the client's riskiness. Thus, it is not clear that the preliminary findings obtained in a job screening context will generalize to the audit context. On the other hand, results consistent with the image theory prediction would suggest a robust theory. Even in the client screening context, where auditors used their own criteria to screen prospective clients, we found overwhelming support for image theory's view of screening. The results indicate the potential payoffs of image theory as a robust framework to address audit and other substantive problems. Implications of a noncompensatory, negative oriented, client screening strategy are discussed.     

The influence of biased exposure to forgone outcomes

After making decisions, we often get feedback concerning forgone outcomes (what would have happened had we chosen differently). Yet, many times, our exposure to such feedback is systematically biased. For example, your friends are more likely to tell you about a party you missed if it was fun than if it was boring. Despite its prevalence, the effects of biased exposure to forgone outcomes on future choice have not been directly studied. In three studies (five experiments) using a simplified learning task, we study the basic influence of biased exposure to forgone outcomes in the extreme case in which decision makers can easily infer the missing information such that the biased exposure carries almost no informational value. The results in all studies suggest that nevertheless, the biased exposure to forgone outcomes affected choice. Exposure to forgone outcomes only when they were better than the obtained outcomes (Only-Better-Forgone) increased selections of the forgone option compared with exposure to forgone outcomes only when they were worse than the obtained outcome (Only-Worse-Forgone). Moreover, relative to an unbiased exposure to all forgone outcomes, the effect of exposure to Only-Worse-Forgone was larger than the effect of exposure to Only-Better-Forgone feedback. However, these effects were not universal: In environments that include rare negative events (“disasters”), biased exposure to forgone outcomes had very little effect. We raise potential explanations and further discuss implications for marketing and risk awareness.     

Buying an electric car: A rational choice or a norm-directed behavior?

The diffusion of electric cars can contribute to more sustainability in the transport sector, but diffusion rates in most countries are still low. We investigated motives for electric car adoption in German households from an environmental psychology perspective. The public debate focuses on rational aspects such as the purchase price or new technological demands (e.g., limited range and a new charging system). Psychological research on energy-related investment decisions in households confirms the relevance of rational motives, but additionally points to the importance of norm-directed motives (moral and social norms). We investigated the relevance of different motives in an online questionnaire with n = 220 members of German households interested in buying a new car. The questionnaire included possible rational and norm-related predictors of electric car adoption. We tested three action models to explain adoption intention: An adjusted technology acceptance model (TAM), an adjusted norm activation model (NAM), and an integrative model with predictors from both models. We analyzed the hypothesized models with path analyses. All models explained a substantial share of variance in adoption intention. The explained share of variance in the NAM was higher than in the TAM and comparably high to the integrative model. The results demonstrate the important role of moral and social motives for households’ investment decisions. Additionally, the technology’s perceived usefulness was an important rational motive. We discuss the context dependency of the results, as household members might have little knowledge about the new technology during the early stages of a technology’s diffusion process. The results strongly suggest broadening political support schemes, such as informational and image campaigns, as a way to more effectively foster electric car diffusion. More comprehensive assessments appear to be necessary in future analyses of electric car adoption as well as energy-related investment decisions.     

Reasoning with Factors

The paper proposes an analysis and a formalisation of factor-based reasoning. After examining the relevance of factors in legal reasoning, binary and scalable factors (dimensions) are distinguished and the relations between them are discussed. An account of a fortiori reasoning with both types of factors is developed. This article reports ideas which are discussed and developed in Sartor (2005). We refer to the latter work for the theoretical framework in which our analysis of factors is embedded.     

Liberalism and the Privatised Family: The Legacy of Rousseau

This article argues that the intellectual legacy of Rousseau is at the root of the failure of 20th century egalitarian theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin to engage intellectually with feminist theorists working within the liberal tradition. Through an extended critique of Rousseau’s delineation of the relationship between liberal citizenship and the private family, it argues that the failure of such liberal theorists to take gender hierarchy seriously is a consequence of their attempt to place the private family outside the sphere not only of politics, but also of justice.     

Index of suspicion: feeling not believing

Throughout the U.S., state laws require professionals who work with children to report cases of suspected child abuse to child protection services. Both practically and conceptually, however, significant problems arise from a lack of clarity regarding the threshold that has been set for reporting. Specifically, there is no consensus as to what constitutes reasonable suspicion, and little direction for how mandated reporters should gauge their legal and professional responsibilities when they harbor suspicion. In this paper we outline the context of the problem, discuss the nature and scope of its conceptual underpinnings, and offer recommendations for moving towards a concrete, practical solution.     

‘Ought implies Can’ and the law

In this paper, we investigate the ‘ought implies can’ (OIC) thesis, focusing on explanations and interpretations of OIC, with a view to clarifying its uses and relevance to legal philosophy. We first review various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of OIC; then we consider how OIC may be incorporated in Hartian and Kelsenian theories of the law. Along the way we also propose a taxonomy of OIC-related claims.     

Learning to Make Selection and Detection Decisions: The Roles of Base Rate and Feedback

The effects of type of feedback and base rate on threshold learning in a multiple‐cue decision task were examined. In most such decision experiments, participants receive feedback after every trial (full feedback), and a single base rate (usually 0.5) is used. Our experiment explored conditional feedback (feedback only after positive decisions) representing common selection and detection tasks (such as hiring), where the decision maker receives no feedback unless the decision is positive (e.g., hire the applicant). We used three base rates (0.2, 0.5, and 0.8). As expected, performance was best in full feedback, but after 300 learning trials, the difference was small. Conditional feedback generally resulted in fewer positive decisions than full feedback, but this difference was not found in the low (0.2) base rate condition. There were interactions between base rates and types of feedback. Results provide partial support for the constructivist encoding hypothesis of Elwin and colleagues. Simulation results suggest that our results may reflect overconfidence when feedback is not given. With respect to rate of learning, when the base rate was 0.2, conditional feedback participants reached approximately the same selection rate but did so more slowly than the full feedback participants. Partial feedback participants learned slower and appeared to be still learning after 500 trials. When the base rate was 0.5 or 0.8, partial feedback was nearly as good as full feedback, but conditional feedback resulted in a systematically lower rate of positive decisions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.