"It's Us Against the World": How Distrust in Americans versus People-In-General Shapes Competitive Foreign Policy Preferences

Previous research has uncovered links between generalized distrust and preferences for competitive (vs. cooperative) action. However, based on individuals' tendency to hold consistent attitudes and to believe that their own political preferences are morally legitimate, it was hypothesized that the direction of the relationship between distrust and competitive foreign policy preferences would depend on which category individuals had in mind: Americans or people. Two correlational studies with American participants were consistent with this hypothesis. Study 1 showed that distrust in Americans versus people had qualitatively different relationships with support for competitive policy preferences (i.e., immigration control, militaristic action). Study 2 found that when the covariance between distrust in Americans and people was controlled, distrust in Americans predicted opposition to torture of suspected terrorists, whereas distrust in people predicted support for torture of suspected terrorists. Moreover, individual discrepancies between distrust in Americans versus people uniquely predicted support for torture. Finally, mediational analyses in both studies indicated that political conservatism explained the effects between distrust in Americans versus people and competitive policy preferences. It is argued that distrust in Americans and distrust in people are distinct but complementary bases of Americans' moral-political reasoning.     

THE TROUBLE WITH TERROR

Abstract: The argument proceeds from a sense of imminent danger; 9/11 and its sequel challenge our deepest pretensions regarding the universality and self‐evidence of moral/political conviction. The intransigence of such convictions is now an important source of international conflict and terror. It also signifies that the resolution of the disorder that now confronts the international community requires a transformation in our conception of morality itself. In this regard, philosophy has an important task to address. The discussion explores a radical change in our understanding of just war, the distinction between war and peace, the logic of conflict, and similar topics.     

Terrorism,War, and The Killing of the Innocent

Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence. I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions in question tend to misunderstand the justification of both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum.

Introduction to Three Diagnoses of God

This brief article introduces the three articles diagnosing God by Helsel, Capps, and Carlin as examples of a skeptical strain that has been present throughout Judeo–Christian history, suggesting that psychology as an “interrogative” mode is a necessary counterpoint to theology’s dogmatic mode. The three articles are recommended on the basis of their heuristic value for instruction about mental illness, their playfulness and humor, and their potential for reshaping traditional images of God that have been harmful.     

Changes in attitudes towards war and violence after September 11, 2001

Two inter-related studies examined the effect of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on attitudes towards war and violence. A three-wave between-subjects analysis revealed that attitudes towards war became more positive after September 11, 2001 and remained high over a year afterwards. Self-reported trait physical aggression also rose after September 11. Attitudes towards penal code violence (PCV) became more positive immediately after September 11, but were somewhat reduced a year afterward. A two-wave within subjects study revealed that war attitudes became even more positive at 2 months post-September 11. Attitudes towards PCV became less positive during this time period, but only for women. Other aggression-related attitudes were not affected in either study. These studies demonstrate that a large-scale event can change attitudes, but those attitudes must be directly relevant to the event.     

Evolution of Destructive Aggression

Aggression is defined as a mechanism of spacing by means of force or displays. It has evolved independently in different animal groups. The mechanisms underlying it are therefore not homologous throughout the animal kingdom. The phenomenon of aggression is so widespread, however, that strong selection pressures must be responsible for its development along analogous lines. Its most obvious functions are in competition for mates, natural resources, and territories, and in the preservation of group identity in many gregarious species. Aggression is often ritualized so that no damage is done to conspecifics. This ritualization may appear as modification of fighting into a tournament, or as the development of submissive postures which block further aggression in the opponent shortly after the onset of a potentially damaging fight. Animal aggression is preprogrammed by phylogenetic adaptation in well-defined ways, but can be modified by experience. The inborn programs involve motor patterns, innate releasing mechanisms, releasers, motivating mechanisms, and learning dispositions specific for the species. Aggression on this biological level can be observed in humans as intragroup aggression. Certain motor patterns and signals which lead to the release of aggression are universal. Some can even be found in deaf- and blind-born people, proving their innateness. A number of patterns of aggression in man are highly ritualized and - in a way analogous to that found in many animals - mechanisms of control have evolved inhibiting the killing of a conspecific. There are strong indications of the existence of motivating mechanisms within the brain, e.g., in the form of neuronal circuits, that show a degree of spontaneity. The type of destructive aggression which we call war, is a product of cultural evolution. War takes advantage of the given motivational structure of man, including his fear of strangers, which develops in every baby independently of experience and makes men inclined to form closed groups and causes them to be wary of or hostile to strangers. Based on these tendencies, man underwent a process of cultural subspeciation. Groups demarcated themselves from others by custom, erecting communication barriers. The development of languages demonstrates how fast and efficient this process is. Members of the same group, during this process, were defined as the “real man,” outsiders often were to be valued less -or even considered nonhuman. On the basis of this self-indoctrination, cultural codes of conduct developed, which allowed members of other groups to be killed when groups competed for resources. A cultural fiiter of norms was established which demanded killing under defined conditions, and was superimposed upon the biological filter of norms which inhibits the killing of a human being. This results in a conflict of norms, which is universally felt as guilt, since the biological filter of norms, though superimposed, is nonetheless working, particularly in the circumstance of a personal encounter. The more advanced the technique of armament, which allows fast and distant killing, the less the inhibitions are activated. Nonetheless, ritualizations occur on the cultural level. Warfare is sometimes ritualized and conventions are developed to prevent escalation into massacres, or the wholesale destruction of the subjugated enemy. To a great extent, this is certainly a result of our inborn moral code, If nothing like this were given to man our situation would be disastrous indeed. Whether cultural evolution will, in the future, be guided by moral maxims in accord with our human nature is a deeision men must make rationally. Although a ruthless ethnocentrism may bring advantage to a warring group, this may eventually prove fatal to mankind as a whole. In the escalating competition mankind runs the danger not only of exhausting its resources, but of destroying itself with its new weapons. If the outcome were not selfdestruction but domination by one group it would impoverish the diversity of human cultures, and thus seriously cut down man's spectrum of adaptability. War fulfills certain functions, similar to those found in animals. It is mainly a mechanism for preserving and extending one's territory, and a means of getting access to scarce resources. It is therefore dangerous to consider war merely as a pathological form of human behavior because this may distract our attention from the fact that, h order to overcome war, the functions of war have to be fulfilled by nonviolent means. Cultural evolution phenocopies biological evolution, due to similarities in the selection pressures shaping its course. This allows us to define the point of the evolutionary spiral we are at currently and to predict our future course.     

THE LASH IS MIGHTIER THAN THE SWORD1: Torture and Citizenry in Medieval Muslim Jurisprudence

Medieval Muslim scholars unequivocally prohibited the torture of prisoners of war out of a concern for maintaining theoretical constructs about the boundaries of the Muslim and non‐Muslim communities. Muslim scholars worried that the torturing prisoners of war would compromise values and ideals predicated on such constructs, and that the demands of citizenship trumped any benefit to the Muslim community that might accrue from torture.     

THE EARLIEST CHRISTIAN WAR: Second‐ and Third‐Century Martyrdom and the Creation of Cosmic Warriors

Many Christian historians and theologians hold the opinion that the early church condemned wholesale an active involvement in bloodshed. However, in light of evidence drawn from early Christian texts, most notably literature dealing with martyrdom, one finds that stance overly simplified. In fact, forms of early Christianity not only glorified war and violence in certain contexts but actively sought it out. This article enters into this conversation by applying a theory championed by Mark Juergensmeyer's Terror in the Mind of God. While this theory deals with modern examples of religious cultures of violence, his “stages of symbolic empowerment” apply surprisingly well to certain communities within the early orthodox church. The cosmic war complex that leads to nefarious figures such as the fanatic suicide bomber can be seen at work within the nascent matrix of the Church, which produced victims and warriors in the form of the voluntary martyrs.     

GLOBAL JUSTICE AFTER THE FALL Christian Realism and the "Law of Peoples"

In The Law of Peoples John Rawls casts his proposals as an argument against what he calls “political realism.” Here, I contend that a certain version of “Christian political realism” survives Rawls's polemic against political realism sans phrase and that Rawls overstates his case against political realism writ large. Specifically, I argue that Rawls's dismissal of “empirical political realism” is underdetermined by the evidence he marshals in support of the dismissal and that his rejection of “normative political realism” is in tension with his own normative concessions to political reality as expressed in The Law of Peoples. That is, I contend that Rawls, himself, needs some form of political realism to render persuasive the full range of normative claims constituting the argument of that work.