New perspectives on theories linking cognition,emotion, and context: A proposal from the Theory of Analysis of Demand

Both scholars and practitioners acknowledge that the major factors explaining behavior are cognition, emotion, and context. However, existing theories tend to only focus on a combination of two. Furthermore, not all models are rooted in a specific theory of mind. Finally, there is no consistent definition of ‘mind.’ To address these issues, we review the major models explaining behavior. We then describe the Theory of Analysis of Demand (TAD), an interactionist (individual-context) model of functioning of mind that thoroughly addresses the conjoint interplay of cognition, emotion, and context. A key concept of the TAD is emotional symbolization, the process of relating one’s experiences of the external context with an inevitable emotional reaction. By considering an intersection among cognition, emotion, and context, TAD fills the gap in the existing literature and expands our understanding of behavior. Moreover, we describe the TAD intervention methodology, Individual-Setting of intervention-Organization technique, which explores an individual’s demand for intervention and the underlying emotion-, cognition-, and context-related categories (i.e., emotional symbolization) that prompt the request. Last, we discuss the potential benefits and boundary conditions of the TAD to integrate existing approaches.     

The Paranoid Style in American Politics Revisited: An Ideological Asymmetry in Conspiratorial Thinking

It is often claimed that conspiracy theories are endorsed with the same level of intensity across the left-right ideological spectrum. But do liberals and conservatives in the United States embrace conspiratorial thinking to an equivalent degree? There are important historical, philosophical, and scientific reasons dating back to Richard Hofstadter's book The Paranoid Style in American Politics to doubt this claim. In four large studies of U.S. adults (total N = 5049)—including national samples—we investigated the relationship between political ideology, measured in both symbolic and operational terms, and conspiratorial thinking in general. Results reveal that conservatives in the United States were not only more likely than liberals to endorse specific conspiracy theories, but they were also more likely to espouse conspiratorial worldviews in general (r = .27, 95% CI: .24, .30). Importantly, extreme conservatives were significantly more likely to engage in conspiratorial thinking than extreme liberals (Hedges' g = .77, SE = .07, p < .001). The relationship between ideology and conspiratorial thinking was mediated by a strong distrust of officialdom and paranoid ideation, both of which were higher among conservatives, consistent with Hofstadter's account of the paranoid style in American politics.     

The targets of all treachery: Delusional ideation,paranoia, and the need for uniqueness as mediators between two forms of narcissism and conspiracy beliefs

The present cross-sectional study (N_Participants = 397; N_Informants = 460) examined the association of both grandiose narcissism and vulnerable narcissism with conspiracy beliefs in the context of four theoretically-relevant mediators. Participants who were higher in grandiose narcissism and vulnerable narcissism were more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, seemingly because they were more likely to hold unusual beliefs. There was, likewise, some evidence to suggest that those high in vulnerable narcissism believe in conspiracy theories because they suffer from paranoia, whereas those high in grandiose narcissism believe in conspiracy theories because of a desire to be unique. Together, these results suggest that the conspiracist ideation seen among those high in grandiose narcissism and vulnerable narcissism is a consequence of features that are shared between and unique to each of the traits.     

Concepts of God and Germs: Social Mechanisms and Cognitive Heuristics

Previous research has shown that the more individuals view observable entities as animate, the more those entities are associated with having psychological and physiological experiences. This study examined the relationship between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for concepts of unobservable scientific (i.e., germ) and religious (i.e., God) entities. This study further explored how children's conceptions vary according to the social learning opportunities (i.e., discourse, rituals) parents reportedly create. Parent–child dyads with young children from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds participated. Three central findings emerged. First, children readily associated God with psychobiological characteristics but did not do so to the same extent for germs. Second, children applied more psychobiological properties to both entity types when they believed that the entity was animate. Third, engaging in rituals and discourse with parents was indirectly related to children's concepts of God but not related to their concepts of germs. Overall, this study presented support for a connection between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for unobservable entities, and an indirect effect of cultural input on this reasoning. The implications of these findings will be discussed.     

Why be critical? Introducing a symposium on Capitalizing Religion

This article introduces a review symposium on Craig Martin’s Capitalizing Religion: Ideology and the Opiate of the Bourgeoisie (2014). It provides a brief summary and situates Capitalizing Religion in relation to recent debates about what it means to engage in the ‘critical’ study of religion\s. The symposium consists of four commentaries: by Véronique Altglas (Queen’s University Belfast); Finbarr Curtis (Georgia Southern University); Sean McCloud (University of North Carolina at Charlotte); and Jörg Rüpke (Universität Erfurt).     

Explaining Normative Versus Nonnormative Action: The Role of Implicit Theories

The current research investigates what motivates people to engage in normative versus nonnormative action. Prior research has shown that different emotions lead to different types of action. We argue that these differing emotions are determined by a more basic characteristic, namely, implicit theories about whether groups and the world in general can change. We hypothesized that incremental theories (beliefs that groups/the world can change) would predict normative action, and entity theories (beliefs that groups/the world cannot change) as well as group identification would predict nonnormative action. We conducted a pilot in the context of protests against a government plan to relocate Bedouin villages in Israel and a main study during the Israeli social protests of the middle class. Results revealed three distinct pathways to collective action. First, incremental theories about the world predicted hope, which predicted normative action. Second, incremental theories about groups and group identification predicted anger, which also predicted normative collective action. Lastly, entity theories about groups predicted nonnormative collective action through hatred, but only for participants who were highly identified with the group. In sum, people who believed in the possibility of change supported normative action, whereas those who believed change was not possible supported nonnormative action.     

Attributes of God: Conceptual Foundations of a Foundational Belief

Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human properties to nonhuman entities, is often posited as an explanation for the origin and nature of God concepts, but it remains unclear which human properties we tend to attribute to God and under what conditions. In three studies, participants decided whether two types of human properties—psychological (mind‐dependent) properties and physiological (body‐dependent) properties—could or could not be attributed to God. In Study 1 (n = 1,525), participants made significantly more psychological attributions than physiological attributions, and the frequency of those attributions was correlated both with participants’ religiosity and with their attribution of abstract, theological properties. In Study 2 (n = 99) and Study 3 (n = 138), participants not only showed the same preference for psychological properties but were also significantly faster, more consistent, and more confident when attributing psychological properties to God than when attributing physiological properties. And when denying properties to God, they showed the reverse pattern—that is, they were slower, less consistent, and less confident when denying psychological properties than when denying physiological properties. These patterns were observed both in a predominantly Christian population (Study 2) and a predominantly Hindu population (Study 3). Overall, we argue that God is conceptualized not as a person in general but as an agent in particular, attributed a mind by default but attributed a body only upon further consideration.     

The robust self-esteem proxy: Impressions of self-esteem inform judgments of personality and social value

People use impressions of an evaluative target’s self-esteem to infer their possession of socially desirable traits. But will people still use this self-esteem proxy when trait-relevant diagnostic information is available? We test this possibility in two experiments: participants learn that a target person has low or high self-esteem, and then receive diagnostic information about the target’s academic success or failure and positive or negative affectivity (Study 1), or watch a video of the target’s extraverted or introverted behavior (Study 2). In both experiments, participants’ impressions of the target’s traits accurately tracked diagnostic information, but impressions also revealed an independent self-esteem proxy effect. Evidently, the self-esteem proxy is robust and influences person perception even in the presence of vivid individuating information.     

Views of a good life and allostatic load: Physiological correlates of theories of a good life depend on the socioeconomic context

This research examines the relationship between one’s theory of a good life and allostatic load, a marker of cumulative biological risk, and how this relationship differs by socioeconomic status. Among adults with a bachelor’s degree or higher, those who saw individual characteristics (e.g. personal happiness, effort) as part of a good life had lower levels of allostatic load than those who did not. In contrast, among adults with less than a bachelor’s degree, those who saw supportive relationships as part of a good life had lower levels of allostatic load than those who did not. These findings extend past research on socioeconomic differences in the emphasis on individual or relational factors and suggest that one’s theory of a good life has health implications.     

Is the good life characterized by self-control? Perceived regulatory success and judgments of life quality

To what extent do people view self-control as central to achieving a healthy, high-quality life? While scientific evidence strongly supports the notion that self-control is associated with successful adaptation and optimal functioning, we examine whether individuals connect this trait with positive outcomes. In Study 1, participants rated the likelihood that an individual with high self-control (or self-esteem) would experience good health and a high-quality life. Studies 2–3 experimentally portrayed a target person as high or low in self-control (and self-esteem) before participants rated the target on an array of positive outcomes. Across studies, self-control was perceived as less strongly connected with a high-quality life than self-esteem. Mediation analyses suggest that people link self-esteem (but not self-control) with healthy behaviors that, in turn, lead to superior perceived physical and psychological health. While self-esteem is strongly associated with lay concepts of the good life, the importance of self-control may be comparatively under-recognized.