暴力视频游戏中不同攻击动机对玩家攻击性的影响

分别采用词汇按键反应任务和EAST范式测查了攻击性认知的流畅性和内隐攻击性评价,旨在考察游戏中攻击动机对攻击性的影响,结果发现：暴力视频游戏的影响效应不仅与暴力内容有关,还受制于攻击动机和玩家的暴力游戏经验;且长期玩暴力游戏会使被试对暴力产生脱敏,表现为攻击性认知的流畅性低,对攻击的评价更积极。本研究表明,暴力视频游戏对个体攻击性的影响需综合考虑多种因素。     

Do the right thing: but only if others do so

Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., systemic corruption, high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators' expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators' choices significantly predict a dictator's own choice. However, dictators' expectations regarding what other dictators think ought to be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions after controlling for empirical expectations. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for designing institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

成败等因素对小学生游戏中自我价值感的影响

本研究以三、四年级的142名小学生为被试,以自编的"背投沙包"游戏为载体,通过创设竞争与合作的四类小组以及控制成功与失败的结果,探讨其对个体自我价值感的影响。研究发现,个体的自我价值感受到个体成败而非群体成败的影响,其中人际关系起着部分中介作用。尤其是在失败的结果产生后,极端的高能力重视水平能够带来高自我价值感。而竞争与合作的小组安排对自我价值感的影响并不显著。     

Trust and trustworthiness in a sequential bargaining game

We use a two‐person extensive form bargaining game to explore individuals' trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the ‘self‐interested’ outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others' trust. But people with low‐trust scores often exhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These ‘inconsistent trusters’ seem to be interested in exploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Focusing failures in competitive environments: explaining decision errors in the Monty Hall game,the Acquiring a Company problem,and multiparty ultimatums

This paper offers a unifying conceptual explanation for failures in competitive decision making across three seemingly unrelated tasks: the Monty Hall game (Nalebuff, 1987), the Acquiring a Company problem (Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985), and multiparty ultimatums (Messick, Moore, & Bazerman, 1997). We argue that the failures observed in these three tasks have a common root. Specifically, due to a limited focus of attention, competitive decision makers fail properly to consider all of the information needed to solve the problem correctly. Using protocol analyses, we show that competitive decision makers tend to focus on their own goals, often to the exclusion of the decisions of the other parties, the rules of the game, and the interaction among the parties in light of these rules. In addition, we show that the failure to consider these effects explains common decision failures across all three games. Finally, we suggest that this systematic focusing error in competitive contexts can serve to explain and improve our understanding of many additional, seemingly disparate, competitive decision‐making failures. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Representation of Game Algebras

We prove that every abstractly defined game algebra can be represented as an algebra of consistent pairs of monotone outcome relations over a game board. As a corollary we obtain Goranko's result that van Benthem's conjectured axiomatization for equivalent game terms is indeed complete.     

Trust,risk, and the social contract

The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume’s meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.     

Exchanges of group-based favours: Ingroup bias in the prisoner's dilemma game with minimal groups in Japan and New Zealand

Japanese ( N  = 48) and New Zealander ( N  = 55) participants were first assigned to one of two minimal groups, and then played a prisoner's dilemma game twice with an ingroup member and twice with an outgroup member. In one of the two games they played with an ingroup (or outgroup) member, participants and their partner knew one another's group memberships (mutual-knowledge condition). In the unilateral-knowledge condition, only the participants knew the group membership of their partner, but the partner did not know the group membership of the participant. Ingroup bias in cooperation emerged only in the mutual-knowledge condition in both countries; in the unilateral-knowledge condition no ingroup bias emerged. Mediational analyses found that, in accord with predictions, cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition is mediated by expectation of the partner's cooperation. Ingroup bias in the mutual-knowledge condition emerged only among those who identified with the ingroup. Results provide support for a group heuristics account of ingroup favouritism in the minimal group. According to this account, participants who face minimal groups activate an ecologically adaptive heuristic of unilaterally cooperating with members of the same group, expecting indirect repayment from others in the same group.     

A generic and efficient emotion-driven approach toward personalized assessment and adaptation in serious games

Emotions have a major role in the player-game interaction. In serious games playing contexts, real-time assessment of the player’s emotional state is crucially important to enable an emotion-driven adaptation during gameplay. In addition, a personalized assessment and adaptation based on the player's characteristics remains a challenge for serious games designers. This paper presents a generic and efficient emotion-driven approach for personalized assessment and adaptation in serious games, in which two main methods and their algorithms are proposed. The first one is a method for assessing, in real time, the player's emotion taking into account the personality type and the playing style of the player. The second one is an emotion-driven personalized adaptation method based on Markov modeling of dependency between the serious game events and the change in the player's emotional state. Therefore, the proposed approach has been evaluated by playing an affective vs. non-affective version of a serious game that we have developed to illustrate the applicability of the above-mentioned methods. The overall results showed that owing to our approach, a serious game become able to enhance its adaptivity toward playing outcomes and improve its overall playability.