两人问题解决中惯例的测量及其微观发生过程

惯例是一种群体的程序化行为，类似于思维定势，其实验测量最早源于 Cohen 与 Bacdayan (1994)发明的TTT扑克牌游戏。研究选取35对两人组被试，在问题解决的框架下采用微观发生法的思路重新设计实验任务，探讨了两人问题解决中惯例的表现，并在此基础上探讨了惯例从无到有的产生过程。结果表明：(1)修改后的40局TTT扑克牌游戏中存在明显的惯例现象，这可以从可靠性、速度、重复的行动序列、基于特定策略的行为模式和偶尔的次优性5个指标进行验证和描述。(2)惯例的产生是在行为掌握基础上，不断进行表征重述的结果。这一过程体现了惯例的产生是程序性知识转向陈述性知识、无意识转向有意识、稳定性与可变性的统一。     

Investor's Pessimistic and False Belief About Trustworthiness and Stake Size in Trust Decision1

Trust is a vital element of any society. Previous studies using trust games have provided insight into understandings of trusting behavior. However, investors' behaviors can be confounded by their risk preferences in the game, and little is known about the relationship between stake size and beliefs of others' good intentions underlying trust. We thus used a variant of the trust game and conducted two experiments to examine how stake size affects investors' beliefs about receivers' trustworthiness, with model-based analyses. We showed that, when holding all else equal, investors trusted more, but their expectations of reciprocation declined as stake size increased. However, actual receivers' reciprocation rates showed the opposite trend to investors' pessimistic beliefs. Furthermore, following previous studies in social psychology, we hypothesized that investors' social preferences (social value orientation) moderated the beliefs underlying trust, but they had no explanatory powers in investors' expectations of reciprocation. These results suggest that peoples' naive beliefs about stake size play a more important role in trust decisions than expected.