The blaze of her splendors: Suggestions about revitalizing fallacy theory

Criticisms of fallacy theory have been lodged from many different directions. In this paper, I consider the classic criticism of incompleteness by DeMorgan, Finocchiaro's claim that fallacies probably exist only in the mind of the interpreter, McPeck's claim that fallacies are at best context-dependent and Paul's complaints about the teaching of fallacies. I seek not merely to defend fallacy theory against unfair criticisms but also to learn from the criticisms what can be done in order to make fallacy theory a viable theory of criticism. I argue that this will involve several changes: rethinking of the nature of fallacy; addressing some theoretical issues; and presenting fallacy theory in a more rigorous fashion. The paper concludes with reflections on how Quine's ontological advice about the resolution of ontological disputes might be applied to the issue of whether or not there are fallacies.     

Evaluating interobserver reliability of interval data

Previous recommendations to employ occurrence, nonoccurrence, and overall estimates of interobserver reliability for interval data are reviewed. A rationale for comparing obtained reliability to reliability that would result from a random-chance model is explained. Formulae and graphic functions are presented to allow for the determination of chance agreement for each of the three indices, given any obtained per cent of intervals in which a response is recorded to occur. All indices are interpretable throughout the range of possible obtained values for the per cent of intervals in which a response is recorded. The level of chance agreement simply changes with changing values. Statistical procedures that could be used to determine whether obtained reliability is significantly superior to chance reliability are reviewed. These procedures are rejected because they yield significance levels that are partly a function of sample sizes and because there are no general rules to govern acceptable significance levels depending on the sizes of samples employed.     

Intervention effects and relative variation as dimensions in experts' use of visual inference

Recent research indicates that when analyzing graphically presented single-subject data, subjects trained in visual inference appear to attend to large changes between phases regardless of relative variation and do not differentiate among common intervention effect patterns. In this follow-up study, experts in applied behavior analysis completed a free-sort task designed to assess the effects of these dimensions on their use of visual inference. The results indicate that they tended to differentiate among common intervention effect patterns but did not attend to relative variation in the data.     

A SIMPLIFIED TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS FOR EVALUATING TREATMENT INTERVENTIONS

Time-series analysis procedures for analyzing behavioral data are receiving increasing support. However, several authorities strongly recommend using at least 50–100 points per experimental phase. A complex mathematical model must then be empirically developed using computer programs to extract serial dependency from the data before the effects of treatment interventions can be evaluated. The present discussion provides a simple method of evaluating intervention effects that can be used with as few as 8 points per experimental phase. The calculations are easy enough to do by hand.     

Axiomatizations with Context Rules of Inference in Modal Logic

A certain type of inference rules in (multi-) modal logics, generalizing Gabbay's Irreflexivity rule, is introduced and some general completeness results about modal logics axiomatized with such rules are proved.     

“TRANSITIVE INFERENCE” IN MULTIPLE CONDITIONAL DISCRIMINATIONS

We used multiple conditional discriminations to study the inferential abilities of pigeons. Using a five-term stimulus series, pigeons were trained to respond differentially to four overlapping pairs of concurrently presented stimuli: A+B?, B+C?, C+D?, and D+E?, where plus and minus indicate the stimulus associated with reinforcement and extinction, respectively. Transitive inference in such situations has been defined as a preference for Stimulus B over Stimulus D in a transfer test. We measured this and other untrained preferences (A vs. C, A vs. D, B vs. E, etc.) during nonreinforced test trials. In three experiments using a novel, rapid training procedure (termed autorun), we attempted to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for transitive inference. We used two versions of autorun: response-based, in which the subject was repeatedly presented with the least well-discriminated stimulus pair; and time-based, in which the subject was repeatedly presented with the least-experienced stimulus pair. In Experiment 1, using response-based autorun, we showed that subjects learned the four stimulus pairs faster than, but at a level comparable to, a previous study on transitive inference in pigeons (Fersen, Wynne, Delius, & Staddon, 1991), but our animals failed to show transitive inference. Experiments 2 and 3 compared time- and response-based autorun. Discrimination performance was maintained, but transitive inference was observed only on the second exposure to the response-based procedure. These results show that inferential behavior in pigeons is not a reliable concomitant of good performance on a series of overlapping discriminations. The necessary and sufficient conditions for transitive inference in pigeons remain to be fully defined.     

The Logic Of Reliable And Efficient Inquiry

Journal of Philosophical Logic - This paper pursues a thorough-going instrumentalist, or means-ends, approach to the theory of inductive inference. I consider three epistemic aims: convergence to a...     

Rethinking the Fallacy of Hasty Generalization

This paper makes a case for a refined look at the so- called fallacy of hasty generalization by arguing that this expression is an umbrella term for two fallacies already distinguished by Aristotle. One is the fallacy of generalizing in an inappropriate way from a particular instance to a universal generalization containing a for all x quantification. The other is the secundum quid (in a certain respect) fallacy of moving to a conclusion that is supposed to be a universal generalization containing a for all x quantification while overlooking qualifications that have to be added to the more limited kind of generalization expressed in the premise. It is shown that these two fallacies relate to two different kinds of generalization.The classification of fallacious generalizations is based on a new theory of generalization that distinguishes three kinds of generalizations – the universal generalization of the for all x type, used in classical deductive logic, the inductive generalization, based on probability, and the presumptive generalization, which is defeasible, and allows for exceptions to a general rule. The resulting classification goes beyond a logic-oriented analysis by taking into account how a respondent may oppose a potentially fallacious generalizing move by falsifying it. Using a dialectical interpretation of premise-conclusion complexes, the paper outline a richer concept of generalizing argument moves embedded in a communicational reconstruction of the strategic uses of such moves in which two parties take part in an orderly dialectical exchange of viewpoints.     

On the Psychological Significance of the Euclidean Representation of Implicit Personality Theory

The overall purpose of the present study was to investigate the psychological significance of the Euclidean representation of implicit personality theory (IPT) by testing the predictive usefulness of this representation. Multidimensional scaling analyses of 18 subjects' estimates of assumed trait co-occurences (IPT) gave Euclidean trait-distance matrices which were used to predict the subjects' trait-to-trait inferences. The results showed that: (1) The Euclidean representations of subjects' IPTs can be used to predict ( p < 0.10) most subjects' (14 of 18) trait-to-trait inferences; (2) The similarity between the Euclidean representation of subjects' IPTs was positively correlated (r_s = 0.43, p < 0.001) with the similarity between subjects' trait-to-trait inferences. These results suggest that the Euclidean representation of IPT has some predictive value, and thus, may at least to some extent, be justified and considered as psychologically significant.     

Inference to the Best Explanation

The common role of research programs in science and religion is now widely accepted. The next step in the methodology debate is to specify more concretely the shared standards for adequate explanations. The article presents a detailed account of the method of inference to the best explanation and gives examples of how the method can structure the philosophical and theological interaction with science. The resulting approach dispenses with deductive and inductive proofs of religious propositions and limits itself to initially plausible hypotheses that are to be assessed according to their explanatory power. Only when a domain of data and a particular explanatory task have been specified can any serious claim be made that religious theories are equal or superior to their naturalistic alternatives.