Why cognitivism?

Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of ‘Practical Knowledge.’ In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one’s intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.     

Partisanship,Political Knowledge,and the Dunning‐Kruger Effect

A widely cited finding in social psychology holds that individuals with low levels of competence will judge themselves to be higher achieving than they really are. In the present study, I examine how the so‐called “Dunning‐Kruger effect” conditions citizens' perceptions of political knowledgeability. While low performers on a political knowledge task are expected to engage in overconfident self‐placement and self‐assessment when reflecting on their performance, I also expect the increased salience of partisan identities to exacerbate this phenomenon due to the effects of directional motivated reasoning. Survey experimental results confirm the Dunning‐Kruger effect in the realm of political knowledge. They also show that individuals with moderately low political expertise rate themselves as increasingly politically knowledgeable when partisan identities are made salient. This below‐average group is also likely to rely on partisan source cues to evaluate the political knowledge of peers. In a concluding section, I comment on the meaning of these findings for contemporary debates about rational ignorance, motivated reasoning, and political polarization.     

Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study

In this paper, we present the results of two surveys that investigate subjects’ judgments about what can be known or justifiably believed about lottery outcomes on the basis of statistical evidence, testimonial evidence, and “mixed” evidence, while considering possible anchoring and priming effects. We discuss these results in light of seven distinct hypotheses that capture various claims made by philosophers about lay people’s lottery judgments. We conclude by summarizing the main findings, pointing to future research, and comparing our findings to recent studies by Turri and Friedman.     

Conclusive Reasons and Epistemic Luck

What is it to have conclusive reasons to believe a proposition P? According to a view famously defended by Dretske, a reason R is conclusive for P just in case [R would not be the case unless P were the case]. I argue that, while knowing that P is plausibly related to having conclusive reasons to believe that P, having such reasons cannot be understood in terms of the truth of this counterfactual condition. Simple examples show that it is possible to believe P on the basis of reasons that satisfy the counterfactual, and still get things right about P only as a matter of luck. Seeing where this account of conclusive reasons goes wrong points to an important distinction between having conclusive reasons and relying on reasons that are in point of fact conclusive. It also has wider consequences for whether modal principles like sensitivity and safety can rule out the pernicious kind of epistemic luck, or the kind of luck that interferes with knowledge.     

The dynamics of fidelity over the time course of long-term memory

Bayesian models of cognition assume that prior knowledge about the world influences judgments. Recent approaches have suggested that the loss of fidelity from working to long-term (LT) memory is simply due to an increased rate of guessing (e.g. Brady, Konkle, Gill, Oliva, & Alvarez, 2013). That is, recall is the result of either remembering (with some noise) or guessing. This stands in contrast to Bayesian models of cognition while assume that prior knowledge about the world influences judgments, and that recall is a combination of expectations learned from the environment and noisy memory representations. Here, we evaluate the time course of fidelity in LT episodic memory, and the relative contribution of prior category knowledge and guessing, using a continuous recall paradigm. At an aggregate level, performance reflects a high rate of guessing. However, when aggregate data is partitioned by lag (i.e., the number of presentations from study to test), or is un-aggregated, performance appears to be more complex than just remembering with some noise and guessing. We implemented three models: the standard remember-guess model, a three-component remember-guess model, and a Bayesian mixture model and evaluated these models against the data. The results emphasize the importance of taking into account the influence of prior category knowledge on memory.     

Explanatory style differences in health literacy: a survey among young adults in Taiwan

Explanatory styles are related to individuals’ positive health management. Everyone interprets and thinks about issues differently; therefore, medical information is understood in different ways. This study explored the relationship of optimistic and positive views on health literacy. A survey method was used to collect information from 342 university students. This study used PLS2.0 and SPSS 18.0 for data analysis. The results indicated that optimists had more accurate self-reported health status and medication-taking and nutritional knowledge than pessimists did. Females had higher scores on health knowledge and medication-taking and nutritional knowledge than males. In addition, female optimists had better performance on self-reported health status and health and medication-taking knowledge than female pessimists did. The major contribution of this study is the confirmation of the effect of explanatory style on health literacy.     

Age differences in suggestibility to contradictions of demonstrated knowledge: the influence of prior knowledge

People maintain intact general knowledge into very old age and use it to support remembering. Interestingly, when older and younger adults encounter errors that contradict general knowledge, older adults suffer fewer memorial consequences: Older adults use fewer recently-encountered errors as answers for later knowledge questions. Why do older adults show this reduced suggestibility, and what role does their intact knowledge play? In three experiments, I examined suggestibility following exposure to errors in fictional stories that contradict general knowledge. Older adults consistently demonstrated more prior knowledge than younger adults but also gained access to even more across time. Additionally, they did not show a reduction in new learning from the stories, indicating lesser involvement of episodic memory failures. Critically, when knowledge was stably accessible, older adults relied more heavily on that knowledge compared to younger adults, resulting in reduced suggestibility. Implications for the broader role of knowledge in aging are discussed.     

Effects of perceptual and conceptual similarities on consumers' evaluations of copycat brand names

Copycats often choose brand names that mimic perceptual, conceptual, or both elements of leading brand names. Yet little is known about how perceptual and conceptual similarities of a copycat interact to affect consumers' evaluations, especially in logographic language systems (e.g., Chinese). Three laboratory experiments demonstrate that perceptual similarity alone leads to negative evaluations of copycat brand names; this negative effect, however, can be mitigated when conceptual similarity is added. The underlying mechanism for this effect can be traced to consumers' persuasion knowledge. Perceptual (vs. conceptual) similarity activates consumers' persuasion knowledge about the insincere motives of the copycat brand, which in turn shapes their brand evaluations. However, this effect can become less prominent when conceptual similarity is added because it alleviates use of persuasion knowledge, or when a consumer is in a happy mood because it neutralizes persuasion knowledge. These findings shed light on how different types of copycat strategies interact to affect copycat brand name evaluations and offer important implications for marketing practice. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Making Teamwork Work: Team Knowledge for Team Effectiveness

This study examined the impact of two types of team knowledge on team effectiveness. The study assessed the impact of taskwork knowledge and teamwork knowledge on team satisfaction and performance. A longitudinal study was conducted with 27 service-management teams involving 178 students in a real-life restaurant setting. Teamwork knowledge was found to impact both team outcomes. Furthermore, team learning behavior was found to mediate the relationships between teamwork knowledge and team outcomes. Educators and managers should therefore ensure these types of knowledge are developed in teams along with learning behavior for maximum effectiveness.