自恋人格调节信任博弈的结果评价

自恋人格个体表现出亲社会行为的减少和对他人的反馈敏感。信任是人类社会互动行为的基础,自恋人格特质可能影响他们的信任决策。为了探究自恋水平如何影响信任博弈中结果评价的大脑活动,本研究采用事件相关电位技术记录了38名被试完成单次信任博弈时的脑电波。行为结果发现相对高自恋者的信任选择率显著低于相对低自恋者的信任选择率。脑电结果表明,相对高自恋者信任损失反馈减互惠获利反馈所得的FRN差异波(d FRN)显著地大于相对低自恋者,并且相对高自恋者结果评价诱发的P300波幅显著地大于相对低自恋者。本研究提供了自恋人格个体信任博弈中结果评价的初步神经电生理学证据。     

Social Value Orientation Moderates the Effects of Intuition versus Reflection on Responses to Unfair Ultimatum Offers

We investigated whether social value orientation (SVO) moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective information processing on responses to unfair offers. We measured SVO one week prior to an ultimatum game experiment in which participants had to accept or reject a series of 10 ultimatum offers including very low (unfair) ones. Before making these decisions, participants mentally contrasted their individual goals with the obstacle of pondering at length or acting in a hasty way; then they made the plan to adopt an intuitive or a reflective mode of processing (intuitive and reflective condition, respectively), or made no such plans (control condition). Participants with rather high (prosocial) SVO scores were more likely to accept unfair offers in the reflective than the intuitive condition. This effect also evinced for a subset of selfish individuals; however, the majority with rather low (selfish) scores made similar decisions in both conditions. This pattern of results suggests that SVO moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective modes of processing on responses to low ultimatum offers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

个体证券投资者自我效能感对赌徒谬误的影响

赌徒谬误指当某一独立随机事件发生后,人们倾向认为这一结果再次出现的概率降低。如果一连串的随机事件呈现出一定的趋势,人们倾向于认为随机事件将呈现系统性反转。证券市场中的赌徒谬误指在股票上涨（下跌）序列中做出股价将要下跌（上涨）的判断。本研究探讨股票市场特征（趋势长度及方向）及投资者的人格特征（自我效能感）对赌徒谬误的影响。以83名股票投资者为对象,采用多层线性模型进行分析,结果发现：趋势长度主效应显著,短线情境下赌徒谬误频次更高;趋势方向主效应显著,下跌情境下赌徒谬误频次更高;二者交互作用显著,在短线下跌情境下,赌徒谬误频次更高;投资者的自我效能感对股票趋势长度具有调节作用,高自我效能的投资者在短线情境下更容易出现赌徒谬误。     

暴力视频游戏中不同攻击动机对玩家攻击性的影响

分别采用词汇按键反应任务和EAST范式测查了攻击性认知的流畅性和内隐攻击性评价,旨在考察游戏中攻击动机对攻击性的影响,结果发现：暴力视频游戏的影响效应不仅与暴力内容有关,还受制于攻击动机和玩家的暴力游戏经验;且长期玩暴力游戏会使被试对暴力产生脱敏,表现为攻击性认知的流畅性低,对攻击的评价更积极。本研究表明,暴力视频游戏对个体攻击性的影响需综合考虑多种因素。     

集体问题解决中的认知表征、行为惯例和动态能力

以王建安和张钢(2008)开发的三人TTT纸牌游戏(原游戏)及其变式(变式游戏)为实验任务, 研究了集体问解决中认知表征和行为惯例对提高动态能力的作用。共有240名被试, 分成80个三人小组, 参加了前后两场各20盘游戏。80个小组按照是否被告知游戏的问题表征(即有无认知表征), 以及是玩原游戏还是玩变式游戏, 均分成4个区组来玩第一场游戏。在第二场游戏中, 4个区组都玩变式游戏。以玩每盘游戏的平均步时和在问题表征中走过的路径为指标测量惯例, 以玩第一场原游戏习得的能力向玩第二场变式游戏的迁移率来衡量动态能力。结果发现：一方面, 适当的认知表征有助于提高集体问题解决的动态能力; 另一方面, 没有适当认知表征支持的行为惯例反而会阻碍动态能力的发展。概括地说, 动态能力的决定因素是认知表征而不是行为惯例。     

暴力游戏中射杀动作和血腥成分对玩家和观看者攻击倾向的影响

通过实验考察游戏中的射杀动作成分和血腥成分对玩家和观看者攻击性行为和攻击性认知的影响。被试为72名男性大学生, 选用第三人称45度角的射击类游戏, 将游戏中的射杀动作成分和血腥成分进行分离, 采用竞争反应时任务范式考察攻击性行为, 采用EAST内隐认知范式考察内隐攻击性认知, 结果表明: (1) 玩家比观看者表现出更强的攻击性, 玩家表现出的攻击性行为和攻击性认知均显著强于观看者; (2) 视频游戏中的射杀动作成分导致观看者有更高的游戏卷入, 血腥成分对被试的攻击性影响强于射杀动作成分, 并使被试倾向于将攻击性进行他人归因。     

Do the right thing: but only if others do so

Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., systemic corruption, high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators' expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators' choices significantly predict a dictator's own choice. However, dictators' expectations regarding what other dictators think ought to be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions after controlling for empirical expectations. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for designing institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

成败等因素对小学生游戏中自我价值感的影响

本研究以三、四年级的142名小学生为被试,以自编的"背投沙包"游戏为载体,通过创设竞争与合作的四类小组以及控制成功与失败的结果,探讨其对个体自我价值感的影响。研究发现,个体的自我价值感受到个体成败而非群体成败的影响,其中人际关系起着部分中介作用。尤其是在失败的结果产生后,极端的高能力重视水平能够带来高自我价值感。而竞争与合作的小组安排对自我价值感的影响并不显著。     

Trust and trustworthiness in a sequential bargaining game

We use a two‐person extensive form bargaining game to explore individuals' trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the ‘self‐interested’ outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others' trust. But people with low‐trust scores often exhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These ‘inconsistent trusters’ seem to be interested in exploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Focusing failures in competitive environments: explaining decision errors in the Monty Hall game,the Acquiring a Company problem,and multiparty ultimatums

This paper offers a unifying conceptual explanation for failures in competitive decision making across three seemingly unrelated tasks: the Monty Hall game (Nalebuff, 1987), the Acquiring a Company problem (Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985), and multiparty ultimatums (Messick, Moore, & Bazerman, 1997). We argue that the failures observed in these three tasks have a common root. Specifically, due to a limited focus of attention, competitive decision makers fail properly to consider all of the information needed to solve the problem correctly. Using protocol analyses, we show that competitive decision makers tend to focus on their own goals, often to the exclusion of the decisions of the other parties, the rules of the game, and the interaction among the parties in light of these rules. In addition, we show that the failure to consider these effects explains common decision failures across all three games. Finally, we suggest that this systematic focusing error in competitive contexts can serve to explain and improve our understanding of many additional, seemingly disparate, competitive decision‐making failures. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.