FEDERATIVE GLOBAL DEMOCRACY

Abstract: In this essay a set of principles is defended that yields a determinate allocation of sovereign competences across a global system of territorially nested jurisdictions. All local sovereign competences are constrained by a universal, justiciable human rights regime that also incorporates a conception of cross-border distributive justice and regulates the competence to control immigration for a given territory. Subject to human rights constraints, sovereign competences are allocated according to a conception of global democracy. The proposed allocation scheme can accommodate substantial local autonomy while at the same time ensuring that everyone has a voice in the political decisions that affect his or her interests. The relevant class of affected interests is fully specified. Relevant affects are of two kinds: those that impose norms of governance on individuals, and those that impose external costs on them. The favored sense of "an external cost" is developed and defended.     

THINKING ABOUT THE GOOD: RECONFIGURING LIBERAL METAPHYSICS (OR NOT) FOR PEOPLE WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES

Abstract: Liberalism welcomes diversity in substantive ideas of the good but not in the process whereby these ideas are formed. Ideas of the good acquire weight on the presumption that each is a person's own, formed independently. But people differ in their capacities to conceptualize. Some, appropriately characterized as cerebral, are proficient in and profoundly involved with conceptualizing. Others, labeled cognitively disabled, range from individuals with mild limitations to those so unable to express themselves that we cannot be sure whether their behavior is mediated by concepts at all. Constricted cognitive capacities have been thought to prevent participation in the prescribed process for forming personalized ideas of the good. So liberal theory, when formulating principles and practices of justice, often disregards cognitively disabled peoples' perspectives. We put aside metaphysically driven notions about personhood and show how interpersonal processes of "prosthetic" thinking (different from surrogacy) can satisfy liberalism's standards, positioning cognitively disabled individuals as fully participating subjects of justice.     

Forgotten Victims of Military Humanitarian Intervention: A Case for the Principle of Reparation?

The purpose of this article is briefly to present a case for the principle of reparation as a new jus in bello principle for just humanitarian intervention. The article is divided into three sections. In “Restorative Justice and Civilian Protection”, I investigate the idea of restorative justice in order to consider whether or not it can complement the shortcomings of the just war tradition in civilian protection. In “The Legal Framework on Reparation: Its Scope and Limitations”, I examine the scope of the law of armed conflict on reparatory measures in order to consider whether and how ideas of and measures for restorative justice might be incorporated in the jus in bello framework for military humanitarian intervention. In “The Issue of Civilian Victims: A Case for Reparation”, I explore the implications of reparatory measures for victims in order to suggest that these measures are not only beneficial to civilian victims but also imperative to be taken by the interveners if they undertake military intervention within the jus in bello framework and claim its moral justifiability.     

Extending Compatibilism: Control,Responsibility, And Blame

In this paper, I argue that ‹moral responsibility’ refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But, second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy, once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires that we are ultimately morally responsible. I contend that this practice must, on grounds of justice, be tempered by adequate consideration of the fact that we are not ultimately morally responsible. My proposal in this regard is that blaming be replaced by admonishment. I would like to thank Dr. Cara Nine and Dr. David Hemp (University College Cork), and the two anonymous referees at Res Publica for their helpful comments on this paper.     

Recognition and Social Justice: A Roman Catholic View of Christian Bioethics of Long-Term Care and Community Service

Contemporary Christian ethics encounters the challenge to communicategenuinely Christian normative orientations within the scientificdebate in such a way as to render these orientations comprehensible,and to maintain or enhance their plausibility even for non-Christians.This essay, therefore, proceeds from a biblical motif, takesup certain themes from the Christian tradition (in particularthe idea of social justice), and connects both with a compellingcontemporary approach to ethics by secular moral philosophy,i.e. with Axel Honneth's reception of Hegel, as based on Hegel'stheory of recognition. As a first step, elements of an ethicsof recognition are developed on the basis of an anthropologicalrecourse to the conditions of intersubjective encounters. Theseconditions are then brought to bear on the idea of social justice,as developed in the social-Catholic tradition, and as systematicallyexplored in the Pastoral Letter of the United States Conferenceof Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice For All (1986). Proceedingfrom this basis, aspects of a Christian ethics of communityservice with regard to long-term care can be defined.     

组织中的申述

组织中的申述指发生在组织环境中的解释。在理论上,研究者采用印象管理和归因、互动公正以及公平理论三种视角探讨申述对缓和组织困境的作用。在方法上,研究者除了使用关键事件调查和实验室实验法之外,发展了“置于情境的实验”方法。在研究成果上,发现申述除了具有积极作用之外,有时也具有反作用和副作用。文章还讨论了申述的应用价值     

公正作为德性——亚里士多德公正德性探析

People currently regard justice as the main principle of institutions and society, while in ancient Greek people took it as the virtue of citizens. This article analyzes Aristotle’s virtue of justice in his method of virtue ethics, discussing the nature of virtue, how justice is the virtue of citizens, what kind of virtue the justice of citizens is, and the prospect of the virtue of justice against a background of institutional justice. Since virtue can be said to be a specific individual character, Aristotle also defines the virtue of justice as the character of justice, with which citizens act justly and desire to do what is just. The virtue of justice is also an individual ethical virtue, differing from others for it is at the same time a social ethic. We can call the virtue of justice a “non-individual individual ethical virtue.” It has been explained as between pure altruism and egoism, which is a wrong explanation. John Rawls regards justice as the first virtue of social institutions, challenging Aristotle’s virtue of justice, an assertion which also needs further deliberation. Translated from Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Xuebao 中国人民大学学报 (Journal of Renmin University of China), 2006, (2): 61–69     

Social comparison processes in organizations

We systematically analyze the role of social comparison processes in organizations. Specifically, we describe how social comparison processes have been used to explain six key areas of organizational inquiry: (1) organizational justice, (2) performance appraisal, (3) virtual work environments, (4) affective behavior in the workplace, (5) stress, and (6) leadership. Additionally, we describe how unique contextual factors in organizations offer new insight into two widely studied sub-processes of social comparison, acquiring social information and thinking about that information. Our analyses underscore the merit of integrating organizational phenomena and social comparison processes in future research and theory.     

消费情感、公平感与患者满意感

消费情感是顾客对交易过程是否公平的情感性体验,公平感是顾客满意感形成的基础条件。在医疗服务消费过程中,患者满意感不仅是对医疗效果是否符合其预期的主观评价,而且也是对医疗服务消费过程中诸如服务行为方式、操作程序规范以及经济利益交换等环节的情感认知性反应。