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51.
Bruce D. Weinstein 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》1993,14(1):57-73
Experts play an important role in society, but there has been little investigation about the nature of expertise. I argue that there are two kinds of experts: those whose expertise is a function of what theyknow (epistemic expertise), or what theydo (performative expertise). Epistemic expertise is the capacity to provide strong justifications for a range of propositions in a domain, while performative expertise is the capacity to perform a skill well according to the rules and virtues of a practice. Both epistemic and performative experts may legitimately disagree with one another, and the two senses are conceptually and logically distinct. 相似文献
52.
The status-legitimacy hypothesis proposes that those who are most disadvantaged by unequal social systems are even more likely than members of more advantaged groups to provide ideological support for the very social system that is responsible for their disadvantages. Li, Yang, Wu, and Kou (2020, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin) sought to expand the generalizability of this hypothesis by testing it in China, addressing inconsistencies surrounding the empirical support for this hypothesis by postulating that the construct of status should be separated into an objective and subjective status marker. They reported that objective socioeconomic status (SES; income and education) negatively predicted system justification, while subjective SES positively predicted system justification. In the present study we attempt to replicate and extend the work of Li et al. in a cross-cultural comparison of demographic stratified quota online samples in China and the United States. We test the status-legitimacy hypothesis using objective and subjective SES to predict system justification using cross-sectional and cross-lagged regression analyses. We received partial support for Li et al.'s findings. Specifically, subjective SES positively predicted system justification for both societies during cross-sectional and cross-lagged longitudinal analyses. However, we failed to replicate Li et al.'s findings surrounding objective SES in China during cross-sectional and cross-lagged analyses. 相似文献
53.
54.
Michael Biehl 《International review of missions》2020,109(2):151-162
This paper discusses the theme of the upcoming World Council of Churches' assembly from the perspective of mission as reconciliation as it has been formulated in ecumenical discussions around the World Missionary Conference at Athens 2005 and since. It argues that the intersecting of reconciliation and healing disclosed theological and ethical dimensions in both concepts that have been picked up in ecumenical mission theology while they had been less prominent in earlier decades. The emphasis on the Holy Spirit as agent of mission (Athens, Arusha) is then used to interpret Christ's love as the outpouring of the inner dynamic of the Trinity into the world. 相似文献
55.
Silvia Krauth‐Gruber Virginie Bonnot 《Journal of community & applied social psychology》2020,30(1):59-72
We examined how the framing of responsibility for reducing socio‐economic inequality affects individuals' emotional reactions towards the poor and the willingness to engage in prosocial actions. Attribution of responsibility to either the system (government and institutions), the less deprived in‐group, or the disadvantaged out‐group (poor) was measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2). Consistent with our hypotheses, moral outrage was higher than collective guilt when system responsibility for inequalities was put forth, but collective guilt arose to reach the level of moral outrage when in‐group responsibility was emphasized. Moreover, distinguishing between collective guilt for action and for inaction, we found guilt for inaction more difficult and thus less likely to arise, unless responsibility was put on the in‐group. Collective emotions were also found to be negatively linked to system justification motivation illustrating the palliative function of legitimization processes. Finally, moral outrage predicted the willingness to act upon socio‐economic inequalities both when the system's and in‐group's responsibility was emphasized, whereas collective guilt for action (but not for inaction) predicted support for prosocial actions only when the in‐group's responsibility was engaged. These findings suggest that the specific group‐based emotions in response to poverty depend on whether the system or the in‐group is held responsible and differentially predict individuals' commitment to act. 相似文献
56.
Davis JK 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2007,28(1):1-30
Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems
indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However,
intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense
with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or constrain our intuitions.
However, this is not a problem, for intuitions can be justified in easy or obvious cases, and decision procedures should be
understood as heuristic devices for reaching judgments about harder cases that approximate the justified intuitions we would
have about cases under ideal conditions, where hard cases become easy. Similarly, the forms of reasoning which provide discursive
justification help decision procedures perform this heuristic function not by avoiding intuition, but by making such heuristics
more accurate. Nonetheless, it is possible to demand too much justification; many clinical ethicists lack the time and philosophical
training to reach the more elaborate levels of discursive justification. We should keep moral decision procedures simple and
user-friendly so that they will provide what justification can be achieved under clinical conditions, rather than trying to maximize our epistemic justification out of an overstated concern
about intuition. 相似文献
57.
JAMES A. MONTMARQUET 《Metaphilosophy》2007,38(1):71-87
Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories. 相似文献
58.
Ted Peters 《Dialog》2014,53(1):58-68
The doctrine of justification‐by‐faith has gathered enough dust on its shelf in the museum of antiquated doctrines. When we draw justification‐by‐faith out where we can take a good look at it, it glistens like a mirror. It reflects back to us human beings who we are. We are self‐justifiers. In the name of justice, we perpetrate violence. The pursuit of justice does as much damage as the pursuit of injustice, unfortunately. Like a mirror, justification‐by‐faith reveals who we are and announces that God justifies us by grace. This means we do not have to self‐justify. Liberated from self‐justification, the Christian is free to love for the sake of the beloved. 相似文献
59.
Recent work by Peijnenburg, Atkinson, and Herzberg suggests that infinitists who accept a probabilistic construal of justification can overcome significant challenges to their position by attending to mathematical treatments of infinite probabilistic regresses. In this essay, it is argued that care must be taken when assessing the significance of these formal results. Though valuable lessons can be drawn from these mathematical exercises (many of which are not disputed here), the essay argues that it is entirely unclear that the form of infinitism that results meets a basic requirement: namely, providing an account of infinite chains of propositions qua reasons made available to agents. 相似文献
60.
Ted Poston 《Metaphilosophy》2014,45(2):182-191
This article develops a theory of reasons that has strong similarities to Peter Klein's infinitism. The view it develops, Framework Reasons, upholds Klein's principles of avoiding arbitrariness (PAA) and avoiding circularity (PAC) without requiring an infinite regress of reasons. A view of reasons that holds that the “reason for” relation is constrained by PAA and that PAC can avoid an infinite regress if the “reason for” relation is contextual. Moreover, such a view of reasons can maintain that skepticism is false by the maintaining that there is more to epistemic justification than can be expressed in any reasoning session. One crucial argument for Framework Reasons is that justification depends on a background of plausibility considerations. The final section of the article applies this view of reasons to Michael Bergmann's argument that any nonskeptical epistemology must embrace epistemic circularity. 相似文献