情景预见对跨期决策的影响机制

为了探究情景预见对跨期决策的影响机制,研究采用延迟折扣任务范式,检验了在情景预见对跨期决策的影响中延迟时间知觉起到的中介作用。两个实验分别操纵了情景预见中未来事件与自我有关的信息和未来事件的情绪特征,结果均发现情景预见通过改变个体对延迟等待时间的时距知觉影响了跨期决策。想象与自己、与母亲有关的未来事件,想象积极、中性情绪效价的未来事件都使得被试将延迟等待时间知觉为较短的时间段,更倾向于选择延迟奖励。想象消极情绪效价的未来事件使得被试将延迟等待时间知觉为较长的时间段,更加偏好即时奖励。本研究有助于增进人们对情景预见影响跨期决策现象的理解。     

参数和非参数Bootstrap方法的简单中介效应分析比较

采用数据模拟技术比较了(偏差校正和未校正的)参数和非参数Bootstrap方法在简单中介效应分析中的表现。结果表明,1)偏差校正的Bootstrap法的总体表现优于未校正的Bootstrap方法,但在某些条件下会高估第Ⅰ类错误率,导致在 时的置信区间偏差较大。2)参数Bootstrap方法优于非参数Bootstrap方法,偏差校正的参数百分位残差Bootstrap法的综合表现最优,且具有适用范围广,对原始样本依赖性小的优点,最具实用性。     

国外关于自信的研究综述

近些年来自信研究已受到越来越多的心理学家的关注。文章对国外30多年来自信的理论和实证研究进行了系统综述,从概念和结构上阐述了国外自信研究的历史和现状,并从自信的差异研究、两极与反面研究以及影响因素3方面总结了具体研究领域的最新进展。在此基础上,指出了自信研究领域存在的问题和将来的研究方向。     

Ideological Orientation and Political Transition in Hong Kong: Confidence in the Future

In the two-component model of ideological orientation, a person's ideological position is jointly influenced by attitudinal and affective components. The present study adopted this conceptual model to predict confidence in the future of Hong Kong. Questionnaire responses were collected from 395 adults (56.8% men and 43.2% women) in Hong Kong in April 1995, some 2 years before its transfer from British to Chinese control. The results show that the level of confidence in Hong Kong was related to both attitudinal and affective identification with Hong Kong and China. These findings suggest that the transfer of government may have brought to the surface a collision of the divergent political cultures of Hong Kong and mainland China, resulting in two antagonistic political orientations that predicted confidence in the future of Hong Kong.     

反馈对目击证人辨认信心的影响

探讨辨认主持人对目击证人的辨认给予不同反馈对其辨认信心的影响。213名被试参加实验。先看一段模拟罪犯逃逸时的录像,然后对11张相继呈现的人像照片做辨认和确定程度的判断。随机给予肯定、否定或没有反馈之后,被试做辨认确定程度和其他一些相关问题的判断。结果表明,辨认错误的证人在得到肯定反馈后,受到的影响较小;而得到否定反馈后,受到的影响较大。不同专业背景、不同性别的被试受到反馈的影响也有所不同。     

Two modes of confidence rating: An effect of episodic information of participant's own past responses in a repeated-question paradigm

Abstract: General knowledge questions with two answer alternatives were employed in experimental session 1; in session 2, the same questions were presented together with participants' own session-1 responses. In order to examine whether or not the episodic information of participant's own responses would suppress standard confidence-rating mode in session 2, rates of answer- and confidence-changes between sessions were analyzed. In session 2, participants were able to change the confidence value to another, if they thought the initial value inadequate. They then had a chance to change the answer to the other and rated their confidence in the new answer. The major results were as follows: (a) Between-session answer change rate was very low; (b) Between-session answer change rate was not a monotonic decreasing function of confidence; (c) However, the rate depended on confidence change from session 1 to before-answer-change rating. These results clearly contrasted with a previous study ( Saito, 1998 ) in which episodic information of participant's own session 1 answers and confidence values was not presented. It was argued that the episodic information triggered another mode of confidence rating or a decision inertia effect.     

Beliefs do not come in degrees

Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees (or that beliefs are graded or that there are partial beliefs). Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that beliefs do not come in degrees.     

Individual Differences in Decision Making Depend on Cognitive Abilities,Monitoring and Control

Decision making is the process by which actions are constructed and initiated. Across many research streams, this can be explained in terms of three broad cognitive processes: cognitive abilities that construct judgements and potential courses of action, and interacting monitoring and control processes that determine when to initiate them as behaviour. The aim of this research was to investigate the generality of individual differences in these processes, and their power to predict patterns of decision behaviour identified in our previous research. Undergraduate participants (N = 364) completed nine tests assessing cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, control thresholds and various patterns of decision behaviour. The tests differed in their cognitive ability requirements and the nature of the payoffs associated with decisions. Cognitive abilities were a strong predictor of individuals' decision competence and optimality, while monitoring confidence and control thresholds were strong and unique predictors of their overall decisiveness, and reckless and hesitant errors. These results were strongest when the measures of cognitive abilities and monitoring confidence were derived from tests with the same cognitive requirements as the tests used to derive the decision behaviours and when the control threshold measure was derived from tests with the same decision payoffs as the test used to derive the decision behaviours. This effect was particularly pronounced for control thresholds, highlighting the domain‐specific nature of cognitive control processes. These findings demonstrate how cognitive abilities, monitoring output and control thresholds interact with cognitive requirements and context‐specific payoffs to drive individual differences in decision‐making behaviour. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can People Identify “Deceptive” or “Misleading” Items that Tend to Produce Mostly Wrong Answers?

In many domains, two‐alternative forced‐choice questions produce more correct responses than wrong responses across participants. However, some items, dubbed “deceptive” or “misleading”, produce mostly wrong answers. These items yield poor calibration and poor resolution because the dominant, erroneous response tends to be endorsed with great confidence, even greater than that of the correct response. In addition, for deceptive items, group discussion amplifies rather than mitigates error while enhancing confidence in the erroneous response. Can participants identify deceptive items when they are warned about their existence? It is argued that people's ability to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive items is poor when the erroneous responses are based on the same process assumed to underlie correct responses. Indeed, participants failed to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive perceptual items when they were warned that some of the items (Experiment 1) or exactly half of the items (Experiment 2) were deceptive. A similar failure was observed for general‐knowledge questions (Experiment 3) except when participants were informed about the correct answer (Experiment 4). Possibly, for these tasks, people cannot escape the dangers lurking in deceptive items. In contrast, the results suggest that participants can identify deceptive problems for which the wrong answer stems from reliance on a fast, intuitive process that differs from the analytic mode that is likely to yield correct answers (Experiment 5). The practical and theoretical implications of the results were discussed. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.