味觉对判断与决策的影响及其机制

味觉作为人类生存必不可少的感觉之一, 早已超越“舌尖”的直接感受, 潜在地影响了个体对人际关系及伦理道德的知觉与判断, 改变着个体对冒险与消费等行为的决策。情绪中介假说、具身隐喻假说、进化假说以及社会建构假说从不同视角试图阐明味觉对判断与决策的影响机制。当前研究存在味觉感受存在个体差异、味觉测量难以保证效度、味觉实验缺乏统一研究范式等问题, 未来可继续进行味觉隐喻的验证并将其应用于感官营销、心理治疗等领域, 从生理、心理及社会等多个层面出发, 全方位探讨味觉对判断、决策的影响及其机制。     

直觉和分析在不同信息获取与呈现方式下对多特征目标判断质量的影响

采用多特征目标判断任务,考察了不同信息获取方式与信息呈现方式条件下,直觉和分析思维模式对判断质量的影响。结果发现：（1）在多特征目标判断任务中,直觉思维比分析思维更有效;（2）直觉型决策者运用直觉思维的判断质量比感觉型决策者更高;（3）归类组块的信息呈现方式能够有效提升决策者运用直觉思维的判断质量;（4）思维模式、信息获取方式与信息呈现方式对多特征目标的判断质量存在三阶交互作用,归类组块的信息呈现方式使直觉型决策者运用直觉思维的判断质量最高,而运用分析思维的判断质量低于感觉型决策者;归类组块排列信息时,直觉型决策者运用分析思维的判断质量低于信息随机排列时的水平。     

权力感对道德困境判断的影响：基于CNI模型的分析

采用道德困境判断的CNI（consequence, norm, inaction）模型,通过两个实验考察权力感对道德困境判断的影响。实验1探讨个人权力感对道德困境判断的影响,结果显示高个人权力感显著增加被试对规则的敏感,促使个体做出道义论的道德判断。实验2考察回忆任务启动的权力感对道德困境判断的影响,发现相对于低权力感启动的被试,高权力感启动的被试在进行判断时更关注行为的结果,对规则更不敏感,这说明启动的权力感促进功利主义的道德判断,抑制道义论的道德判断。结果表明,不同类型的权力感对道德困境判断的影响存在差异。     

Crossmodal temporal order and processing acuity in developmentally dyslexic young adults

We investigated crossmodal temporal performance in processing rapid sequential nonlinguistic events in developmentally dyslexic young adults (ages 20-36 years) and an age- and IQ-matched control group in audiotactile, visuotactile, and audiovisual combinations. Two methods were used for estimating 84% correct temporal acuity thresholds: temporal order judgment (TOJ) and temporal processing acuity (TPA). TPA requires phase difference detection: the judgment of simultaneity/nonsimultaneity of brief stimuli in two parallel, spatially separate triplets. The dyslexic readers' average temporal performance was somewhat poorer in all six comparisons; in audiovisual comparisons the group differences were not statistically significant, however. A principal component analysis indicated that temporal acuity and phonological awareness are related in dyslexic readers. The impairment of temporal input processing seems to be a general correlative feature of dyslexia in children and adults, but the overlap in performance between dyslexic and normal readers suggests that it is not a sufficient reason for developmental reading difficulties.     

How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.     

Sentence processing deficits in two Cantonese aphasic patients

This paper reports the performances of two Cantonese aphasics on tasks examining their sentence processing deficits. The data on sentence comprehension show that thematically noncanonical sentences, full passives, and subject-gap sentences present greater difficulty to these patients than canonical sentences, truncated passives, and object-gap sentences, respectively. These patterns are consistent with previous observations on Chinese aphasics and are expected given the structural differences between Chinese and English. In a Cantonese grammaticality judgment test, a set of structures are identified that can elicit clear judgments from normal subjects and aphasics, contrary to the claim that grammaticality judgments in Chinese are probabilistic and fragile. Most interestingly, the patients' overall performance patterns reveal a double dissociation between sentence comprehension and judgment of sentence well-formedness, suggesting that the two tasks are supported by independent processing mechanisms.     

Quantity judgments and individuation: evidence that mass nouns count

Three experiments explored the semantics of the mass-count distinction in young children and adults. In Experiments 1 and 2, the quantity judgments of participants provided evidence that some mass nouns refer to individuals, as such. Participants judged one large portion of stuff to be "more" than three tiny portions for substance-mass nouns (e.g. mustard, ketchup), but chose according to number for count nouns (e.g. shoes, candles) and object-mass nouns (e.g. furniture, jewelry). These results suggest that some mass nouns quantify over individuals, and that therefore reference to individuals does not distinguish count nouns from mass nouns. Thus, Experiments 1 and 2 failed to support the hypothesis that there exist one-to-one mappings between mass-count syntax and semantics for either adults or young children. In Experiment 3, it was found that for mass-count flexible terms (e.g. string, stone) participants based quantity judgments on number when the terms were used with count syntax, but on total amount of stuff when used with mass syntax. Apparently, the presence of discrete physical objects in a scene (e.g. stones) is not sufficient to permit quantity judgments based on number. It is proposed that object-mass nouns (e.g. furniture) can be used to refer to individuals due to lexically specified grammatical features that normally occur in count syntax. Also, we suggest that children learning language parse words that refer to individuals as count nouns unless given morpho-syntactic and referential evidence to the contrary, in which case object-mass nouns are acquired.     

The relationship between acute stress disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder in severely injured trauma survivors

This prospective longitudinal study was designed to investigate the relationship between acute stress disorder (ASD) and the subsequent development of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in a population of severely injured hospitalised trauma survivors. Symptoms of ASD were assessed just prior to discharge in 307 consecutive admissions to a Level 1 Trauma Centre, with PTSD assessments completed at 3 and 12 months post-injury. A well-established structured clinical interview was adopted for both assessments. Only 1% of the sample met criteria for an ASD diagnosis (at a mean of 8 days post-injury), while the incidence of PTSD was 9% at 3 months and 10% at 12 months. Although all ASD symptom clusters contributed to the prediction of subsequent PTSD severity, logistic regression indicated that only re-experiencing and arousal predicted a categorical PTSD diagnosis. The dissociative symptoms that form the core of ASD were rarely endorsed and showed high specificity but low sensitivity, resulting in a high proportion of false negative diagnoses. Reducing the number of dissociative symptoms required for a diagnosis ameliorated, but did not resolve, the problem. In this particular population, the low sensitivity of the ASD diagnosis renders it a poor screening test for use in identifying high risk individuals for early intervention and prevention strategies.     

The influence of hierarchy on probability judgment

Consider the task of predicting which soccer team will win the next World Cup. The bookmakers may judge Brazil to be the team most likely to win, but also judge it most likely that a European rather than a Latin American team will win. This is an example of a non-aligned hierarchy structure: the most probable event at the subordinate level (Brazil wins) appears to be inconsistent with the most probable event at the superordinate level (a European team wins). In this paper we exploit such structures to investigate how people make predictions based on uncertain hierarchical knowledge. We distinguish between aligned and non-aligned environments, and conjecture that people assume alignment. Participants were exposed to a non-aligned training set in which the most probable superordinate category predicted one outcome, whereas the most probable subordinate category predicted a different outcome. In the test phase participants allowed their initial probability judgments about category membership to shift their final ratings of the probability of the outcome, even though all judgments were made on the basis of the same statistical data. In effect people were primed to focus on the most likely path in an inference tree, and neglect alternative paths. These results highlight the importance of the level at which statistical data are represented, and suggest that when faced with hierarchical inference problems people adopt a simplifying heuristic that assumes alignment.     

Remarks on the identifiability of thurstonian paired comparison models under multiple judgment

It is well-known that the representations of the Thurstonian models for difference judgment data are not unique. It has been shown that equivalence classes can be formed to provide a more meaningful partition of the covariance structures of the Thurstonian ranking models. In this paper, we examine the equivalence relations between Thurstonian covariance structure models for paired comparison data obtained under multiple judgment and discuss their implications on the general identification constraints and methods to check for parameter identifiability in restricted models.The author is indebted to Ulf Böckenholt and Albert Maydeu-Olivares for their significant comments and suggestions which led to considerable improvement in this article.