Resisting Explanation

Although explanation is widely regarded as an important concept in the study of rational inquiry, it remains largely unexplored outside the philosophy of science. This, I believe, is not due to oversight as much as to institutional resistance. In analytic philosophy it is basic that epistemic rationality is a function of justification and that justification is a function of argument. Explanation, however, is not argument nor is belief justification its function. I argue here that the task of incorporating explanation into the theory of rational inquiry poses a serious challenge to our basic concept of epistemic rationality as well as the a priori method of inquiry that still lies at the heart of analytic philosophy. Specifically, it pushes us toward a much stronger form of naturalism than is generally thought necessary, one in which argument and explanation are recognized as distinct and equally fundamental cognitive processes whose dynamic relationship is one of the central issues in the theory of rationality.     

Fodor’s riddle of abduction

How can abductive reasoning be physical, feasible, and reliable? This is Fodor’s riddle of abduction, and its apparent intractability is the cause of Fodor’s recent pessimism regarding the prospects for cognitive science. I argue that this riddle can be solved if we augment the computational theory of mind to allow for non-computational mental processes, such as those posited by classical associationists and contemporary connectionists. The resulting hybrid theory appeals to computational mechanisms to explain the semantic coherence of inference and associative mechanisms to explain the efficient retrieval of relevant information from memory. The interaction of these mechanisms explains how abduction can be physical, feasible, and reliable.     

传递性推理的ERP研究

以抽象的内容作为实验材料,测定15名大学生在完成三种不同类型的传递性推理任务和基线任务(记忆判断任务)时的事件相关电位(ERP),探讨传递性推理过程的脑内时程动态变化。研究发现,三种推理任务所诱发的波形基本一致,而推理任务与基线任务之间的ERP波形存在明显的差异。这说明对于传递性推理,被试可能是根据视觉的空间表征对信息进行加工的,结果进一步支持了心理模型理论。     

The Role of Inference in Attribute Framing Effects

Previous research has shown that a speaker's choice between logically equivalent frames is influenced by reference point information, and that listeners draw accurate inferences based on the frame. Less clear, however, is whether these inferences play a causal role in generating attribute framing effects. Two experiments are reported, which suggest that frame‐dependent inferences are sufficient to generate attribute framing effects, and that blocking such inferences may block framing effects. Experiment 1 decomposed the typical framing design into two parts: One group of participants saw a target described in one of two attribute frames and reported their estimates (inferences) of the typical attribute value. These estimates were then given to a second group of yoked participants, who evaluated the target. Although this latter group was not exposed to different attribute frames, they nevertheless exhibited a “framing effect” as a result of receiving systematically different inferences. In contrast, Experiment 2 shows that experts—who are familiar with an attribute's distribution and are therefore less likely to draw strong frame‐based inferences—exhibit a diminished framing effect. Together, these findings underscore the role of inferences in the generation and attenuation of attribute framing effects. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

部分呈现条件下类别分类学习中的信息表征机制

先前研究者普遍认为, 类别推理学习条件下可以同时表征诊断性信息和非诊断性信息, 而类别分类学习条件下中只能表征诊断性信息, 不能表征非诊断性信息。而最近又有研究者发现部分呈现条件下的类别分类学习可以表征非诊断性信息。本研究通过两个实验系统比较了全部呈现和部分呈现条件下类别分类学习的结果, 进一步探讨了分类学习条件下信息的表征情况, 并进一步探讨了部分呈现条件下的分类学习能够表征非诊断性信息的原因。实验1发现全部呈现6个特征、缺失1个特征(即部分呈现5个特征)、缺失2个特征(即部分呈现4个特征)3种条件下都能表征诊断性信息, 但只有部分呈现条件下能表征非诊断性信息。实验2发现全部呈现7个特征、缺失2个特征(即部分呈现5个特征)、全部呈现5个特征3种条件下都能表征诊断性信息, 但只有部分呈现条件下能表征非诊断性信息。总的实验结果表明：全部呈现条件下的分类学习只能表征诊断性信息, 而部分呈现条件下的分类学习能够同时表征诊断性信息和非诊断性信息, 并且部分呈现条件下表征非诊断性信息的原因是被试进行了推理学习, 而非注意广度的变化。     

类别学习中的分类和推理

该文介绍了类别学习中的分类和推理两种任务,并从学习的条件、过程、结果和发展等方面的归纳了当前研究的最新进展。表明了类别的分类学习和推理学习有相同的形式,但学习的信息处理过程和学习的结果不同。分类学习关注类别间的区分性信息,更可能是样例学习结果;推理学习更为关注单个类别内部的共同性信息,更可能是原型学习结果。这方面的结论强化了基于解释的观点。     

传递性关系推理的简约模型——诠释传递性关系推理的新理论

Wynne的简约模型是基于动物的传递性关系推理研究所提出的理论模型。该模型假设：个体的传递性关系推理是通过运用刺激的强化值来表征顺序信息,并比较所呈现刺激之间强化值的差异来实现的。研究文献证实简约模型能够说明在人类和其它动物的传递性关系推理研究中所发现的大多数标准化效应,因此其被视为迄今解释传递性关系推理问题最经济的模型。但该模型将人类高级认知活动采用动物的机械学习方式来解释的还原论倾向是值得商榷的,它所探讨的传递性行为是否是“真传递性关系推理”也有待进一步验证。     

The amount of recent action-outcome coupling modulates the mechanisms of the intentional binding effect: A behavioral and ERP study

Our everyday interactions depend on the ability to maintain a feeling of control over our bodily actions, that is, the sense of agency. The intentional binding effect – a perceived temporal shortening between voluntary actions and sensory outcomes – has been shown to implicitly measure agency. We investigated the effect’s underlying mechanisms: prediction and retrospective inference. First, long-term and recent action-outcome coupling were compared. Second, brain activity was recorded to uncover the neural correlates of the two mechanisms. Our results show that the recent accumulation of action-outcome coupling, but not that of a long-term accumulation, is correlated with the binding effect of actions and accounts for both mechanisms. Temporal action binding was reflected in both the readiness potential and the auditory evoked potential. The results shed new light on our understanding of the influence that immediate context of an action has on its temporal binding and the neural substrate of human agency.