A Study of the Benefit of Social and Religious Support on Church Members During Times of Crisis

A majority of Americans participate in religious services and identify themselves as members of a faith community. Understanding the role that religion plays in people's lives is essential to developing a comprehensive model of social support during times of crisis. The purpose of the current study was to identify the resources of social support that are helpful for church members during times of crisis. Although research on the impact of social support has identified several types of support—and the function of such support—to people undergoing difficult times, researchers have not looked at the impact of religious beliefs and participation in religious communities on social support to any significant extent. The current study collected questionnaire data from 23 members of one congregation who experienced a personal crisis. Analysis of the data shows that religious beliefs and the support provided by the religious community were seen as extremely helpful in times of crisis. Implications for incorporating people's religious beliefs and participation in religious communities into future investigations of social support are discussed.     

Chisholm's Epistemic Principles

Abstract: An exposition and discussion of Chisholm's “epistemic principles.” These are compared with relevant views of Wilfrid Sellars and Richard Foley. A further comparison, with the approach favored by Descartes, is argued to throw light on the status of such principles.     

The ‘mad scientists’: Psychoanalysis,dream and virtual reality2

The author explores the concept of reality‐testing as a means of assessing the relationship with reality that prevails in dream and in virtual reality. Based on a model developed by Jean Laplanche, she compares these activities in detail in order to determine their respective independence from the function of reality‐testing. By carefully examining the concept of hallucination in the writings of Freud and Daniel Dennett, the author seeks to pinpoint the specific modalities of interaction between perceptions, ideas, wishes and actions that converge in the ‘belief’ and in the ‘sense of reality’. The paper's main thesis consists of the distinction that it draws between immediacy‐testing and reality‐testing, with the further argument that this distinction not only dissipates the conceptual vagueness that generally surrounds the latter of the two concepts but also that it promotes a more precise analysis of the function of reality in dream and in virtual reality.     

Virtual reality and the new psychophysics

Virtual reality (VR) promises methodological rigour with the extra benefit of allowing us to study the context-dependent behaviour of individuals in their natural environment. Pan and Hamilton (2018, Br. J. Psychol.) provide a useful overview of methodological recommendations for using VR. Here, we highlight some other aspects of the use of VR. Our first argument is that VR can be useful by virtue of its differences from the normal perceptual environment. That is, by virtue of its relative non-realism and poverty of its perceptual elements, it can actually offer increased clarity with respect to the features of interest for the researcher. Our second argument is that VR exerts its measurable influence more by eliciting an acceptance of the virtual world (i.e., ‘suspension of disbelief’) rather than by eliciting a true belief of the realism of the VR environment. We conclude by providing a novel suggestion for combining neuroimaging methods with embodied VR that relies on the suspension of disbelief.     

Getting it Right

In addition to noting significant differences of interpretation between me and Kristopher Norris on understanding classic just war thought and judging its importance, this Comment flags errors of fact and faulty logic in the Norris essay.     

道德信仰简论

道德信仰是时代的强烈呼唤。道德信仰的本质是人在道德人格上的自我超越，它具有高度的主体自觉性、形上性和价值整合性，具有道德境界的提升功能、道德人格的塑造功能、道德行为的动力功能和道德秩序的控制功能。     

JUST WAR THEORY,HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION,AND THE NEED FOR A DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION

The primary purpose of government is to secure public goods that cannot be achieved by free markets. The Coordination Principle tells us to consolidate sovereign power in a single institution to overcome collective action problems that otherwise prevent secure provision of the relevant public goods. There are several public goods that require such coordination at the global level, chief among them being basic human rights. The claim that human rights require global coordination is supported in three main steps. First, I consider Pogge's and Habermas's analyses as alternatives to Hobbesian conceptions of justice. Second, I consider the core conventions of international law, which are in tension with the primacy of state sovereignty in the UN system. Third, I argue that the just war tradition does not limit just causes for war to self‐defense; it supports saving innocent third parties from crimes against humanity as a just reason for war. While classical authors focused less on this issue, the point is especially clear in twentieth‐century just war theories, such as those offered by the American Catholic bishops, Jean Elshtain, Brian Orend, and Michael Walzer. Against Walzer, I argue that we add intractable military tyranny to the list of horrors meriting intervention if other ad bellum conditions are met. But these results require us to reexamine the “just authority” of first resort to govern such interventions. The Coordination Principle implies that we should create a transnational federation with consolidated powers in place of a treaty organization requiring near‐unanimity. But to be legitimate, such a global institution must also be directly answerable to the citizens of its member states. While the UN Security Council is inadequate on both counts, a federation of democracies with a directly elected executive and legislature could meet both conditions.     

JUST LIES: Finding Augustine's Ethics of Public Lying in His Treatments of Lying and Killing

Augustine famously defends the justice of killing in certain public contexts such as just wars. He also claims that private citizens who intentionally kill are guilty of murder, regardless of their reasons. Just as famously, Augustine seems to prohibit lying categorically. Analyzing these features of his thought and their connections, I argue that Augustine is best understood as endorsing the justice of lying in certain public contexts, even though he does not explicitly do so. Specifically, I show that parallels between his treatments of killing and lying along with his “agent (auctor)–instrument (minister)” distinction, in which God is the true agent or “author” of certain acts and humans are merely God's instruments, together imply that he would regard certain instances of public lying as permissible and even obligatory. I buttress my argument by examining several key but neglected passages and by responding to various objections and rival interpretations. Throughout, I challenge standard interpretations of Augustine's ethics of killing and lying and seek to deepen our overall understanding of these dimensions of his thought. In so doing, I contribute to ongoing discussions of public and private lying and to the task of relating Augustine's thought to contemporary debate and deliberation on war, killing, and lying.