Mindreading deception in dialog

This paper considers the problem of detecting deceptive agents in a conversational context. We argue that distinguishing between types of deception is required to generate successful action. This consideration motivates a novel taxonomy of deceptive and ignorant mental states, emphasizing the importance of an ulterior motive when classifying deceptive agents. After illustrating this taxonomy with a sequence of examples, we introduce a Framework for Identifying Deceptive Entities (FIDE) and demonstrate that FIDE has the representational power to distinguish between the members of our taxonomy. We conclude with some conjectures about how FIDE could be used for inference.     

ALL THE (MANY,MANY) THINGS WE KNOW: EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE*

In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis—the thesis that the mind extends into the world—on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to a bifurcation with respect to the concepts of belief and knowledge. We suggest that this conceptual bifurcation supports a form of pluralism about these concepts. Third, we discuss whether something similar can be said at the metaphysical level.     

Beyond Skills and Structure: Justice Dispositions as Antecedents of Young Citizens' Volunteering and Political Participation

Community involvement is usually attributed to opportunity structures and individuals' ability to be involved. Building on psychological justice research, this paper proposes that justice dispositions add to explaining why young citizens become active in their communities or not. Furthermore, it is argued that justice dispositions help to understand why most studies find only moderate relationships between youth volunteering and forms of political involvement. In a sample of 321 young Swiss volunteers, this study shows justice centrality and belief in a just world to predict the extent of volunteering and political participation, even after controlling for civic skills and opportunity structures. However, scrutinising the motivations to volunteer, self‐oriented motivations (enhancement, social, career and understanding) more strongly affected the level of volunteering than motivations related to justice dispositions (political responsibility and social responsibility). These findings have implications for the attraction and retention of volunteers as well as for the politics of volunteering and community development in general. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Interplay of Cross‐Situational Word Learning and Sentence‐Level Constraints

A variety of mechanisms contribute to word learning. Learners can track co‐occurring words and referents across situations in a bottom‐up manner (cross‐situational word learning, CSWL). Equally, they can exploit sentential contexts, relying on top–down information such as verb–argument relations and world knowledge, offering immediate constraints on meaning (word learning based on sentence‐level constraints, SLCL). When combined, CSWL and SLCL potentially modulate each other's influence, revealing how word learners deal with multiple mechanisms simultaneously: Do they use all mechanisms? Prefer one? Is their strategy context dependent? Three experiments conducted with adult learners reveal that learners prioritize SLCL over CSWL. CSWL is applied in addition to SLCL only if SLCL is not perfectly disambiguating, thereby complementing or competing with it. These studies demonstrate the importance of investigating word‐learning mechanisms simultaneously, revealing important characteristics of their interaction in more naturalistic learning environments.     

Self‐specific Optimism Bias in Belief Updating Is Associated with High Trait Optimism

People learn more from new information when it leads to favorable future outlooks and thus can maintain optimism despite conflicting evidence. In two studies (N = 20 and 26), we investigated whether this optimism bias in belief updating is self‐specific by modifying a recently introduced learning paradigm. In each trial, participants had to estimate the probability of experiencing a negative future event, were then presented with the population base rate of that event, and were subsequently asked for a second, updated estimation. In half of the 88 trials with varying events, estimations were made for oneself, in the other half for a similar other. We tested whether the updates (differences between the first and second estimates) following undesirable base rate were lower than those following desirable base rates, and whether this difference was greater for self relative to other. In both studies, the overall results support the presence of a self‐specific optimism bias in belief updating. However, taking into account trait optimism (TO) as a moderator variable revealed that this was the case only in participants with high TO, whereas those with low TO showed optimistic belief updating for both self and other. In Study 2, we additionally controlled for possible misclassifications of base rate desirability. Taken together, the optimism bias in belief updating was demonstrated by a selective neglect of unfavorable information. A self‐specific influence of this bias in individuals with high TO may ultimately cause the impression of a more positive future outlook relative to others. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Changes in cooperative behaviour and belief in finitely repeated social dilemmas

Economic and psychological studies have determined the tendency to improve cooperation in initial interactions in which people are required to contribute in public good games. The current study examined the behavioural changes of individuals during finite interaction times. Participants were invited to make decisions twice in a step‐level public good game, and their belief in achieving the collective interest was measured. Participants were divided into three groups based on their first decisions. Results showed that high contributors demonstrated high levels of contribution in their subsequent interactions, whereas low and equal contributors increased their levels of contribution after the initial interaction. Additionally, the cooperative level of low contributors increased along with their cooperative belief. The theoretical and practical implications of changes of behaviour and belief in repeated social dilemmas were identified.     

Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rational Belief

This paper presents a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement that distinguishes two principles of rational belief, here called probability and autonomy. When we discover that we disagree with peers, there is one sense in which we rationally ought to suspend belief, and another in which we rationally ought to retain our original belief. In the first sense, we aim to believe what is most probably true according to our total evidence, including testimony from peers and authorities. In the second, we aim to base our beliefs only on objective evidence and argumentation, even if that lowers the probability of their being true. The first principle of rational belief tends to serve the short-term epistemic interests of individuals, while the second tends to serve the long-term epistemic interests of both individuals and groups. The best way to reconcile these principles in cases of peer disagreement is to associate them with two corresponding species of belief, here called perception and opinion.     

The Myth of the Angry Atheist

Atheists are often portrayed in the media and elsewhere as angry individuals. Although atheists disagree with the pillar of many religions, namely the existence of a God, it may not necessarily be the case that they are angry individuals. The prevalence and accuracy of angry-atheist perceptions were examined in 7 studies with 1,677 participants from multiple institutions and locations in the United States. Studies 1–3 revealed that people believe atheists are angrier than believers, people in general, and other minority groups, both explicitly and implicitly. Studies 4–7 then examined the accuracy of these beliefs. Belief in God, state anger, and trait anger were assessed in multiple ways and contexts. None of these studies supported the idea that atheists are particularly angry individuals. Rather, these results support the idea that people believe atheists are angry individuals, but they do not appear to be angrier than other individuals in reality.     

Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity

Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.     

Unus Mundus: A New Approach to The Reading of Complexity

In the last decades of the twentieth century, there was quite a change in the scientific approaches as far as humankind and nature are concerned. The recent discoveries of quantum physics with the phenomenon of entanglement and of the neurosciences with the holographic theory of mind have furthermore amplified the epistemological perspectives of complexity, introducing completely new and amazing hypotheses concerning the human­–universe relationship. Therefore, on the basis of these quantum specifications by Bohm, we can postulate the hypothesis that if all the matter of the universe is also entangled, living matter and the cognition entangled to it, which are at the basis of the network of life, do not represent but a giant living hologram provided with specific information prerogative which, generally speaking, can flow by means of the continuous interaction of the corporeal matter of humankind together with the wider network of the whole. This interaction of humankind with the universe is studied by Ecobiopsychology, which qualifies in the “panorama” of complexity like a new discipline, which relates the informative codes of the living world and their specific languages (the ecological aspect) to the analogous languages of the human body, which sediments in itself the phylogenesis of the world (the biological aspect), to then recover the relationship between the “world” and the human “bios” in its psychological and cultural aspects expressed in myths, in the history of religions, and in the collective images of humanity (the psychological aspects). Ecobiopsychology, referring to the most recent developments of complexity, considers humankind as an organized totality provided with a meaning that can be justified only if contextualized in the relationships with its body, its mind, and its social and cultural dynamics without any of these aspects being privileged the human being, the human unit is to be seen as a node within a broader network. The human­-unity is provided with a specific organization, schema, structure, and process, the outcome of that manifestation of strength and information flowing in a continuous dynamism. The ecobiopsychological model focusing on the constant relationship between the unconscious and the body, in referring to the information “physicality” of the archetype and in evaluating the importance of the synchronicity as a rule able to bind among themselves the information of existential events together with the categories of the different forms of the universe, by means of the vital analogies and the symbols, proposes a holistic Weltanschauung of humankind. This is similar to the most modern conceptions of quantum physics.