Authorization and The Morality of War

Why does it matter that those who fight wars be authorized by the communities on whose behalf they claim to fight? I argue that lacking authorization generates a moral cost, which counts against a war's proportionality, and that having authorization allows the transfer of reasons from the members of the community to those who fight, which makes the war more likely to be proportionate. If democratic states are better able than non-democratic states and sub-state groups to gain their community's authorization, this means that some wars will be proportionate if fought by democracies, disproportionate if not.     

The impact of event vividness,event severity,and prior paranormal belief on attributions towards a depicted remarkable coincidence experience: Two studies examining the misattribution hypothesis

Two studies examine the impact event vividness, event severity, and prior paranormal belief has on causal attributions for a depicted remarkable coincidence experience. In Study 1, respondents (n = 179) read a hypothetical vignette in which a fictional character accurately predicts a plane crash 1 day before it occurs. The crash was described in either vivid or pallid terms with the final outcome being either severe (fatal) or non‐severe (non‐fatal). Respondents completed 29 causal attribution items, one attribution confidence item, nine scenario perception items, a popular paranormal belief scale, and a standard demographics questionnaire. Principal axis factoring reduced the 29 attribution items to four attribution factors which were then subjected to a 2 (event vividness) × 2 (event severity) × 2 (paranormal belief) MANCOVA controlling for respondent gender. As expected, paranormal believers attributed the accurate crash prediction less to coincidence and more to both paranormal and transcendental knowing than did paranormal sceptics. Furthermore, paranormal (psychokinesis) believers deemed the prediction more reflective of paranormal knowing to both (1) a vivid/non‐fatal and (2) a pallid/fatal crash depiction. Vividness, severity, and paranormal belief types had no impact on attribution confidence. In Study 2, respondents (also n = 179) generated data that were a moderately good fit to the previous factor structure and replicated several differences across attributional pairings albeit for paranormal non‐believers only. Corresponding effects for event severity and paranormal belief were not replicated. Findings are discussed in terms of their support for the paranormal misattribution hypothesis and the impact of availability biases in the form of both vividness and severity effects. Methodological issues and future research ideas are also discussed.     

Does Religious Belief Matter for Grief and Death Anxiety? Experimental Philosophy Meets Psychology of Religion

It is commonly reasoned that religious belief moderates death anxiety and aids in coping with loss. However, a philosophical perspective known as meta‐atheism includes the claim that avowed religious believers grieve deaths and experience death anxiety as intensely as avowed atheists. Thus, we report a study comparing religious believers and nonbelievers on measures of death anxiety and grief. We further investigated the relationships between certain religious beliefs (views of God, afterlife belief, religious orientation) and death anxiety, as well as both painful grief reactions and grief‐related growth. We surveyed 101 participants across the United States, ranging in age (19 to 57), education, and ethnicity. Participants avowing some form of religious belief, in comparison to those not, did not demonstrate lower levels of death anxiety. They did, however, display higher levels of a certain type of death acceptance. Additionally, those professing belief reported less grief and greater growth in response to loss. Greater afterlife belief was not associated with less grief; however, it was associated with both greater grief‐related growth and lower death anxiety.     

How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs

People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions (such as trembling in fear when their death becomes an imminent possibility, despite earlier professing that “Death is not bad!”). But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief (or degrees of confidence) may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.     

Negation in context: Evidence from the visual world paradigm

Literature assumes that negation is more difficult to understand than affirmation, but this might depend on the pragmatic context. The goal of this paper is to show that pragmatic knowledge modulates the unfolding processing of negation due to the previous activation of the negated situation. To test this, we used the visual world paradigm. In this task, we presented affirmative (e.g., her dad was rich) and negative sentences (e.g., her dad was not poor) while viewing two images of the affirmed and denied entities. The critical sentence in each item was preceded by one of three types of contexts: an inconsistent context (e.g., She supposed that her dad had little savings) that activates the negated situation (a poor man), a consistent context (e.g., She supposed that her dad had enough savings) that activates the actual situation (a rich man), or a neutral context (e.g., her dad lived on the other side of town) that activates neither of the two models previously suggested. The results corroborated our hypothesis. Pragmatics is implicated in the unfolding processing of negation. We found an increase in fixations on the target compared to the baseline for negative sentences at 800?ms in the neutral context, 600?ms in the inconsistent context, and 1450?ms in the consistent context. Thus, when the negated situation has been previously introduced via an inconsistent context, negation is facilitated.     

Explanation,updating, and accuracy

There is evidence that people update their credences partly on the basis of explanatory considerations. Philosophers have recently argued that to minimise the inaccuracy of their credences, people's updates also ought to be partly based on such considerations. However, there are many ways in which explanatory considerations can factor into updating, not all of which minimise inaccuracy. It is an open question whether in their updating, people take explanatory considerations into account in a way that philosophers would deem recommendable. To address this question, we re-analyse data from an experiment reported in Douven and Schupbach, “The role of explanatory considerations in updating” (Cognition, 2015).     

高师生心理健康教育实验研究

本文采用自然教学实验的研究方法,探讨心理健康教育对高师生健康信念、健康行为和健康水平的影响,以高师９５级大学三年级学生１２６个为实验组,进行５４个课时的心理健康课程教学,并以同校同级学生１０９个对照组。采用健康信念和健康行为调查表和Ｃａｗｔｅ健康量表,对实验组和控制组被试进行调查和测试。结果表明,心理健康教育不仅明显改善了高师生的健康信念和健康行为,而且提高了他们的身心健康水平。     

用户换位型思维的形成及对机会信念绩效的影响

用户换位型思维是创业者进行机会识别并应对市场竞争的重要因素,但已有研究忽视了其模式、形成机理及对机会信念绩效的影响。针对此问题,基于结构映射理论与注意力参与模型解构用户换位型思维模式,包括吸收式、归纳式、启发式和分析式;然后,从“个体-用户”双元视角探讨与用户有关的先验知识、灵活的角色导向、认知复杂性以及用户需求不确定性和碎片化等因素对用户换位型思维形成的正向影响;最后,以机会信念形成速度和创新性为绩效指标,阐释用户换位型思维模式对机会信念形成绩效的影响,并考察适应新的信息环境和调用自身知识结构的认知管理策略对用户换位型思维模式与机会信念形成绩效的调节作用。研究结论将丰富用户换位型思维的内涵,拓展结构映射理论与注意力参与模型的解释范围,也为指导创业者运用用户换位型思维去识别机会提供参考,对创业者思考与理解用户有重要意义。     

Demonstrating the effect of context on order effects for an army air defense task using the patriot simulator

The results reported herein support the hypotheses that (1) situation-specific, contextual features of a task can cause people to use explanation-based reasoning (Pennington and Hastie, 1993); (2) such reasoning can cause experienced personnel, both individually and in two-person teams, to reinterpret the meaning of the same information when it is presented in two different ordered sequences; and (3) the result will be primacy or recency (or no) effects depending on whether the most recent conflicting information can be explained away or not, respectively. These results extend the belief-adjustment model proposed by Hogarth and Einhorn (1992), which does not address information reinterpretations, and always predicts recency effects for an evaluation task with a short series of conflicting information. More generally, the results demonstrate the importance of situation-specific, contextual features in understanding judgment processes. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Truth in Fiction,Impossible Worlds,and Belief Revision

We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.