What is A Philosophical Question?

There are many ways of understanding the nature of philosophical questions. One may consider their morphology, semantics, relevance, or scope. This article introduces a different approach, based on the kind of informational resources required to answer them. The result is a definition of philosophical questions as questions whose answers are in principle open to informed, rational, and honest disagreement, ultimate but not absolute, closed under further questioning, possibly constrained by empirical and logico‐mathematical resources, but requiring noetic resources to be answered. The article concludes with a discussion of some of the consequences of this definition for a conception of philosophy as the study (or “science”) of open questions, which uses conceptual design to analyse and answer them.     

The Fallacy of Many Questions: On the Notions of Complexity, Loadedness and Unfair Entrapment in Interrogative Theory

The traditional fallacy of many questions, also known as the fallacy of complex question, illustrated by the question, "Have you stopped sexually harassing your students?", has been known since ancient times, but is still alive and well. What is of practical importance about this fallacy is that it represents a tactic of entrapment that is very common in everyday argumentation, as well as in special kinds of argumentation like that in a legal trial or a parliamentary debate. The tactic combines the use of loaded questions with the complexity of the question. A key notion is that of the presupposition of the question. How to deal with such questions is a point of departure for interrogative theory, and for any attempts to construct formal dialogues of a kind that can be used as normative models of argumentation.     

Naturalism Need Not Be "Made Safe": A Response to William Rottschaefer's Misunderstandings

In this article, I respond to William Rottschaefer's analysis of my writings on religion and science, especially my Religion, Science and Naturalism (1996). I show that I am not trying "to make naturalism safe," as Rottschaefer contends, but rather attempting to explore options available when one endorses naturalistic approaches. I also explain why I object to the label "supernaturalistic naturalism" used by Rottschaefer. Possible limitations to naturalistic projects are discussed, not as limitations imposed but rather as features uncovered.     

Discerning the Limits of Religious Naturalism

In response to my "How to Make Naturalism Safe for Supernaturalism: An Evaluation of Willem Drees's Supernaturalistic Naturalism" (Rottschaefer 2001), Willem Drees maintains that I have misunderstood his purpose and views and have failed to make the case against his view that naturalism is intrinsically limited. In this response, I comment on these concerns.     

Walton's Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning: A Critique and Development

The aim of the paper is to advance the theory of argument or inference schemes by suggesting answers to questions raised by Walton's Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (1996), specifically on: the relation between argument and reasoning; distinguishing deductive from presumptive schemes, the origin of schemes and the probative force of their use; and the motivation and justification for their associated critical questions.     

Teaching mands for information using speech generating devices: A replication and extension

Approximately 30% of individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) fail to develop vocal communication and, therefore, use some form of augmentative or alternative communication system. The current study replicates and extends previous research on teaching “Who?” and “Which?” mands for information to 3 young children diagnosed with ASD using a speech generating device. Procedures were evaluated using a multiple baseline across participants design. All participants learned to mand for information and, subsequently, used the information to access preferred items.     

The effect of question type on resistance to misinformation about present and absent details

The typical misinformation effect shows that accuracy is lower for details about which people received misleading compared to non-misleading (control) information. In two experiments, we examined the misinformation effect for non-witnessed details (i.e., absent). Three question types introduced control, misleading, and absent details (closed, closed-detailed, and open questions) about a mock burglary video. On this misinformation test, participants' reports of absent details were less accurate than control details only when they were introduced using open questions. Misinformation effects in a subsequent recognition test were present for misleading details in both experiments, but for absent details only in Experiment 2. Experiment 2 also revealed that participants who avoided answering open questions containing misleading and absent details had more accurate memories for these details on the subsequent recognition test than participants who answered these questions. In both experiments, confidence was lowest for absent details. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.