Illusory inferences with quantifiers

The psychological study of reasoning with quantifiers has predominantly focused on inference patterns studied by Aristotle about two millennia ago. Modern logic has shown a wealth of inference patterns involving quantifiers that are far beyond the expressive power of Aristotelian syllogisms, and whose psychology should be explored. We bring to light a novel class of fallacious inference patterns, some of which are so attractive that they are tantamount to cognitive illusions. In tandem with recent insights from linguistics that quantifiers like “some” are treated as wh-questions, these illusory inferences are predicted by the erotetic theory of reasoning, which postulates that a process akin to question asking and answering is behind human inference making.     

Do Questions Get Infants Talking? Infant Vocal Responses to Questions and Declaratives in Maternal Speech

Maternal questions play a crucial role in early language acquisition by virtue of their special grammatical, prosodic and lexical forms, and their abundance in the input. Infants are able to discriminate questions from other sentence types and produce rising intonations in their own requests. This study examined whether caregiver questions were related to the quantity of infant vocalizations. Thirty‐six infants aged 10 and 14 months participated in a laboratory play session with their mothers. In separate blocks, mothers were instructed to ask questions and to refrain from asking questions. Both block‐level and utterance‐level analyses found no evidence that maternal questions affected the amount of infant‐response vocalizations. Mothers of 14‐month‐olds (but not 10‐month‐olds) tended to repeat questions. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ambiguity and explanation

This paper presents evidence that ‘because’ is importantly ambiguous between two closely related senses covering what are usually called causal explanations, on the one hand, and grounding or metaphysical explanations, on the other hand. To this end, it introduces the lexical categories of monosemy, polysemy and homonymy; describes a test for polysemy; and discusses the results of the test when applied to ‘because’. It also shows how to understand so-called hybrid explanations in light of the semantic facts established by the analysis.     

Facilitation by Variation: Right-to-Left Learning of English Yes/No Questions

This study advances the hypothesis that optional structural variation in language facilitates syntactic learning (facilitation‐by‐variation). Support for this is provided by a right‐to‐left‐elaboration acquisition model for English yes/no questions (YNQs). Previous studies have focused on the acquisition of ‘‘inverted’’ YNQs, a cornerstone of nativist theories of language development. Data from five American children (1;3 to 5;1) and their parents show that children hear a range of adult questions (Coming?You coming?Are you coming?), not all inverted. These variants are ordered from structurally least complex noncanonical forms to complex canonical inverted forms. I use state‐of‐the‐art econometric techniques to estimate breakpoints in YNQ time series and show that noncanonical questions emerge early in children’s speech and facilitate acquisition of canonical ones. This incremental structure‐building process relies on an adjunction strategy that augments noncanonical questions with initial auxiliaries and subjects. Development proceeds incrementally from right to left to derive auxiliary‐initial structures.     

Reliability and Validity of the Gamblers Anonymous Twenty Questions

One of the earliest instruments to screen for problem gambling, the Twenty Questions (20Q), was developed within Gamblers Anonymous. This instrument has not received serious research attention, however, and its psychometric properties are generally unknown. This study reports reliability and validity data for this instrument in 3 independent samples totaling 456 participants: two samples of problem gamblers in treatment and a non-treatment sample of problem gamblers. The Twenty Questions was shown to possess high reliability as measured by Cronbach’s alpha. Concurrent, convergent and predictive validity of the 20Q supported the use of this instrument as an acceptable screening instrument. Classification analyses indicated that the 20Q is comparable to the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for pathological gambling in specificity, sensitivity and rates of false negatives and false positives. The 20Q appears to be a reliable and valid measure of problem gambling and warrants continued research attention.     

乙肝抗病毒治疗存在的问题及其对策

对乙肝的治疗,抗病毒是核心和关键,但抗病毒治疗自身存在着诸多问题:费用高、疗程长、疗效有限、治疗时机和条件难以掌控;药物有潜在或者明确的不良反应;医患认知不足;疗效评价极端化;治疗中不可预测因素的干扰等。通过细致的分析,探讨了乙肝治疗中的难点,并针对这些问题和难点就未来乙肝的治疗提出了一些有益的建议。     

The fallacy of fallacies

Several of the so-called fallacies in Aristotle are not in fact mistaken inference-types, but mistakes or breaches of rules in the questioning games which were practiced in the Academy and in the Lyceum. Hence the entire Aristotelian theory of fallacies ought to be studied by reference to the author's interrogative model of inquiry, based on his theory of questions and answers, rather than as a part of the theory of inference. Most of the fallacies mentioned by Aristotle can in fact be diagnosed by means of the interrogative model, including petitio principii, multiple questions, babbling, etc., and so can Aristotle's alleged anticipation of the fallacy of argumentum ad hominem. The entire Aristotelian conception of inquiry is an interrogative one. Deductive conclusions caught Aristotle's attention in the form of answers that every rational interlocutor must give, assuming only his own earlier answers. Several features of Aristotle's methodology can be understood by means of the interrogative model, including the role of endoxa in it. Theoretically, there is also considerable leeway as to whether fallacies are conceived of as mistakes in questioning or as breaches of the rules that govern questioning games.     

The effect of question type on resistance to misinformation about present and absent details

The typical misinformation effect shows that accuracy is lower for details about which people received misleading compared to non-misleading (control) information. In two experiments, we examined the misinformation effect for non-witnessed details (i.e., absent). Three question types introduced control, misleading, and absent details (closed, closed-detailed, and open questions) about a mock burglary video. On this misinformation test, participants' reports of absent details were less accurate than control details only when they were introduced using open questions. Misinformation effects in a subsequent recognition test were present for misleading details in both experiments, but for absent details only in Experiment 2. Experiment 2 also revealed that participants who avoided answering open questions containing misleading and absent details had more accurate memories for these details on the subsequent recognition test than participants who answered these questions. In both experiments, confidence was lowest for absent details. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

The Fallacy of Many Questions: On the Notions of Complexity, Loadedness and Unfair Entrapment in Interrogative Theory

The traditional fallacy of many questions, also known as the fallacy of complex question, illustrated by the question, "Have you stopped sexually harassing your students?", has been known since ancient times, but is still alive and well. What is of practical importance about this fallacy is that it represents a tactic of entrapment that is very common in everyday argumentation, as well as in special kinds of argumentation like that in a legal trial or a parliamentary debate. The tactic combines the use of loaded questions with the complexity of the question. A key notion is that of the presupposition of the question. How to deal with such questions is a point of departure for interrogative theory, and for any attempts to construct formal dialogues of a kind that can be used as normative models of argumentation.