Cut Elimination inside a Deep Inference System for Classical Predicate Logic

Deep inference is a natural generalisation of the one-sided sequent calculus where rules are allowed to apply deeply inside formulas, much like rewrite rules in term rewriting. This freedom in applying inference rules allows to express logical systems that are difficult or impossible to express in the cut-free sequent calculus and it also allows for a more fine-grained analysis of derivations than the sequent calculus. However, the same freedom also makes it harder to carry out this analysis, in particular it is harder to design cut elimination procedures. In this paper we see a cut elimination procedure for a deep inference system for classical predicate logic. As a consequence we derive Herbrand's Theorem, which we express as a factorisation of derivations.     

A base logic for default reasoning

Based on a close study of benchmark examples in default reasoning, such as Nixon Diamond, Penguin Principle, etc., this paper provides an in depth analysis of the basic features of default reasoning. We formalize default inferences based on Modus Ponens for Default Implication, and mark the distinction between “local inferences” (to infer a conclusion from a subset of given premises) and “global inferences” (to infer a conclusion from the entire set of given premises). These conceptual analyses are captured by a formal semantics that is built upon the set-selection function technique. A minimal logic system M of default reasoning that accommodates Modus Ponens for Default Implication and suitable for local inferences is proposed, and its soundness is proved. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2003 (special issue) by Ye Feng     

Hume on the Problem of Other Minds

Hume is not often cited as a philosopher who posited a solution to the Problem of Other Minds. He instead seems to assume the belief in other minds in his moral philosophy without justification. However, Hume needs to explain how we experience and respond to others’ affections, and hence generate moral sentiments, given how central the latter are to his moral theory. Two recent interpretations of Hume’s solution to the Problem are the Wittgensteinian Interpretation, and the Simulation Theory Interpretation. Both focus on the concept of sympathy as a solution to the Problem, claiming that, for Hume, sympathy produces the belief in other minds. This paper critically examines these two interpretations and offers an alternative called ‘the Analogical Argument Interpretation’, which reconstructs Hume’s version of an analogical argument carried out not by our rational faculty of mind but by custom and imagination. On this interpretation, Hume does not think that sympathy generates the belief in other minds, but rather, sympathy presupposes that belief.     

情境线索对社会认知内容推断的影响

本研究考察了情境线索对社会目标不同内容维度之间的推断的影响。研究一发现,缺乏情境线索时,两个基本维度热情和能力之间呈一种正向推断。研究二发现,当情境线索明确指向高能力时,高热情描述会导致低能力推断,同时也引发了消极的行为倾向。研究三进一步考察了热情的两个子维度社交性和道德性之间的推断,结果发现描述社交性职业的社交性信息或者描述道德性职业的道德性信息时,对目标对象的整体评价和行为意愿都更为积极。本研究表明,情境的预期性线索为社会认知内容的推断提供了基本的认知框架,当信息呈现与情境预期相匹配时,更容易产生积极推断。     

Attention norms in Siegel’s The Rationality of Perception

Can we be responsible for our attention? Can attention be epistemically good or bad? Siegel tackles these under‐explored questions in “Selection Effects”, a pathbreaking chapter of The Rationality of Perception. In this chapter, Siegel develops one of the first philosophical accounts of attention norms. Her account is inferential: patterns of attention are often controlled by inferences and therefore subject to rational epistemic norms that govern any other form of inference. Although Siegel’s account is explanatorily powerful, it cannot capture a core attention norm in cognitive science: one should balance between exploratory and exploitative attention. For central cases of exploratory attention such as mind‐wandering, child‐like, and creative thinking are non‐inferential. Siegel’s view classifies them as “normative freebies” that are not subject to epistemic evaluation. We’re therefore left with a disjunctive conclusion: either Siegel’s inferentialist theory of attention norms is incomplete or cognitive scientists are wrong about the norms that govern attention.     

Spontaneous Trait Associations and the Case of the Superstitious Banana

We explored whether spontaneous trait transference (STT) occurs in cases where inanimate objects, rather than human bystanders, are presented in the context of trait-implicative behavior. The results provide a vivid demonstration of the associability of primed trait constructs by demonstrating STT to inanimate objects to which one does not normally attribute traits (e.g., superstitious being associated with a banana). This finding is consistent with the notion that the trait associations involved in STT are formed independent of person perception processes. The implications of this finding for the types of associative processes exposed by the popular savings in relearning methodology are discussed.     

因果变化模式与因果联结强度在幼儿因果推理中的作用

对93名幼儿进行了五种因果变化模式的因果推理题目的测试。结果表明:(1)在不同的因果变化模式下,被试进行因果推理的成绩存在差异,且在对于这五类题目的掌握上具有一定的顺序。(2)被试在同样因果变化模式题目的表现之间具有较高的相似性,而在因果联结强度相同的题目之间则具有显著的差异。(3)被试对于各题目回答的正确率并不随原因与结果联结次数的增多而提高。(4)即使是在观察到的刺激完全一致的情况下,被试的回答仍会因因果变化模式的差异及主试对于题目解释的不同而存在差别。     

刻板印象与内隐推理的实验研究

采用间接测量方法,探讨刻板印象与内隐推理效应。实验结果表明：91）刻板印象启动的内隐推理直接影响到不同句式的记忆;（2）内隐推理不受意识水平高低以及具体的记忆任务的影响。     

Premise-pair training for valid tests of serial list organization in macaques

This study evaluated the role of several different training procedures on (1) efficiency of acquisition and (2) organizational characteristics of memory for lists that could be serially ordered. Five macaque monkeys were trained via two-choice object discriminations in a formboard apparatus on several five-item-series tasks that provided different levels of intrasession conditionality. Although ease of acquisition differed for subsets of the constituent pairs, concurrent inclusion of the four premise pairs that defined a list required equivalent amounts of training on every task. All training procedures yielded similar retention-test performances and showed common organizational properties (on both error and latency measures) consistent with the view that lists were retained as internally represented ordered series. Test outcomes emphasized the need for integrated exposition of all concurrent conditional relationships to allow appropriate tests of serial organization. However, if given such training, the monkeys revealed integrated serial memory even though they had never seen many of the possible novel combinations of list items. In overview, their performances offered further definition of the procedures required for valid assessment of inferential properties in comparative cognition. Electronic Publication