In Defence of Luck Egalitarianism

This paper considers issues raised by Elizabeth Andersons recent critique of the position she terms luck egalitarianism. It is maintained that luck egalitarianism, once clarified and elaborated in certain regards, remains the strongest egalitarian stance. Andersons arguments that luck egalitarians abandon both the negligent and prudent dependent caretakers fails to account for the moderate positions open to luck egalitarians and overemphasizes their commitment to unregulated market choices. The claim that luck egalitarianism insults citizens by redistributing on the grounds of paternalistic beliefs, pity and envy, and by making intrusive and stigmatizing judgments of responsibility, fails accurately to characterize the luck egalitarians rationale for redistribution and relies upon luck egalitarians being insensitive to the danger of stigmatization (which they need not be). The luck egalitarian position is reinforced by the fact that Andersons favoured conception of equality, democratic equality, is counterintuitively indifferent to all unchosen inequalities, including intergenerational inequalities, once bare social minima are met.I am indebted to Catriona McKinnon and Hillel Steiner for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this article. An antecedent of the paper was presented at the Northern Political Theory Association Annual Conference at the University of St Andrews in August 2003. Research for this article was supported by the University of York Alumni Fund and the Arts and Humanities Research Board.     

Some Thoughts about the Origins of ``Greek Ethics'

In this paper, I argue that several of the main issues that became a focus for classical Greek philosophy were initially framed by Homer. In particular, Homer identifies a tension between justice and individual excellence, and problematizes the connection between the heroic conception of excellence and ``eudaimonia' (happiness). The later philosophers address the problems raised in Homer by profoundly transforming the way each of these terms was to be conceived.     

Global Inequality and International Institutions

This article considers the links between international institutions and global economic justice: how international institutions might be morally important; how they have changed; and at what those changes imply for justice. The institutional structure of international society has evolved in ways that help to undercut the arguments of those who take a restrictionist position towards global economic justice. There is now a denser and more integrated network of shared institutions and practices within which social expectations of global justice and injustice have become more securely established. But, at the same time, our major international social institutions continue to constitute a deformed political order. This combination of density and deformity shapes how we should think about international justice in general and has important implications for the scope, character, and modalities of global economic justice. Having laid out a view of normative development and where it leads, the article then examines why international distributive justice remains so marginal to current practice.     

A policy‐modeling approach to examining fairness judgments in organizational acquisitions

Organizational acquisitions may be characterized by the degree of friendliness or hostility as well as the degree of autonomy or absorption of the organizations following the merger. This study examined judgments of fairness across four types of organizational acquisitions. Students read fictitious newspaper accounts of a university acquisition and rated their expectations and perceptions of fairness about possible changes. Results indicated that in an acquisition, both the procedures used and the outcomes provided influenced how fair the acquisition was perceived. As predicted, the relative importance of procedures and outcomes in overall perceptions of fairness shifted depending on the context of the acquisition. As the desirability of the acquisition increased, individuals placed greater importance on the procedural elements. In a friendly and low integration acquisition, the processes and outcomes became equally important. Individuals faced with a high integration acquisition expected more unfair changes and fewer fair changes to occur. Furthermore, these results highlight the importance expectations play in perceptions of fairness. The type of acquisition will influence expectations for fair treatment. Under less desirable conditions (hostile and high‐integration mergers), organizations should take steps early in the process to manage fairness perceptions. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fields and Theology: A Response to Wolfhart Pannenberg

In responding to Pannenberg's paper, "God as Spirit—and Natural Science," Polkinghorne challenges the paper's interpretation of the scientific concept of field. He insists on its physical, material nature, elaborated by quantum theory, and asserts that Pannenberg's concept of field is immaterial or even in some sense "spiritual." Polkinghorne also comments on how a physical theory may give rise to several differing, even contradictory, metaphysical interpretations.     

Beyond the molar-molecular distinction: we need multiscaled analyses.

Dinsmoor's (2001) adherence to molecular analyses may require him to assert that molar and molecular principles are mutually exclusive, but to instead analyze the phenomena of avoidance as inherently multiscaled is to follow a well-established practice in the natural sciences. Besides the issue of scale, two-factor theory, which Dinsmoor advocates, has little to say about some important and longstanding results in experiments that qualify as avoidance.     

Community-based Practices: Integrating Dissemination Theory with Critical Theories of Power and Justice

This paper critically reviews two diverse intellectual traditions concerned with community-based interventions: the literature on dissemination of community interventions and the critical psychology literature that is concerned with systemic power inequalities and structural injustice. The dominant dissemination-of-innovations framework has shifted toward an emphasis on community, yet it does not generally take into account issues of power and inequality within the diverse community spheres into which interventions are disseminated. On the other hand, critical psychologists, who have concerned themselves with both understanding and addressing issues of power and structural injustice, have tended to eschew the possibility of standardizing and making transferable practices, programs, and even processes that address these issues in particular settings. This paper traces and critiques both sides of this divide within community psychology, positing a framework to bring these diverse intellectual resources together so that community interventions might fruitfully be examined in terms of their community-based practices, or practices that bear on structural injustice. This framework is illustrated with a case study of the community-based practices of a widely disseminated evidence-based community intervention.     

Sacrifices,Aspirations and Morality: Williams Reconsidered

When a person gives up an end of crucial importance to her in order to promote a moral aim, we regard her as having made a moral sacrifice. The paper analyzes these sacrifices in light of some of Bernard Williams’ objections to Kantian and Utilitarian accounts of them. Williams argues that an implausible consequence of these theories is that that we are expected to sacrifice projects that make our lives worth living and contribute to our integrity. Williams’ arguments about integrity and meaning are shown to be unconvincing when the content of projects is left open. However, a look at his later arguments suggests a reason to be concerned about defensible ethical projects as understood through what he refers to as “the morality system”. The problem for theories of this type turns out to be not merely conflicts between ethical projects and moral demands but making sense of some of the ethically relevant features of these projects. Accommodations to moral theories that leave room for ethical projects may be insufficient to explain such features, for example in cases where agents demand more of themselves than the theories require. Making the theories more demanding is also problematic. Williams’ view about the role ethics plays in our conception of the life we want to lead provides a better account of these cases.

正义的战争与战争的正义——关于战争伦理的反思

War can be defined as organized political violence among two or more nations. In accordance with the purpose, processes and results of war, the ethics of war generally comprises three aspects: right ethics, action ethics and duty ethics. The most important issue in ethics of war is “justice”. “Justice” and “injustice” as a conceptual pair do not prescribe the objective character of war but rather convey a subjective attitude and ethical position that have the potential to compel a populace to either support or oppose a war. Translated by Zuo Gaoshan and Xi Yunpeng from Lunlixue Yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Studies in Ethtics), 2005, (6): 43–48