Do Cognitive Interview Instructions Contribute to False Beliefs and Memories?

To examine whether exposing people to false events using instructions taken from the cognitive interview creates false beliefs and false memories, we conducted an experiment where participants took part in two sessions. First, they rated how confident they were that they had experienced certain childhood events and their memories of those events; they also rated how plausible they thought the events were. Second, 2 weeks later, participants were exposed to two of three false target events: one high, one moderate, and one low plausibility. For the first event, participants were instructed to either report everything or mentally reinstate the event context. For the second event, participants received both instructions. The third event was the control event about which participants received no instructions. Finally, participants rated their confidence and memories the second time. The results showed that the cognitive interview instructions had little to no effect on the development of false beliefs and false memories. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pictorial encoding effects and memory confusions in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm: Evidence for the activation of spontaneous imagery

The purpose of the experiments reported in this paper was to examine the possible role of spontaneous imagery and list-specific cues on pictorial encoding effects induced by the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task. After viewing pictures and words referring to thematically related materials, by way of a picture/word source-judgement task, participants were asked to remember the way in which these materials were presented. Participants reported “seeing” pictures of items that were presented as words, an effect predicted by the imaginal activation hypothesis in its suggestion that incidental images experienced during encoding will later be mistaken as memories for pictures. Whether participants made the same picture misattributions on related lures (or non-presented related items) depended on the way in which the lures’ respective thematic lists were experienced during encoding (Experiments 1 and 2), pointing to the effects of list-specific cues in picture/word judgements. These findings have intriguing implications for interpretations of picture-encoding effects induced by the DRM task. The findings also speak to the use of DRM false-memory rates when marshalling evidence against the use of imagery in applied settings.     

Does retrieval intentionality really matter? Similarities and differences between involuntary memories and directly and generatively retrieved voluntary memories

Theories of autobiographical memory distinguish between involuntary and voluntary retrieval as a consequence of conscious intention (i.e., wanting to remember). Another distinction can be made between direct and generative retrieval, which reflects the effort involved (i.e., trying to remember). However, it is unclear how intention and effort interacts. For example, involuntary memories and directly retrieved memories have been used interchangeably in the literature to refer to the same phenomenon of effortless, non‐strategic retrieval. More recent theoretical advances suggest that they are separate types of retrieval, one unintentional (involuntary), another intentional and effortless (direct voluntary retrieval), and a third intentional and effortful (generative voluntary retrieval). Whether this also entails differing phenomenological characteristics, such as vividness, rehearsal, or emotional valence, has not been previously investigated. In the current study, participants reported memories in an experimental paradigm designed to elicit voluntary and involuntary memories and rated them on a number of characteristics. If intention affects the retrieval process, then we should expect differences between the characteristics of involuntary and directly retrieved memories. The results imply that retrieval intention seems to differentiate how a memory appears in a person's mind. Furthermore, we argue that these differences in part could result from differences in encoding and consolidation.