自恋人格调节信任博弈的结果评价

自恋人格个体表现出亲社会行为的减少和对他人的反馈敏感。信任是人类社会互动行为的基础,自恋人格特质可能影响他们的信任决策。为了探究自恋水平如何影响信任博弈中结果评价的大脑活动,本研究采用事件相关电位技术记录了38名被试完成单次信任博弈时的脑电波。行为结果发现相对高自恋者的信任选择率显著低于相对低自恋者的信任选择率。脑电结果表明,相对高自恋者信任损失反馈减互惠获利反馈所得的FRN差异波(d FRN)显著地大于相对低自恋者,并且相对高自恋者结果评价诱发的P300波幅显著地大于相对低自恋者。本研究提供了自恋人格个体信任博弈中结果评价的初步神经电生理学证据。     

Social Value Orientation Moderates the Effects of Intuition versus Reflection on Responses to Unfair Ultimatum Offers

We investigated whether social value orientation (SVO) moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective information processing on responses to unfair offers. We measured SVO one week prior to an ultimatum game experiment in which participants had to accept or reject a series of 10 ultimatum offers including very low (unfair) ones. Before making these decisions, participants mentally contrasted their individual goals with the obstacle of pondering at length or acting in a hasty way; then they made the plan to adopt an intuitive or a reflective mode of processing (intuitive and reflective condition, respectively), or made no such plans (control condition). Participants with rather high (prosocial) SVO scores were more likely to accept unfair offers in the reflective than the intuitive condition. This effect also evinced for a subset of selfish individuals; however, the majority with rather low (selfish) scores made similar decisions in both conditions. This pattern of results suggests that SVO moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective modes of processing on responses to low ultimatum offers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Game Logic is Strong Enough for Parity Games

We investigate the expressive power of Parikh's Game Logic interpreted in Kripke structures, and show that the syntactical alternation hierarchy of this logic is strict. This is done by encoding the winning condition for parity games of rank n. It follows that Game Logic is not captured by any finite level of the modal -calculus alternation hierarchy. Moreover, we can conclude that model checking for the -calculus is efficiently solvable iff this is possible for Game Logic     

Games in Clinical Genetic Counseling Supervision

Games are defined as ongoing series of complementary ulterior transactions that are superficially plausible but have a concealed motivation to maximize pay-offs and minimize penalties for the initiator. While some games are harmless and part of socialization, others are destructive. Destructive game-playing in clinical supervision, in which game-playing (initiated by either supervisors or students) interferes with a student's realization of internship goals, has been documented in some allied healthcare professions but has not yet been studied in genetic counseling. Genetic counselors and clinical supervisors of genetic counseling students were anonymously surveyed regarding their experiences with destructive game-playing. Results show that such games do occur in genetic counseling clinical supervision. Some games are the same or similar to ones previously described in other health-care professions; others may be unique to genetic counseling. The purpose of this paper is to document these games as a first step to facilitating dialogue, understanding and awareness of them.     

First Among Equals: Hybridization of Cognitive Diagnostic Assessment and Evidence-Centered Game Design

The objective of the present article is to explore differences and similarities between cognitive diagnostic assessment (CDA) and evidence-centered game design (ECgD) in the service of intentional hybridization. Although some testing specialists might argue that both are essentially the same given their origins in principled assessment design and equivalency of measurement models, this view misses differences in their focus and operationalization. Given the strengths of both CDA and ECgD, there is motivation to consider ways in which each can deliberately inform the other. The intentional hybridization of CDA and ECgD has, at least in principle, significant advantages to produce a stronger offspring than either parent alone. The article includes four sections: (1) conceptual differences between CDA and ECgD, (2) conceptual similarities between CDA and ECgD, (3) challenges with CDA and ECgD, including narrowness of cognitive models, fidelity with learning, ocean of data, sensitivity to diverse learners, reliance on multidimensional psychometric models, and how hybridization may help, and (4) implications for educational assessment in the twenty-first century around the globe.     

Exploring cooperation and competition in the Centipede game through verbal protocol analysis

The Centipede game is an abstract model of reciprocal relationships in which two individuals alternate in helping each other at relatively small personal cost. Whereas mutual cooperation can benefit both individuals in the long run, a paradoxical but logically compelling backward induction argument suggests that cooperation is irrational. Empirical studies have reported reliable deviations from the non‐cooperative backward induction solution, but their exclusively quantitative methods allow only a limited range of predefined motives to be explored. Our study uses verbal (‘think aloud’) protocols and qualitative data analysis to identify motives for cooperation in the Centipede game. The results provide little evidence for sophisticated backward induction reasoning. Instead, a wide range of motives emerged, their relative saliences varying according to the stage of the game. Activity bias affected decisions mainly at the beginning of the game, whereas cooperative and altruistic social value orientations most frequently accounted for cooperation towards its natural end.     

Cultural Adjustment and Social Justice Behaviour: The Role of Individual Differences in Multicultural Personality

The present study examined altruistic behaviour using broad personality traits (the Big Five) and the narrow personality trait of cultural adjustment (multicultural personality) while controlling for social justice attitudes and other demographic variables. Using an analogue version of a modified dictator game, 153 participants were required to divide a variable amount of money between themselves and a hypothetical recipient who was treated unfairly in a prior dictator game (based on results from a separate sample). We varied the race (Black and White) and gender (male and female) of the fictional recipient to present the individual as either advantaged or disadvantaged in society. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions with the recipient presented as (i) a White man, (ii) a White woman, or (iii) a Black man. A separate sample of 71 participants rated recipients as treated unfairly and as representing a marginalized group. Results showed that subscales of the Multicultural Personality Inventory predicted giving behaviour above and beyond the variance accounted for by broad personality traits and attitudes towards social justice. The discussion focuses on implications for research in social justice based on cultural adaptation and personality. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Cooperation in repeated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game experiments, 1992–2016

Cooperation is a fundamental form of social interaction, and turn-taking reciprocity one of its most familiar manifestations. The Centipede game provides a formal model of such alternating reciprocal cooperation, but a backward induction (BI) argument appears to prove logically that instrumentally rational players would never cooperate in this way. A systematic review of experimental research reveals that human decision makers cooperate frequently in this game, except under certain extreme conditions. Several game, situational, and individual difference variables have been investigated for their influence on cooperation. The most influential are aspects of the payoff function (especially the social gain from cooperation and the risk associated with a cooperative move), the number of players, repetitions of the game, group vs. individual decisions, and players’ social value orientations (SVOs). Our review of experimental evidence suggests that other-regarding preferences, including prosocial behavioural dispositions and collective rationality, provide the most powerful explanation for cooperation.