The robust self-esteem proxy: Impressions of self-esteem inform judgments of personality and social value

People use impressions of an evaluative target’s self-esteem to infer their possession of socially desirable traits. But will people still use this self-esteem proxy when trait-relevant diagnostic information is available? We test this possibility in two experiments: participants learn that a target person has low or high self-esteem, and then receive diagnostic information about the target’s academic success or failure and positive or negative affectivity (Study 1), or watch a video of the target’s extraverted or introverted behavior (Study 2). In both experiments, participants’ impressions of the target’s traits accurately tracked diagnostic information, but impressions also revealed an independent self-esteem proxy effect. Evidently, the self-esteem proxy is robust and influences person perception even in the presence of vivid individuating information.     

Is the good life characterized by self-control? Perceived regulatory success and judgments of life quality

To what extent do people view self-control as central to achieving a healthy, high-quality life? While scientific evidence strongly supports the notion that self-control is associated with successful adaptation and optimal functioning, we examine whether individuals connect this trait with positive outcomes. In Study 1, participants rated the likelihood that an individual with high self-control (or self-esteem) would experience good health and a high-quality life. Studies 2–3 experimentally portrayed a target person as high or low in self-control (and self-esteem) before participants rated the target on an array of positive outcomes. Across studies, self-control was perceived as less strongly connected with a high-quality life than self-esteem. Mediation analyses suggest that people link self-esteem (but not self-control) with healthy behaviors that, in turn, lead to superior perceived physical and psychological health. While self-esteem is strongly associated with lay concepts of the good life, the importance of self-control may be comparatively under-recognized.     

Why be critical? Introducing a symposium on Capitalizing Religion

This article introduces a review symposium on Craig Martin’s Capitalizing Religion: Ideology and the Opiate of the Bourgeoisie (2014). It provides a brief summary and situates Capitalizing Religion in relation to recent debates about what it means to engage in the ‘critical’ study of religion\s. The symposium consists of four commentaries: by Véronique Altglas (Queen’s University Belfast); Finbarr Curtis (Georgia Southern University); Sean McCloud (University of North Carolina at Charlotte); and Jörg Rüpke (Universität Erfurt).     

Explaining Normative Versus Nonnormative Action: The Role of Implicit Theories

The current research investigates what motivates people to engage in normative versus nonnormative action. Prior research has shown that different emotions lead to different types of action. We argue that these differing emotions are determined by a more basic characteristic, namely, implicit theories about whether groups and the world in general can change. We hypothesized that incremental theories (beliefs that groups/the world can change) would predict normative action, and entity theories (beliefs that groups/the world cannot change) as well as group identification would predict nonnormative action. We conducted a pilot in the context of protests against a government plan to relocate Bedouin villages in Israel and a main study during the Israeli social protests of the middle class. Results revealed three distinct pathways to collective action. First, incremental theories about the world predicted hope, which predicted normative action. Second, incremental theories about groups and group identification predicted anger, which also predicted normative collective action. Lastly, entity theories about groups predicted nonnormative collective action through hatred, but only for participants who were highly identified with the group. In sum, people who believed in the possibility of change supported normative action, whereas those who believed change was not possible supported nonnormative action.     

Attributes of God: Conceptual Foundations of a Foundational Belief

Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human properties to nonhuman entities, is often posited as an explanation for the origin and nature of God concepts, but it remains unclear which human properties we tend to attribute to God and under what conditions. In three studies, participants decided whether two types of human properties—psychological (mind‐dependent) properties and physiological (body‐dependent) properties—could or could not be attributed to God. In Study 1 (n = 1,525), participants made significantly more psychological attributions than physiological attributions, and the frequency of those attributions was correlated both with participants’ religiosity and with their attribution of abstract, theological properties. In Study 2 (n = 99) and Study 3 (n = 138), participants not only showed the same preference for psychological properties but were also significantly faster, more consistent, and more confident when attributing psychological properties to God than when attributing physiological properties. And when denying properties to God, they showed the reverse pattern—that is, they were slower, less consistent, and less confident when denying psychological properties than when denying physiological properties. These patterns were observed both in a predominantly Christian population (Study 2) and a predominantly Hindu population (Study 3). Overall, we argue that God is conceptualized not as a person in general but as an agent in particular, attributed a mind by default but attributed a body only upon further consideration.     

Is the label ‘conspiracy theory’ a cause or a consequence of disbelief in alternative narratives?

Using the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is widely perceived to be a way of discrediting wild ideas and unsubstantiated claims. However, prior research suggests that labelling statements as conspiracy theories does not reduce people's belief in them. In four studies, we probed this effect further, and tested the alternative hypothesis that the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is a consequence rather than a cause of (dis)belief in conspiracy-related statements. Replicating prior research, Study 1 (N = 170) yielded no evidence that the label ‘conspiracy theory’ affects belief in statements. In Study 2 (N = 199), we discovered that the less people believed in statements, the more they favoured labelling them as ‘conspiracy theories’. In Studies 3 and 4 (Ns = 150 and 151), we manipulated the relative believability of statements and found that participants preferred the label ‘conspiracy theory’ for relatively less believable versus more believable statements. The current research therefore supports the hypothesis that prior (dis)agreement with a statement affects the use of the label ‘conspiracy theory’ more than the other way around.     

The philosophical legacy of Meehl (1978): confirmation theory, theory quality, and scientific epistemology

The reach and impact of Paul Meehl’s work is extraordinary. Focusing on his “Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks”, I trace three consequences of his findings. The first is the influence of his work on confirmation theory in the philosophy of science, in which he provided a more sophisticated alternative to Popperianism, despite some affinities with it. The second is a clear focus on the evaluation of theory quality as an explanation for the success of hard vs. soft theories. The third is a very deep critique of the practices of contemporary epistemology; his research recommends the replacement of demonstrably unreliable, subjective judgments about justification and knowledge with simple predictive models that outperform human experts. This is an impressive array of intellectual contributions to psychology and philosophy. As influential as his work was, it is just now beginning to receive attention commensurate with its merits.     

Why best cannot last: Cultural differences in predicting regression toward the mean

Four studies were conducted to investigate cultural differences in predicting and understanding regression toward the mean. We demonstrated, with tasks in such domains as athletic competition, health and weather, that Chinese are more likely than Canadians to make predictions that are consistent with regression toward the mean. In addition, Chinese are more likely than Canadians to choose a regression‐consistent explanation to account for regression toward the mean. The findings are consistent with cultural differences in lay theories about how people, objects and events develop over time.