"It's Us Against the World": How Distrust in Americans versus People-In-General Shapes Competitive Foreign Policy Preferences

Previous research has uncovered links between generalized distrust and preferences for competitive (vs. cooperative) action. However, based on individuals' tendency to hold consistent attitudes and to believe that their own political preferences are morally legitimate, it was hypothesized that the direction of the relationship between distrust and competitive foreign policy preferences would depend on which category individuals had in mind: Americans or people. Two correlational studies with American participants were consistent with this hypothesis. Study 1 showed that distrust in Americans versus people had qualitatively different relationships with support for competitive policy preferences (i.e., immigration control, militaristic action). Study 2 found that when the covariance between distrust in Americans and people was controlled, distrust in Americans predicted opposition to torture of suspected terrorists, whereas distrust in people predicted support for torture of suspected terrorists. Moreover, individual discrepancies between distrust in Americans versus people uniquely predicted support for torture. Finally, mediational analyses in both studies indicated that political conservatism explained the effects between distrust in Americans versus people and competitive policy preferences. It is argued that distrust in Americans and distrust in people are distinct but complementary bases of Americans' moral-political reasoning.     

THE TROUBLE WITH TERROR

Abstract: The argument proceeds from a sense of imminent danger; 9/11 and its sequel challenge our deepest pretensions regarding the universality and self‐evidence of moral/political conviction. The intransigence of such convictions is now an important source of international conflict and terror. It also signifies that the resolution of the disorder that now confronts the international community requires a transformation in our conception of morality itself. In this regard, philosophy has an important task to address. The discussion explores a radical change in our understanding of just war, the distinction between war and peace, the logic of conflict, and similar topics.     

Terrorism,War, and The Killing of the Innocent

Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence. I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions in question tend to misunderstand the justification of both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum.

Changes in attitudes towards war and violence after September 11, 2001

Two inter-related studies examined the effect of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on attitudes towards war and violence. A three-wave between-subjects analysis revealed that attitudes towards war became more positive after September 11, 2001 and remained high over a year afterwards. Self-reported trait physical aggression also rose after September 11. Attitudes towards penal code violence (PCV) became more positive immediately after September 11, but were somewhat reduced a year afterward. A two-wave within subjects study revealed that war attitudes became even more positive at 2 months post-September 11. Attitudes towards PCV became less positive during this time period, but only for women. Other aggression-related attitudes were not affected in either study. These studies demonstrate that a large-scale event can change attitudes, but those attitudes must be directly relevant to the event.     

THE LASH IS MIGHTIER THAN THE SWORD1: Torture and Citizenry in Medieval Muslim Jurisprudence

Medieval Muslim scholars unequivocally prohibited the torture of prisoners of war out of a concern for maintaining theoretical constructs about the boundaries of the Muslim and non‐Muslim communities. Muslim scholars worried that the torturing prisoners of war would compromise values and ideals predicated on such constructs, and that the demands of citizenship trumped any benefit to the Muslim community that might accrue from torture.     

THE EARLIEST CHRISTIAN WAR: Second‐ and Third‐Century Martyrdom and the Creation of Cosmic Warriors

Many Christian historians and theologians hold the opinion that the early church condemned wholesale an active involvement in bloodshed. However, in light of evidence drawn from early Christian texts, most notably literature dealing with martyrdom, one finds that stance overly simplified. In fact, forms of early Christianity not only glorified war and violence in certain contexts but actively sought it out. This article enters into this conversation by applying a theory championed by Mark Juergensmeyer's Terror in the Mind of God. While this theory deals with modern examples of religious cultures of violence, his “stages of symbolic empowerment” apply surprisingly well to certain communities within the early orthodox church. The cosmic war complex that leads to nefarious figures such as the fanatic suicide bomber can be seen at work within the nascent matrix of the Church, which produced victims and warriors in the form of the voluntary martyrs.     

GLOBAL JUSTICE AFTER THE FALL Christian Realism and the "Law of Peoples"

In The Law of Peoples John Rawls casts his proposals as an argument against what he calls “political realism.” Here, I contend that a certain version of “Christian political realism” survives Rawls's polemic against political realism sans phrase and that Rawls overstates his case against political realism writ large. Specifically, I argue that Rawls's dismissal of “empirical political realism” is underdetermined by the evidence he marshals in support of the dismissal and that his rejection of “normative political realism” is in tension with his own normative concessions to political reality as expressed in The Law of Peoples. That is, I contend that Rawls, himself, needs some form of political realism to render persuasive the full range of normative claims constituting the argument of that work.     

Political Psychology as a Lens for Viewing Traumatic Events

A burgeoning area of scientific inquiry uses psychological perspectives to understand traumatic events. This research has led to the identification of psychological symptoms and disorders frequently experienced in response to traumatic events. Many of the events having traumatic effects on large numbers of persons are of interest to political psychologists. Such events include the Holocaust, war, terrorism, captivity, torture, political migration, living as a political refugee, and assassination. Some interpersonal forms of trauma, such as rape and incest, also may be viewed with a political perspective. Although a number of studies have examined psychological consequences of political events, this area of inquiry is rarely explicitly considered within the domain of political psychology. Adopting an explicitly political psychology perspective on traumatic events may enrich our interdisciplinary understanding of these events and inform the design and evaluation of intervention programs to reduce psychological distress resulting from these events.     

A Response to G. Scott Davis

This defense of my essay on Vitoria and Suárez argues that my use of the term “religious war” is based on religious authority at least as much as religious cause, and that Davis’s decision to discuss only Vitoria limits his ability to come to terms with my thesis. To Davis’s argument that for Vitoria war was justified against the Indians only as a necessity of simple justice and to protect the innocent, I argue that his disjunction between simple justice and religious cause is a false one that fails to come to term with the church’s primary reason for approaching Indians, with the Thomistic understanding of the relation between nature and grace and between reason and revelation, and with the distinction between what justice requires in relation to the church and Christians and what it requires for others. I explain finally that my claim is not that the Catholic political rulers readily responded to papal calls for war except when it was in their interest, but that papal war was central to the normative just‐war tradition of the church in canon law and among major theologians like Vitoria and Suárez.